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Introduction

The scope and nature of German occupation in the east far surpassed any
west of the Rhine. In terms of both geographical size and population, the east
outstripped any other occupied territory. The military presence exceeded three
million, the bureaucracy supported some 30,000 administrators and
functionaries, and the occupied populations topped fifty-five million at its
maximum in 1942.1 Yet, even the extraordinary scope of the occupation paled in
comparison to its nature. Beginning in June 1941, all historical precedents of a
traditional occupation were rejected in favour of what one historian dubbed "Nazi
Colonial Dreams," the racial and political restructuring of the east.2 The captured
territories, already battered by the racially underpinned war of annihilation,
experienced numerous efforts undertaken by the German occupiers at racial,
political and economic reorganization. In short, in the east Nazi policies were
most fully undertaken.3 Intention and feasibility converged like in no other area
under the Nazi rule in the Occupied Eastern Territories (OET).
Already in the wake of rapid German advances into the Soviet Union,
Hitler ordered on 20 August 1941 the transfer of conquered areas from military to
1

Rolf-Dieter Muller and Gerd R. Oberschar, Hitler's War in the East, 1941-1945:
A Critical Assessment (New York: Berghahn Books, 1997), 283.
2
Wendy Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams: German Policies in Ukrainian Society in
Zhytomyr, 1941-1944" PhD thesis American University, 1999. Such a rejection
also implied that the occupation differed fundamentally from the traditional
German Drang nach Osten. Also see Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire-Building and
the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
3
Jonathan Steinberg, "The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration
in the Occupied Soviet Union, 1941-1944," English Historical Review. 1995; ex:
624.
1

civil administration. Previously, among numerous directives, Hitler determined
that a multitude of agencies would operate in the east, foremost Gbring's Four
Year Plan, Alfred Rosenberg's Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories or Ostministerium (OMi), Himmler's SS-police complex and Sauckel's
General Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labour {Generalbevollmachtigter
fur den Arbeitseinsatz). Consequently, from the outset the Occupied Eastern
Territories assumed a chaotic, polycratic character as rival organizations waged
a "Hobbesian war of all against all" to implement their own competing policies in
accordance with what they perceived to be Hitler's vision.4 In this Darwinian
struggle, historians have traditionally asserted that the civil administration fared
badly.5
The captured territories were broken up into Reichskommissariat Ukraine
(RKU) and Reichskommissariat Ostland (RKO). These territories were then
further sub-divided into regional Generalkommissariate and finally, into
Gebietskommissariate or sub-regional administrative areas.6 The civil
administration of these areas was organized as a vast bureaucracy populated by
administrative commissars, agricultural officials, statisticians and specialists
expected to implement broad Nazi policies with a minimum of centralized

4

Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected," 624.
Ibid, 626, 632.
6
Ibid, 634-35. The actual organization of the OET differed substantially from
what was initially planned due to wartime complications. Further in
WeiBruthenien, a Hauptgebiet, a coordinating administrative level between
Generalbezirke and Kreisgebiete existed. Additionally, larger cities were
administered by a Stadtkommissar, in many ways an urban Gebietskommissar.
5

2

supervision.7 At the head of the civil administration in the Gebietskommissariate
sat the Gebietskommissare (District Commissars). In theory, as Rosenberg
stated, "the weight of the entire administration" rested on the local administration
of the various sub-regions (Gebiete).8 Yet despite their centrality, little research
has been conducted on the composition of the new colonial elite apart from the
upper echelons.
The objective of this study is to investigate the nature of the Nazi civil
administration at the local level in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union
between 1941 and 1944, concentrating specifically on determining the identity of
the Gebietskommissars and their role in implementing German rule with respect
to: (a) population and Jewish policy; (b.) genocide; and (c) taxation, food
economics and labour policy.
Certainly, past scholarship has recognized the importance of the civil
administration in understanding both German occupation policy and the nature of
the Nazi state. Recent articles by Jonathan Steinberg and Bernhard Chiari both
maintain that the occupied east provides "laboratory conditions for understanding
the essential features of the Nazi state."9 Furthermore, current scholarship has
engendered a shift in focus from the centre outwards to the periphery which,
when applied to the case of the civil administration, raises important new
7

Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams," 2-3. Just how vast the original intentions were
is evidenced by the theoretical organisation plan of the OMi listing every area
they hoped to control and who they intended to have in charge. BA R43/685,
3737-48, Braune Mappe. Hereafter cited as Braune Mappe.
8
Quoted in Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams," 3.
9
Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected," 621, fn. 2. Bernard Chiari, "Deutsche
Zivilverwaltung in WeiBruBland, 1941-1944: Die lokale Perspecktive der
Besatzungsgeschichte,"Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, iii, 1993, 75-6.
3

questions. The previously dominant "history from above" approach has been
modified by studies dealing with "everyday life" and administrative activity at the
lower levels of the regional commissariats.10 Such work is highly relevant to the
understanding of the Third Reich, the mind frame of its officials and their function
in the ruthless exploitation and genocidal policy perpetrated in the east.
"Periphery studies" have yet to provide a broad, comprehensive
reconstruction of the organisation and function of the civil administration at the
local level.11 Rather, recent research such as Christian Gerlach's study of mass
murder, Martin Dean's account of the police complex, and Wendy Lower's case
study of Generalbezirk Zhytomyr have all focussed on theoretical organisational
models and particular aspects and actions of the local administration.12
Consequently, space remains for this effort to bring the pieces of the puzzle
together, to provide a thorough detailing of the organisational arrangement of the
Gebietskommissariate broad enough to be generally representative yet specific

See Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams,"3. Also see Karel Berkhoff, Harvest of
Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 35-58.
11
Such limitations have also been noted in Christopher Browning, "German
Killers: Orders from Above, Initiative from Below and the Scope of Local
Autonomy: The Case of Brest-Litovsk," in Christopher Browning, Nazi Policy,
Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge;New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 116-43.
12
Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und
Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: Hamburger
Edition, 1999); Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local
Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44 (Basingstoke : Macmillan in
association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum;New York : St.
Martin's Press, 2000); Bogdan Musial, Deutsche Zivilverwaltung und
Judenverfolgung im Generalgouvernement: eine Fallstudie zum Distrikt Lublin,
1939-1944 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999) and Lower, Nazi Empire-Building.
4

enough to appreciate the inevitable gap between theoretical organisation and
practical implementation.
Historians have detailed the organisational structure and theoretical tasks of
the OMi based primarily on Alfred Rosenberg's vision of the civil administration
outlined in his brief, Braune Mapped3 Again, responsibilities, questions of
jurisdiction and authority have been addressed in terms of official, theoretical
chains of command and with emphasis on the various special arrangements
made between the OMi and other agencies. More often than not, such
arrangements are perceived solely as detrimental to the civil authorities' power
and influence and little consideration is given to how such arrangements were
comprehensively enacted locally.
Within the historiography, the translation of these tasks to practice below the
Generalbezirk is largely unaddressed. Further, analysis of the activities,
influence and involvement of the "numerous other agencies" has not filtered
down the power-pyramid to the Gebiet level.14 In general, only in passing or in
reference to specific relationships, such as the police, is the jurisdiction and
authority of the Gebietskommissariate addressed at all. Again, the theoretical
and institutional focus of past research is obvious.

13

Braune Mappe, 3693-3736. Also see GARF, 7021-148-4 and Alexander
Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies
(London: Macmillan, 1981), 53-8, 93. Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on
Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945 (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1960), 137-43.
14
See Dallin, German Rule, 99. Also see Ibid, 80-103. A notable exception in
this regard were tasks involving the SS-police complex.

5

Similar to questions of tasks and authority, the relationships between
various agencies at the local level had been largely overlooked. While important
research has addressed the civil administration-police relationship, association
and interaction with other agencies as diverse as Army Security commands,
Army Economics Command, War Administrative Agencies, the Forest
administration, the Railway Ministry, Zentralen Handelsgesellschaft Ost (ZHG)
and Organization Todt have received virtually no attention.15
Certainly, both character sketches and comprehensive studies of the Nazi
elite prove legion. However, such scholarship is not paralleled at the Gebiet
level.16 Further, even a comprehensive cataloguing of Gebietskommissars and
their staffs is absent in the secondary literature. While a close reading of this
material can often produce individual names and, at best, some broad indication
of their position and activities, the Gebietskommissars remain merely bit players
and are denied systematic or detailed analysis.17 For instance, only vague

15

For an examination of the police-civil administration relationship see Erich
Haberer, "The German Police and Genocide in Belorussia, 1941-1944," Journal
of Genocide Research, 1-3 (2001): 13-29, 207-18, 391-403; Gerlach, Kalkulierte
Morde, 180-96; Dean, Collaboration. For mention of agriculture leaders and
foresters see Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected"; Bernard Chiari, Alltag hinter der
Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weissrussland 1941-1944
(Dusseldorf: Droste, 1998), 64-5; Michael Imort, "Forestopia: The Use of Forest
Landscape in Naturalizing National Socialist Ideologies of Volk, Race
Lebensraum, 1918-1945" (PhD. Dissertation, Queen's University, Kingston,
2000), 449-60 and Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 169.
16
The unsatisfactory nature of research on the civil administration is candidly
noted in Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 170.
17
For representative examples see Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected,"620-51,
Dallin, German Rule, 101-103, Reitlinger, The House, 128-59, Chiari, "Deutsche
Zivilverwaltung ," 75-6; Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front, 51-95; Haberer, "German
Police,"391-403; Dean, Collaboration, 60-77, 105-18; Timothy Mulligan, Politics
6

references are made to the selection and training of the Gebietskommissars in
terms of party affiliation.
The perceptions, activities and actions of the Gebietskommissars have
been most fully investigated in terms of their complicity in genocide and
exploitation and maltreatment of the indigenous populations. Yet here too
scholars have largely ignored the vast bulk of administrative functionaries that
oversaw the day to day operations of the OET. The picture that does emerge
from the scanty research portrays an administration staffed by an ill-prepared,
corrupt, immoral and sadistic collection of Nazi thugs. Thus we are presented a
composite sketch of the civil administrator as Ostnieten, a rabble of:
job-seekers, unemployed party hacks, disgruntled
Gauleiter looking for empires to build, bored city and
county officials who saw themselves strutting a grander
stage than domestic administration offered, aging
Altkampfer.. .who seized their chance to act out their
sadistic urges.18

Lower is somewhat more discriminating in her appraisal of the
administrators in the RKU. Required to ensure "that 60% of his staff be Nazi
party members," Generalkommissar Kurt Klemm turned to members of the
Ordensjunker, SA officials and others "with some Party affiliation."19 Further,

of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policies in the Soviet Union, 1942-43
(New York : Praeger, 1988), 21-31 and Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 56-79.
18
Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected,"621. This trend in the historiography is
noted also by Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 171.
19
Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams," 6-7. The contention that the civil
administration turned to Ordensjunker is mirrored in Chiari, Alltag, 82-3.
Additionally, Raul Hilberg noted: "...most of the high officials in the Rosenberg
apparatus were party men." See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European
Jews: Volume One (New York: Holmes & Meier), 1985, 345-67, fn 14.
7

Lower asserts that commissars were not a "tightly-knit organization controlled by
a group of Nazi fanatics."20 Such a conclusion suggests that possibilities to
maintain local autonomy and act outside prescribed patterns existed. Overall,
these "Golden Pheasants", as they were referred to by military personnel,
indiscriminately plundered the local population and displayed a keen taste for
vodka, women and public executions.21 In short, the civil administration was
supposedly composed of "blockheads and ass-lickers,""drunk on power."22 While
such conclusions prove an interesting narrative, little headway has been made in
de-coding behaviour in an effort to understand efficiency, effectiveness and
motivation. Questions remain such as: is behaviour a reflection of training?
Does efficiency, effectiveness and behaviour change over time? Is it dependent
on location? Are current characterizations universal or even valid? Are there
exceptions to this characterization, if they indeed exist? What was the place of
ideology in both the mindset and behaviour of civil administrators?
Given the absence of any comprehensive or even broad study of the
Gebietskommissars further research is necessary to firm up and empirically test
current, not to say provisional, conclusions and characterisations. Further, while
how Gebietskommissars functioned and behaved has received some attention,

^ Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams," 11.
21
"Golden Pheasant" (Goldfasanen) was a derogatory term to describe the civil
administration. The phrase itself referred to the yellow-brown uniform.
According to Fritz Hillenbrand, it was also used to describe long time Nazis "who
were given important positions in the Party or one of its organisations." Fritz
Hillenbrand, Underground Humour in Nazi Germany: 1933-1945, Routledge:
London, 1995, 51.
22
Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected," 621, 636. For a fuller examination of the
conduct of the Goldfasanen see Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams," 11 -20.
8

why they acted in such ways remains almost entirely neglected. Certainly, of
late, much headway has been made in understanding the personal motivations of
other Germans in the east, yet little attention has been paid to the Golden
Pheasants.23 Equally surprising is the lack of mono-causal explanations among
the motivations that are suggested. While anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism
cannot be discounted as motives, rarely do historians consider them primary.24
However, by extrapolating motive from behaviour, perhaps some historians have
swung too far in the other direction, seeing motivations as entirely self-serving,
base and immoral. Steinberg, for example, presents the civil administration as
composed of "cranks" and sociopaths.25 If colonizers and social planners went
east to realize their various visions, Steinberg asserts that the realities of
occupation quickly subordinated their unrealistic ideas to more diabolical ones of
plunder and sadism.26
Lower too details the various cruelties and crimes of the civil
administration in RKU. While not claiming universality, her analysis portrays the
Gebietskommissars in Zhytomyr as swaggering petty tyrants indifferent to the
For two representative examples see Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men:
Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York:
Harper-Collins, 1992) and Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War
in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
24
For the suggestion of anti-Bolshevism as a motivation see Chiari, "Deutsche
Zivilverwaltung," 82-3.
25
This characterization certainly owes much to Strauch's July 1943 letter to
Chief of Guerrilla Combat Units SS-Obergruppenfuhrer and General of the Police
von dem Bach. In this "report" primarily regarding his disdain for Wilhelm Kube,
he accuses two local civil administrators (Stadtkommissar Janetzke and
Gebietskommissar Hachmann) of gross incompetence. Reprinted in
Willi Dressen,Ernst Klee, Volker Riess, "The Good Old Days": The Holocaust as
seen by its Perpetrators and Bystanders (New York: Free Press, 1991), 183-94.
26
See Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected," 629, 636.
9

needs and conditions of their charges. However, despite such behaviour, among
some officials a degree of professional pride and belief in an eastern mission
existed. Certainly corruption, the black market and looting were hallmarks of the
occupation. Yet a number of senior officials took great pains to ensure that
plunder found its way into the Reich's coffers. Ultimately however, Lower tends
to agree with General Commissar Leyser's assessment: "district
commissars...were disgracing the German uniform, and some had to be sent
back to Germany."27 Finally, Lower asserts that that Abenteuerlust, lust for
adventure, motivated the actions of some commissars.28
While focussed primarily on the police and motives behind participation in
shooting operations, Haberer does provide some insights applicable to the civil
administration as a whole. To understand motives beyond personal greed,
Haberer asks why the civil administration at times acted outside their prerogative,
particularly in the implementation of genocide. First, many accepted the
extermination policy "as a mission of their own."29 Second, this overarching
motivation could be combined with a variety of others such as ideological
commitment, however "difficult to assess" and careerism. Further, Haberer notes
that in the context of a particular environment normal moral judgements were
malleable and "hierarchies of authority" magnified.30 Such factors may be as
applicable to the Gebietskommissars as it is to their police subordinates.

See Lower, "Nazi Colonial Dreams," 19. Unfortunately, precisely which
Gebietskommissars and why they were sent back to Germany is not discussed.
28
Ibid, 42.
29
Haberer, "German Police," 396-7.
30
Ibid, 398.
10

By looking to other disciplines, particularly social psychology, historians
have much to gain in terms of understanding motivation. When addressing
perpetrators of genocide and explaining "extraordinary human evil," the research
of James Waller proves particularly insightful. Of importance to Waller's study is
the necessity of providing a "psychological explanation of how people come to
commit extraordinary evil."31 In short, Waller rejects traditional claims of the
extraordinary origins of extraordinary evil in favour of an explanation focussing on
a combination of evolutionary, individual, social and situational factors.32
Ultimately, Waller's model is most useful in that it can help address the question
of why the Gebietskommissars themselves acted and how they came to commit
their heinous crimes. Such insights promise not only to further illuminate a
community of perpetrators previously relegated to the historical shadows but
also, more broadly, to provide new insights into the process and nature of Nazi
genocidal activities in the east.
The nature of the policies that the civil administration was expected to
carry out is highly contested within the current historiography. Particularly
cantankerous is the debate over the variable weights given to economic and
ideological determinants of genocide. Christoph Dieckmann and Christian

James Waller, "Perpetrators of Genocide: An Explanatory Model of
Extraordinary Human Evil,'1'Journal of Hate Studies, 1,1, 2001, 7. A fuller
analysis was presented in James Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People
Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
32
Perhaps most poignant for scholars of Nazi genocide is Waller's articulate
rejection of the primacy of "the influence of an extraordinary ideology" as a monocausal explanation of extraordinary evil. Here Waller adds his voice, from the
perspective of a psychologist, to the overwhelming evidence against the
feasibility of the "Goldhagen Thesis." See Waller, "Perpetrators," 10-11.
11

Gerlach both contend that pressures from the centre based on the primacy of
food economics proved cardinal factors in both genocide and the civil
administration's role in it.
Dieckmann maintains that in August 1941, the German civil administration
in occupied Lithuania transformed their selective genocide of Jewish men and
Communists to encompass "very nearly the entire Jewish population- men,
women, children -in the rural areas."33 A lethal combination of food shortage and
growing security concerns legitimized this radicalization of anti-Jewish policy in
the eyes of the perpetrators. While ideology engendered a genocidal frame of
mind, these twin concerns "made the decisive changes and transitions
possible."34
Interestingly, Dieckmann suggests that an unexpected reversal in the war
occurred as early as late summer 1941. Having failed to defeat the Soviet
regime in the first six weeks of war, supplies and security became increasingly
important and intertwined concerns. Given that the priority for supplies lay with
the Wehrmacht, the civilian authorities faced the alarming prospect of too little
food and too many mouths.35 Pressured by increased demands from the Reich
that adequate food supplies were ensured, the regional occupation authorities
sought to "reduce the cost of supplying provisions at the cost of the Jewish
33

Christoph Dieckmann, "The War and the Killing of the Lithuanian Jews," in
UI rich Herbert (ed.), National Socialist Extermination Policies : Contemporary
German Perspectives and Controversies (Mew York : Berghahn Books, 2000),
241, 250. This decision proves all the more striking as, according to Dieckmann,
"no order had been given for the total annihilation of the Lithuanian Jews by the
beginning of the war in June 1941."
34
Ibid, 266.
35
Ibid, 258.
12

population.

The most superfluous mouths, Jews, faced elimination.

When

combined with the impracticality of resettlement, the civil administration turned to
outright murder as a "definitive solution" to both the Jewish and provisions
problem. For Dieckmann, massive pressure on the regional administration from
Berlin forced radical action more functional than intentional. Yet their solution,
mass murder, was unthinkable without authorization at the highest levels in
Berlin.38 To accept Dieckmann's argument is also to accept that the civil
administration in Lithuania in 1941 was far from incompetent or lacking in vision
and purposefulness. Rather, Lohse and company proved highly effective, if
homicidal, problem-solvers.39
In his examination of Byelorussia, Christian Gerlach too sees the civil
administration as capable of adapting to the rapidly evolving and radicalizing antiJewish policy.40 Again, akin to Dieckmann, Gerlach perceives that food
economics and scarcity set the tempo of extermination policy and was the axis
upon which it developed.41 In this analysis, the primary goal of the Byelorussian
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occupation was the extraction of food surplus, de-industrialization and deurbanization.42 Beginning in autumn 1941, vague Utopian plans (a starvation
policy) were transformed into an "implemental program of mass murder" as the
civil officials sought practical methods to sidestep the potential problems
presented by attempting the wholesale starvation of the Jewish population.43 In
close cooperation with the Security Police and the SD, the civil administration
turned to shootings and gas vans to escape an economically generated cul-de44

sac.
Gerlach's challenging thesis offers three essential conclusions for
understanding the role, activities and place of the civil administration in
Byelorussia. First, the primacy of an economic determinant casts doubt on the
absolute centrality of ideology in Nazi extermination policy. Rational, if
repugnant, calculation replaces irrational anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism as
the sole basis of mass murder. While these factors were certainly "preconditions
for these murders," economic necessity was the dynamic agent that fuelled the
machinery of destruction.45 Second, while pressures from Berlin certainly
affected the decision-making process at the regional and local levels, Gerlach
interprets the civil officials as central interpreters and innovators of policy: "they
vast majority of Soviet Jews...above all by starvation, supported by brutal
occupation policies." See Gerlach, "German Economic Interests," 215-16, 222.
42
Ibid, 217. As Gerlach notes, Belorussia prove unique due to the marginal
nature of its industry. This reality also negatively impacted the chances of
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were one of the driving forces behind the destruction of the Jews.

As

extermination became increasingly an institutionalized part of occupation policy,
the civil administration proved a dominant feature to the point where "the massive
liquidation campaigns took place only when they accorded with the combined
interests of the administrative authorities."47 Third, Gerlach is correct in his
assertion that, practically speaking, no single order to kill all Jews was
necessary. Rather: "Mass murder always required supplementary local or
regional planning, and it required interest, consensus, and initiative to ensure that
the far-reaching destruction became reality."48 Thus, research suggests that in
the transformation from idea to reality, civil administrators and functionaries stood
perilously close to the centre of the whirlwind.
For both Dieckmann and Gerlach ideology appears resigned to context, a
part of the overall environment in which the occupiers operated but not central to
the origins, nature or scope of their activities themselves. Christopher Browning
has argued that such conclusions are the result of the regional and local focus of
much of the current literature and wholly undervalue the importance of ideology
as a determinant of genocide. For Browning, the Nazi regime held ideological
"policies in principle" that were predicated on a racist worldview. By 1942, these
46
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principles had radicalized to a point where ideological considerations assumed
primacy over all others.49 Once these policies in principle included the
"implementation of the Final Solution,"economically grounded arguments...were
totally in vain."50
Using a case study of Brest-Litovsk where local authorities attempted to
"drag their feet" in an effort to exempt Jewish labour from shootings, Browning
argued for the pre-eminence of these ideological policies (that is, Berlin's
dominance in the decision-making process). While directives from Berlin were
initially open enough to be interpreted differently by local authorities and
instituted in ways that "best suited their purposes," definitive limitations existed.51
When resolve hardened among the top Nazi leadership that a final solution to the
Jewish Question be undertaken, any contrary initiatives "were crushed with
draconic severity."52 In Brest, the civilian authorities would be simply brushed
aside and the ideologically motivated directives from Berlin carried out.
Regardless of how the administrators perceived the orders from centre, in the
end they were realized "with terrible and total compliance."53
While historians have begun asking questions about the role of the district
commissar and the nature of his authority and relationship with other agencies in
the context of studying genocide in the east, little research has been forthcoming
49
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on precisely the men who implemented Nazi policy on the ground. At this level,
economic and ideological determinants are intimately tied to the debate
surrounding the issue of local initiative and leverage in the decision-making
process. Further, such considerations also suggest significant differences
among historians concerning cooperation and coordination amongst competing
agencies at the regional and local levels. As noted, Browning allows for some
measure of local autonomy in interpreting directives. However, a definitive line
existed demarcating acceptable from unacceptable deviation or translation of
policy. In the case of retaining Jewish labour in Brest, "sharp criticism of
occupation policy" was even permissible.54 While the exercise of local autonomy
that conflicted with the "long term goals and policies of the regime [were]
temporarily tolerated," when confronted with nonnegotiable ideologically
motivated "policies in principle," regional and local authorities quickly fell into
line.55 Any subsequent deviation could result in dismissal, as in the case of
Klemm or execution as was the fate of Kovel Gebietskommissar Arwed Kempf.56
For Browning, the question of local autonomy is largely moot. Rather the focus
of investigation should more accurately be placed on the dynamic interaction
between local and central authorities rather than local initiatives.
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Steinberg is even less certain of the civil administration's autonomy and
position in either the development or implementation of policy.57 From top to
bottom, the civil administration was largely ineffective in this respect. Only the
Reichskommissar of Ukraine Erich Koch, who "simply refused to obey any of
Rosenberg's orders," exercised any real autonomy at all. For the rest of the civil
administration, staffed with supposed misbehaving incompetents at the regional
and local levels, any real power or autonomy proved negligible. Rather the
dynamic SS-police complex increasingly ruled the east and the civil authorities
were "simply swept aside."58
Chiari concurs with Steinberg's belief in the growing power of the SS.59
He does not however suggest that the sweeping aside of the civil administration
removed them from the implementation of policy. Rather, the administration
acted as a cog in the "requisitioning machinery."60 While limited to areas such as
food requisition, propaganda and cultural policy, civil authorities enjoyed a large
measure of autonomy, as "each area commissar was to a large extent his own
man."61 Yet such islands of autonomy proved largely marginal and detached
from reality. Ultimately, the civilian administration formed the weakest link within
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the Nazi eastern hierarchy and was subjected to a "rapid loss of meaning of all
administrative structures...in favour of brutal SS rule."62
The perception of a powerless and marginalized civil administration is not
universally accepted among historians. Rather questions of autonomy are
addressed within a framework that sees power as containing a hidden transcript
and subject to constant questioning and negotiating from below.63 Building on
Chiari, Wendy Lower asserts local civilian authorities quickly realized that their
power hinged upon the ability to juggle ideological imperatives and the demands
of establishing and maintaining a workable occupation system. As a result, to a
large degree, civilian authorities enjoyed considerable autonomy in the day-today functioning of the occupation. Moreover, personal choice, "unpredictable
variables of local conditions and the changing relations with other powerful
German agencies" allowed space for local initiative and interpretation of initial
occupation policies.64 While Himmler battled Rosenberg in Berlin, in the OET
administrators "enjoyed a certain independence... and could conduct themselves
in ways that were not limited by official policies or the expectations of their
superiors."65
Rather than limiting the autonomy of the civil administration, the HimmlerRosenberg conflict engendered ill-defined policies that effectively decentralized
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power and demanded initiative and improvisation. In this way, "ad hoc and
arbitrary methods," determined at the local level marked the transfer of power
"into the hands of regional leaders."66 In short, local administrators enjoyed a
certain "latitude to test out certain methods of rule" and exercised their power
with almost universal brutality.67
Still, Lower does insist that limits of authority did exist. In many ways
akin to Browning, she perceives that ideological imperatives, enforced by the SS,
placed significant boundaries on the power of local civilian authorities.68 In the
case of genocide in Zhytomyr, centrally mandated extermination directives
allowed no space for local autonomy and ensured that the civilian administration
carried out its orders regardless of their own needs or criticisms.69
Erich Haberer questions such conclusions based on the experience in
Byelorussia. While the civil administration showed some initial reluctance to
implement genocidal directives in 1941, by 1942 they had "dispensed with any
qualms and became actively engaged in the whole process of genocide."70 At
this point, the Gebietskommissar who "was pretty well ruling his domain as he
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pleased" demonstrated not just cooperation and compliance, but initiative.
While in theory the chain of command may have imposed restrictions on the
autonomy of the Gebietskommissar, in reality they tended to wield much more
authority at the sharp end of genocidal actions than previous analyses have
recognized.72 While Haberer maintains that the overall push for genocide came
from Berlin, the civil administration demonstrated autonomy and initiative in its
implementation. In short, the civil administration was not marginalized or swept
aside but proved central to the entire extermination process.
In terms of cooperation and coordination, Steinberg emphasizes the
degree to which in-fighting and the effectiveness of the SS-police complex in
imposing their authority marked the process of genocide.73 Unfortunately, how
this was reflected at the local level is not addressed. Steinberg's useful analysis
of the upper echelons notwithstanding, Lower and Haberer assert that the turmoil
in Berlin was not replicated at the regional/local levels in RKU and RKO. In
Zhytomyr, Lower argues that, on balance, cases of inter-agency cooperation
outnumbered conflict. Further, this reality cannot be attributed solely to the effort
of ambitious local functionaries to garner recognition from superiors.74 Rather
collaboration proved the result of close contact between the functionaries of the
various agencies in the field. Often, Lower notes, several agencies shared the
same office. Cooperation however did not mean that each agency enjoyed the
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same level of influence or role in the implementation of policy.

For the civil

administration, this meant limitations existed and while "their participation was
almost imperative...their power [was] limited." As noted, the case of Klemm
made plain the reality that cooperation was expected and the real power of the
civil administration rested on the ability to "cooperate by embracing their
'competitors' policies."76 Tacitly Lower suggests that Klemm's case may have
been exceptional. As Klemm's replacement, Leyser discovered interagency
cooperation in the Final Solution was more the norm than the exception.77 While
individual functionaries might have harboured hard feelings and petty jealousies
toward other agencies, the nature of rule in the east, the scarcity of resources
and of manpower ensured that the civil administration maintained a large
measure of power through "the central coordinating role that they played in
implanting Nazi policy at the lowest levels."78
If Lower maintains that the role of the civil administration in genocide
proved "almost imperative," Haberer asserts that in Byelorussia it was definitive.
While "persistent jurisdictional squabbles" ensured the civil administration initially
came only willy-nilly to accept the extermination of Jewry as official policy, they
quickly dropped any reservations and cooperated by employing the resources at
75
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their disposal, most importantly the police. In some cases they went as far as
"active participation in genocide."79 While Haberer does not downplay the
significance and influence of the SS-police complex in the process of genocide
he does identify a significant broadening that encompassed a "lethal combination
of Sipo/SD and civil-police administrative agencies."80 Given the scarcity of
resources, "the killing of Jews depended on the Gebietskommissar's initiative
and the Gendarmerie's execution of his directives "to clean up" the rural
rayons."81 In this analysis, the role of the Gebietskommissar is not as second
fiddle to the SD. Instead, he "functioned essentially as a linchpin of genocide."82
The ambitious and dedicated Gebietskommissar could wield real power, set the
tone and enjoy an unrivalled measure of influence through the strategic use of
the assets at his disposal. In short, while conflict certainly existed at higher
levels, it did not preclude interagency cooperation at the local level between the
SD, Gebietskommissar and his Gendarmerie. In Byelorussia, extermination on
the scale intended by the Nazis was impossible without this collusion.83
As noted, a full catalogue of the competencies and tasks of the
Gebietskommissar has yet to be produced. As with the majority of research
focussed on the OMi, significant attention has only been paid to tasks related to
genocide and Nazi war crimes. Yet here too, research remains centered on
79

Haberer, "German Police," 23.
Haberer, "German Police," 391-2.
81
NARB 370/55/11 ,Glebokie, November 1941. Also see Haberer, "German
Police," 212, 216.
82
Haberer, "German Police," 397. Chiari noted that "only in one case [did] the
civil administration offer resistance against the murder of the Byelorussian Jews,"
see Chiari, Alltag, 57.
83
Haberer, "German Police," 396.
80

23

other agencies such as the police and the SS and pays only marginal attention to
either the tasks or function of the Gebietskommissar in the both the preparation
for and commission of Nazi crimes. Thus investigations of the civilian
administration and genocide in the east have remained engaged primarily in the
two debates detailed above. Consequently, not only is the scope of research
limited but also many questions concerning the OMi and in the process of
genocide are unaddressed.
In terms of Jewish affairs {Judensachen), the regional civil administration
played a cardinal core in the coordination and procedures that greased the
wheels of genocide. As others have noted, the OMi proved open and adaptable,
despite some jurisdictional squabbling, to radical transformations in Jewish policy
and often cooperated readily with agencies such as the Security Police. While
not charged directly with solving the "Jewish Question," the volume of directives,
memos and decrees implicating Gebietskommissars suggests that this is not only
a question of participation in the process of genocide, but also of degree. In
short, the cooperation of the civil administration proved indispensable in the
management of Jewish affairs in that the Gebietskommissar was responsible for:
Collection and registration of all Jews.
Marking of Jews with yellow stars.
Abolition of charity (liberality) for Jews.
Establishment and administration of ghettos.
Transfer of rural and urban Jews into the ghettos.
Installation of Jewish Councils of Elders in the ghettos.
Installation of a Jewish order service in the ghettos.
Seizure and delivery of the Jewish possessions and assets.
Elimination of Jews from various professions.
Introduction of a hard labour obligation.
Determination of work and non-work Jews
Determination of who was to be regarded as a Jew.
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Oddly, despite the obvious centrality of these tasks in implementing Jewish
policy at the local level, both research and analysis are wanting. Rather
investigation has focussed on questions surrounding the radicalization of policy
toward genocide on the one hand and, on the other hand, efforts to more fully
understand the nature of local authority/autonomy and the nuances of interagency relations. Certainly, if Haberer and Lower are correct, the role of the civil
administration in genocide requires further research.
Obviously, a central problem exists in the historiography of the civil
administration. Simply, no study has yet comprehensively addressed the
Gebietskommissars or their authority and ability to influence, if not determine,
policies and events in their areas of jurisdiction. While work in other similar areas
may provide some insights, only a rough fit is possible. Accurate assessments
and conclusions for understanding of the Gebietskommissars themselves remain
illusive. The state of the current historiography requires a more in-depth
analysis. First, focusing on the district commissars promises important new
opportunities for understanding how decisions were actually implemented at the
local level within an organization labelled an "administrative monstrosity" guided
by "egotistical hyenas" and how this reflected wider Nazi policies and
administrative chaos. As we have seen, historians have begun asking questions
about the role of the district commissar and the nature of his authority and
relationship with other agencies in the context of studying the Holocaust in the
East. However, no research has been forthcoming on precisely the impact of the
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men who implemented Nazi policy "on the ground." Other essential questions
remain largely unanswered: Who were these administrators? What was their
social background and ideological experience? What did they perceive as their
main function? What was their relationship with the indigenous population and
their role in mass murder and the genocide of the Jews? How did they exercise
their power?
In addressing such questions this study aims at not only advancing our
knowledge and understanding of the Nazi regime but also of the men who
translated, adapted and helped to carry out Nazi policies of pacification,
exploitation and extermination. To focus on the lowest level of civil government,
where the interaction between occupier and occupied was most immediate and
potent, is overdue and will fill an obvious gap in the historiography and our
understanding of the structure and operation of the occupation administration.
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Parti
The German Civil Administration in Nazi Occupied Soviet Territory

Destroying the Soviet Union was Hitler's real war aim. From its vastness,
the thousand year Reich would be sustained. Only in capturing and exploiting the
East could the German people survive. As early plans were laid for the
administration of the occupied east, Hitler intended that civilians rather than the
military would play the predominant role.84 Under their leadership, Hitler
envisioned the spoliation of the Soviet Union. Hitler's 17 July 1941 decree
established the Eastern Ministry (Reichsministerium fur die besetzen Ostgebiete,
also known as Ostministerium or, in short, OMi), the mechanism by which the
captured territories would be administered. The overall functions and authority of
the civil administration were spelled out prior to deployment, yet came rather late
in July 1941. Hitler determined that the civil administration should not have free
reign in the east. Important restrictions and limitations were placed on its
authority, to preserve both the place of other agencies and Hitler himself. Both
the "independent prerogatives" of Goring and Himmler were maintained while
Hitler appointed administrative heads and retained the role of arbitrator for
"differences of opinion that cannot be settled by direct negotiations."85
At the top of the OMi in Berlin was Alfred Rosenberg, Reichsministerium
fur die besetzten Ostgebiete (RmfdbO) and the Party's leading eastern "expert"

Dallin, German Rule, 24. Reitlinger, The House, 128.
Mulligan, Politics, 22.
27

and self-styled philosopher.

From his office, theoretically, the east would be

carved-up, ruled and exploited. Yet, from the outset neither the area nor the
configuration of the occupied territories matched the expectations of
Ostministerium officials.87 Wedged between the more integrated western areas
Poland and Czechoslovakia and eastern zones remaining under military control,
civilian administrated districts never reached their intended size.88 Of the four
areas intended for Ostministerium proprietorship, only two, Reichskommissariat
Ukraine (RKU) and Reichskommissariat Ostland (RKO) were actually
established. Heading these administrations was a pair of Reichskommissars,
Erich Koch in Rowno and Heinrich Lohse in Riga.89 Under this level sat the
Generalkommissariat or Generalbezirk (region) headed by a Generalkommissar
and finally, the Gebietskommissariator Kreisgebiet (district).90 In terms of overall
personnel, the German presence was surprisingly limited. While the upper levels
of the administration supported between 350 (RKO) and 450 (RKU)
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functionaries, in the Gebiet, the number generally ranged between a mere 8-12
individuals to oversee populations in the hundreds of thousands.91
In terms of ethnicity, the bulk of the indigenous population, more rural than
urban, varied according to geography and (former) national boundaries. As early
as September 1941, the OMi had compiled a list of the multitude of ethnic groups
in the USSR. The list was not ordered according to demographic proportion and
certainly reflected the heterogeneous complexion of the Soviet Union. Not
surprisingly, Ethnic Germans were at the top. Listed were: "Ethnic Germans,
Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Caucasians, Turkistanish, Volga-Ural,
Baits, Finns, Mongolians, Romanians, Bulgars and Greeks." Despite the fact that
Poles, Jews and Roma-Sinti represented significant populations, they were not
included on the list.92
Lohse's RKO was composed of four Generalkommissariate consisting of
the former Baltic states: Estonia (Estland), Latvia (Lettland) and Lithuania
(Litauen) and a truncated Byelorussia (WeiBruthenien).93 In total, the area
encompassed 493,300 km2 with a population of over ten million. To administer
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this area, the Reichskommissar selected Generalkommissars.

In Lettland was

Hugo Wittrock, in Estland Karl-Sigismund Litzmann, in Litauen Otto Heinrich
Drechsler and Wilhelm Kube in WeiBruthenien. Beneath them were 26
Gebietskommissars and Stadtkommissars.95 The size and population of Gebiets
varied. In WeiBruthenien, for example, Glebokie encompassed 9,000 km2 and a
population of 2.5 million while a smaller Lida included an area of 2,500 km2 and
a population of 280,000.96
To the south, based on the former Soviet republic of Ukraine, was the
RKU. Essentially, the RKU extended to Charkow with two noted exceptions
detached: Galicia {Generalgouvernmenf) and Transnistria (Romania). In the
RKU, the civil administration occupied about 339,000 km2 and that supported a
population of about 25 million. In the end, the realities of the war ensured that
the RKU was roughly only half the size of what the OMi had planned.97
The first Generalkommissariate established were Wolhynien-Podolien
headed by Heinrich Schone and Shitomir under Kurt Klemm. As the front
pushed east, the RKU expanded to include Kiew (Waldemar Magunia), Nikolajew
(Ewald Oppermann) and Dnjepropetrowsk (Nikolaus Selzner). Finally, military
success in the summer of 1942 enabled the establishment of Taurien under
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Alfred Frauenfeld.

Under this administrative level, the RKU deployed 103

Gebiets-Stadtkommissars."
Once in place, the tasks of the civil administration were governed by Hitler's
political goals and worldview. For their part, Gebietskommissars would play
significant roles as they and their staff occupied the lowest level of the German
administration where they acted as heads of the entire administration.100 As
Gebietskommissars prepared for eastern service beginning in the late summer of
1941, they were informed that whatever duties they might be required to
complete, "the first task of the civil administration in the occupied East was to
represent the interests of the Reich."101
Organizationally, as discussed in chapter two, the civil administration
conformed broadly to the Nazi inclination for multiple layers, hierarchies and
subordinations. Theoretically, the demands and expectations on the civil
administration were spelled out and accessible. Yet critically a divide existed
from the beginning between what was on paper and the realities of occupation.
Overall, Gebietskommissars came to their posts burdened with high
prospects from the Eastern Ministry. OMi directives notwithstanding,
9B
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Gebietskommissars were expected to wear many hats and interact regularly with
numerous other agencies and organizations. Not surprisingly some fared worse
than others. To more fully understand the Gebietskommissars themselves,
chapter three discusses, by way of collective biorgraphy, the identity and "ideal
type" of national socialist civil administrator. Gebietskommissars held important
positions in intimate contact with the occupied population. Given their roles in
both genocide and broader policies, it is essential to understand both how their
office "fit" into the polycratic occupied territories and both who they were and
where they came from.
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Chapter 2
Organisation and Guidelines
"A threatened nation can react to uncertain dangers solely through administrative
channels, to the truly embarrassing situation of perhaps overreacting." Jurgen Habermas

From 1941 -1944, the ranks of the OMi numbered about 13,000 at the
various levels.102 Further, approximately half served in leadership positions, the
remainder consigned to jobs within the day-to-day functioning of the occupation.
As of 28 June, 1941, Rosenberg determined that the leadership corps of the civil
administration would encompass four Reichskommissars, twenty-four
Generalkommissars, about approximately eighty Hauptkommissars and over 900
Gebietskommissars. In the end, only a fraction, 129 Gebietskommissare and
Stadtkommissare, were ever deployed.103
In early July 1941, a list of about 1000 candidates for the Haupt and
Gebietskommissar positions was drawn up. Initially, Rosenberg intended that
these offices would be filled by men drawn from a variety of agency including the
Sturmabteilung (SA), Deutsche Arbeitsfront DAF), Reichsministerium des Innern
(RMI) and SS. However, manpower shortages and the independent-mindedness
of the SS ensured that personnel policy never met initial expectations.104 To fill
these positions, the OMi looked primarily to the party apparatus and the SA.
As seen in chapter three, party membership was not a requirement for
eastern service, Gebietskommissars and above were almost universally party-
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men effectively ensuring that the civil administration was a "party Ministry."105
Rosenberg hoped that their backgrounds and "party spirit" would provide a
bulwark against any negative experiences while on duty and the hardships that
would arise from close contact with "strange nationalities." With these
considerations in mind, the OMi believed that SA-men were excellent candidates.
From the SA's perspective, eastern service promised new possibilities and
opportunities to recapture some of the influence and prestige that was lost in the
Reich. However, while the SA leadership certainly perceived this possibility, they
also portrayed themselves as "genuine Germans" and loyal to the OMi in contrast
to the economically motivated SS.106
While Mulligan's assertion that approximately 90% of the civil
administration belonged to the SA has been challenged, Gebietskommissars
tended to be SA-men and graduates (Ordensjunker) of the Nazi training
schools.107 Initially, these men often found their way east on the coat-tails of
former party superiors with whom they were familiar. For example, in Lohse's
RKO,

Generalkommissar Heinrich Drechsler and sixteen Gebiets-Stadtkomissars

followed the Reichskommissar from Schleswig-Holstein.108 Likewise, in
WeiBruthenien Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube brought with him Wilhelm
Janetzke to serve as Stadtkommissar. IN RKU, the trend continued as
Reichskommissar Erich Koch appointed numerous functionaries, including
Gebietskommissars, from his former command in East Prussia. It was not until
105
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November 1941 that the OMi was sufficiently functional to assert a fuller authority
of over personnel selection. By that time, however, many of the post in the
western areas of the civilian controlled east had already been filled.
Throughout the occupation, district administrations suffered from a chronic
manpower shortage. As mentioned, on average, a Gebietskommissar could
expect a staff of about ten German officials and employees, some agricultural
specialists and a smaller number of interpreters and secretaries.109 Clearly, at
the local level, Nazi rule would have to be realized "on the cheap." As a result,
local civil administrations tended to adapt their organization, often combining and
in some cases simply abandoning prescribed administrative departments. In
some cases, local conditions dictated the necessity and number of subordinate
departments. However, in theory, a Gebietskommissar presided over an office
organized into several departments {Referate): I. Politics, Race and Nationality,
II. Economics and Industry, III. Labour, IV. Administration and Taxation, V.
Forestry, VI. Agriculture.110 Given the lack of German personnel at the local
level, some native officials tended to continue as the civil administration
supervised and interacted with low level indigenous functionaries such as mayors
and Rayonchefs. Based on this structure, the Gebietskommissar was expected
to ensure the effective policing of his district and the exploitation of its resources
in the service of the Reich. In practice, Gebietkommissariats were superimposed
on former Soviet administrative blocs (rayons), establishing a pattern of piggy109

An excellent example is found in BA-L AR-Z 262/59. "Testimony of Heinrich
Carl," 15.12.1959.
110
BA-L AR-Z 94d/59v. 1,80, v. 17, 2442. See Appendix IV. CSA-Kiev
3206/1/11 indicates 1943 district level organisational changes in RKU.
35

backing Soviet forms that was repeated in numerous other areas. At this level,
the practical work of the occupation would be carried out.
The primary security and enforcement arm of the local civil administration
was the German police and locally recruited indigenous auxiliaries
{Schutzmannschaff). Again reflecting the chronic shortage of Germans, these
locals greatly outnumbered their German counterparts and proved diverse in
both reliability and their ability. The German police were nominally subordinated
to the civil administration. Following directives from Heinrich Himmler, "the
Higher SS and Police Leader was directly and personally subordinated to the
Reich Commissar." Such semantic gymnastics not only appeased Himmler in his
capacity as Head of German Police but also conformed to Hitler's own
predilection for institutional rivalry engendered by foggy competences and
jurisdictions. At the local level, directives issued in November 1941 established
the Gebietskommissar, the "bearer of the majesty of the Reich," as technically in
control of the police apparatus.111 Not surprisingly, at higher levels such an
arrangement could produce inter-agency friction.112 Yet, as we shall see,
Gebietskommissars could and did enjoy better relationships with their police than
their superiors in Minsk, Kowno or Berlin. In important cases cooperation rather
than friction proved the most common result of the union.113
What were the objectives and purposes of the civil administration? According
to initial guidelines, the goal of the occupation administration in the east was
111
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maximum spoliation and exploitation.114 To that end, the civil administration was
predicated on several broad principles outlined in Rosenberg's Brown Portfolio
(Braune Mappe):

1. The first task of the civil administration in the OET was to represent the
interests of the Reich.
2. While the final form and composition of the OET was fluid, it was
perceived that it would "lead a certain independent existence."
3. However, these areas were still part of the greater GermanLebensraum.
As a result, the OET was not considered subject to the terms of the Hague
Land Warfare Convention as the USSR was "to be regarded...as
dissolved." "Consequently the obligation to exercise all government and
other sovereignty powers in the interest of the national inhabitants" lay
with the German authorities. Accordingly, "all measures, which appear to
the German administration necessary for the execution of this
comprehensive task, were considered suitable and permissible."115
To facilitate implementation, the OMi's Braune Mappe, explained in
greater detail the goals and intentions of the new regime. In it, new civil
administrators were informed not only of the broad precepts of the occupation,
but also the particular means and methods favoured by their superiors. Thus,
from the outset the Gebietskommissars were presented with a theoretical
framework of guidelines and expectations for their tenure in the east. By
understanding these initial expectations and presumptions, the actual work and
practice of rule at the local level is more clearly brought into focus.
The OMi's political guidelines were dominated by anti-Communist
rhetoric that thinly camouflaged more practical (and traditional) sentiments
concerned with Soviet expansion and drive for economic hegemony. On the
114
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whole, it centered on the perceived expansionist aims of the Moscow regime and
the threat posed by "Red troops...[on] the German border." For the OMi, the
Communist "release of the proletariat from the capitalist yoke" in the Baltic states
and Poland had clearly demonstrated Russia's "aggressive Imperialism." Given
Rosenberg's Baltic roots, such an analysis seems hardly surprising.
In line with the larger Nazi worldview, Rosenberg focused on the
necessity of securing raw materials both as the means to continue the war effort
against Britain and to ensure Germany's control over the vast resources of the
east. His solution to these dangers was a final settling with the "Bolshevik
danger,"preceded by the creation of German-dominated buffer states, fashioned
on the basis of racial criteria. With this development, the OMi predicted a
substantial double-victory. Not only would the Reich be saved from the Red
Army but also claim "an enormous increase in political and economic power" and
the control of "all important raw materials."116
Rosenberg held that Soviet occupation, repression and mismanagement
presented Germany with invaluable capital for ensuring the collaboration of the
eastern populations. To guarantee this, the OMi maintained that Germany
present itself as liberator and ensure that this fact was not lost on the liberated.
Significantly, Rosenberg bluntly stated: "The most important condition for this is
the appropriate treatment of the country and the population." Consequently,
while German wartime needs were to be satisfied, newly occupied territories
were not to be regarded as soley objects of exploitation. The populations,
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Rosenberg asserted, had already endured enough hardship under the Bolshevik
yoke and would "hold no hatred" for their Nazi conquerors if efforts were made to
redress the ravages of Soviet occupation. To this end, Rosenberg asserted that
no empty promises be issued.117 However much time it took, the impression was
to be avoided ("over all conditions") that the Germans offered only pompous
promises.
Essential to civilian rule was the issue of food economics. The OMi
understood that successful grain requisition required the "willing cooperation of
farmers." Collaboration would ensure that the nutritional needs of the cities could
be met. Along with the expectation of "extraordinary successes in agriculture,"
local OMi officials were instructed to seek the farmers' "willing cooperation" in the
re-building of the agricultural sector. Further, cooperation at the local level was
to entail, through suitable advisors, consultation with the population.118 Indeed,
close association between occupied and occupier was to expand beyond simply
the agricultural sector. Rosenberg ordered that his Generalkommissars and
Gebietskommissars assemble trusted indigenous advisors, headed by a
municipal mayor {Burgermeister) from "reliable representatives of the native
population."119 Such arrangements were to encompass "cities, villages,
(workers') housing estates, urban settlements etc."120 Indigenous assistance
was envisioned as an arrangement by which advice pertaining to mutual interests
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(primarily cultural and economic) could be gleaned by the civilian administration
and, with the return of normality, relations between the Gebietskommissar and
the local population facilitated.121
Central to Rosenberg's planning for the newly occupied east was a
solution to the Jewish question. From the outset, all measures concerning this
were predicated on an understanding that the war allowed for a complete
solution to be realized, despite the logistics of such a massive undertaking.122
Further, any solution could not be based simply upon "using chicanery" and
would require the cooperation of the indigenous populations. Consequently,
Rosenberg ordered that within the confines of maintaining law and order in the
rear of the Army, "any actions by the local civilian population against the Jews
[was] not to be prevented."123 Such actions were perceived as political with strict
instructions that neither mobs (StraBenpobels) nor criminal elements be allowed
to use anti-Jewish actions as a opportunity to plunder Jewish businesses or
enrich themselves at the expense of the population.124
The OMi recognized the enormity of the "Jewish problem" in the east
and understood that, at least initially, only limited and conservative measures
were possible. Consequently, administrators were presented with a three-stage
blueprint. Apart from, at minimum, not obstructing anti-Jewish actions
undertaken by the gentile native populations, the civilian authorities' first step
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would be mandatory registration and marking (with a yellow star of David) of all
Jews.125 Once defined, the Jewish population was to be strictly separated from
the non-Jewish population and removed from public life.126
From the beginning, the OMi planned the ghettoization of Jews.127
Significantly, Rosenberg anticipated the active cooperation of Jews in the
process and determined that they supervise and police themselves, thereby
ensuring that the Kommissariatspolizei be responsible only for the security of the
Ghetto boundaries and beyond.128
Isolation and concentration would be followed by expropriation and
exploitation of the Jewish population. For Rosenberg, the first precept upon
which the process of economic manipulation rested was that "due to the war, it is
to be made certain that in all measures against the Jews, economic interests are
not substantially damaged."129 Yet while substantial damage was to be avoided,
the OMi recognized the necessity of restructuring Jewish economic life to ensure
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both the proscription and restriction of Jews from certain professions.130
However, such measures were to be undertaken with a degree of pragmatism
lest the indigenous population suffer deprivations. Jews employed in factories,
cottage industries and as craftsmen would continue to work under civil
administrative supervision. Further, Jews were to be increasingly active in the
agricultural sector and, in the case of Jewish collectives (agricultural enterprises),
continue to operate under the watchful eye of the civilian authorities.
For the OMi, the Social Question (soziale Frage) was primarily one of
ensuring the effective organisation of labour. To guarantee that eastern workers
achieved the highest productivity possible "in the interest of the German
economy" Rosenberg recognized that not only must labour be well-organised but
also well supervised and, to a certain extent, well treated. To ensure this, all
workers would be responsible to a labour manager (Werksleiter) who, in turn,
answered to the German agencies. In this manner, at the local level, discipline
rested with indigenous workers themselves. With industry-wide trade unions
banned, representation was to be localized with the Werksleiter responsible not
only for discipline but also for accommodation, food supply, health support,
wages and the organisation of work within a framework set by German
agencies.131
Rosenberg understood that little of the Soviet administration would
remain intact. That which did survive, primarily "village Soviets", were to be
130
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dissolved immediately. Consequently, upon entry into the east, the German civil
administration was to begin tabula rasa in the political reconstruction of occupied
areas. Only former Soviet administrative divisions would be retained in order to
ease the transition for both the local populations and the new civilian authorities.
Reich administrators were cautioned against excessive use of their lawmaking powers lest the new regime "suffocate in regimentation."132 By the same
token, the OMi understood that comprehensive legislation was largely impossible
given the absence of any specific knowledge of local conditions, affairs and
populations. Consequently, as few binding arrangements as possible were to be
issued. Rather, higher agencies were directed to leave room for local authorities
to act in accordance with area conditions.133
The handling of sabotage cases was to be a matter for the SS/police.
However, the authority for the use of collective reprisals against the indigenous
population would lay with the appropriate Commissar in consultation with his
SS/police leader.134 Further, Rosenberg discouraged hostage-taking and only in
necessary cases when the effect would outweigh the negative consequences of
such actions.135
The initial principles of the OMi's occupation demonstrate a hybrid of
ideological imperatives and practical considerations. How these precepts were
translated and modified, embraced or ignored is the central story at the local
132
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level. As we shall see, important disconnects certainly existed. Still, as early as
Fall 1941, OMi officials received analyses and summaries laying out numerous
aspects of their new territories.136 In short, some resources were available to the
leadership corps of the occupation, provided they chose to look.
For the civil administration, Rosenberg's Braune Mappe presented a
translation of Hitler's worldview into broad guidelines. As we have seen, the
Reichsminister tied together important aspects such as the political, racial, and
economic reorganization of captured territories. Yet Rosenberg's Braune Mappe
was not a set of concrete or practical guidelines for district administrators. The
late establishment of the OMi and the practical difficulties of producing clear
guidelines and policies on short order plagued the civil administration from its
inception. Further, not only were specific policy details lacking but guidelines for
preparing functionaries for eastern service was not produced until January 1942
or implemented until 1943. Only in January 1943, in fact, did Rosenberg finally
produce official regulations on the "legal and financial position of OMi officeholders as well as their rights and obligations."137 If Gebietskommissars were
apprised of broad policy aims, in significant ways they were unprepared, even
unaware of the finer points as they assumed their posts in the east.
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Chapter 3
The Gebietskommissar: The Making of an "Ideal" National Socialist
Administrator
'When a person identifies himself with a group his critical faculties are diminished and his
passions enhanced by a kind of emotive resonance. The individual is not a killer, the group is,
and by identifying with it, the individual becomes one. This is the infernal dialectic reflected in
man's history." Arthur Koestler

The ideal candidate for eastern service was to possess a combination of
political reliability, loyalty and the ability to work alongside other agencies.
Certainly little mention was made of practical or administrative skill and ability.
As one OMi official noted: "combat experience, party badges and secured party
offices [was] an absolute priority" for selection.138 Given the personal nature of
initial selections, however, space existed for superior candidates, as well as
inferior ones, to be selected. While specific training and preparation for eastern
service was generally lacking, Gebietskommissars were not deployed wholly
unprepared. At Ordensburg Krossinsee in Falkenburg, Pomerania, all
Gebietskommissars were given rudimentary training for "practical administrative
activity."139
Whatever training and education future civil administrators received prior to
1941, all passed through Krossinsee before assuming their posts in the occupied
east. One of three Nazi training schools, Ordensburg Krossinsee opened in April
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1936.140 First conceived in 1933, construction of the school began in September
1934 as a project of Robert Ley's German Labour Front. So physically
impressive was the installation and noteworthy the ideological commitment it
represented that Ordensburg Krossinsee rated a visit from the suspect Duke of
Windsor, the former Edward VIM, in October 1937.141
Future Gebietskommissars attended the school in the 1930s. Consequently,
they certainly conformed to both the ideological and physical selection criteria. In
1938, the NSDAP set a number of qualifying preconditions for candidates to
attend the school:
1. Male
2. A Party member or candidate.
3. Active in the party or its federations for several years where they displayed
leadership characteristics.
4. German citizenship
5. Engaged in labour and military service (Arbeits-und Wehrdienstes)

6. 23-26 years of age
7. At least 160 cm tall
8. Physically healthy and without physical handicaps (without eyeglasses or
physical deformations)
9. Proof of marriage fitness and the family's hereditary health. ("Nachweis
der Ehetauglichkeit sowie der Erbgesundheit der Sippe")
10. Proof of Aryan descent142
Clearly, the party envisioned the successful candidate as the hybrid of the Nazi
ideological, physical and racial perfection. Yet, despite the seemingly strict
application criteria there was no shortage of applicants. In fact, a round of
examinations was administered to hopefuls by local Kreis and Gauleiters.
Rolf Sawinski, Die Ordensburg Krossinsee in Pommern: von der NSOrdensburg zur polnischen Kaserne (Aachen: Helios, 2004), 6.
141
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Further physical examinations were conducted by physicians with the Office for
Public Health. Finally, the last decision was frequently made personally by
Robert Ley. Consequently, in 1937 the Nazi training school admitted only 540
candidates from 1044 applications.
Ley envisioned the training as a four-year process. The first two schools
attended would be Krossinsee and Vogelsang. Originally the Pomeranian facility
was intended as the "freshman" year of National Socialist education. Here the
Nazi obsession with physicality was stressed as students would undergo physical
and military training. Ordensjunker wexe to attend for one year before passing on
to Ordensburg Vogelsang in the Eifel, Ordensburg Sonthofen in the Allgau and
Ordensburg Marienburg near Danzig.143
However, in practice the process proved less rigid. Marienburg was never
more than an architectural blueprint. Vogelsang and Krossinsee offered a hybrid
curriculum and aspiring Ordensjunker were expected to attend both to receive
both physical and ideological training. After about ten months at each facility,
trainees would then serve an apprenticeship in a local party office gleaning
Students at the Nazi training academies received various designations
ranging from Ordensjunker, Junker, Nachwuchsfuhrer and Fuhrerwarter. Only in
1939 was the uniform designation Nachwuchsfuhrer formalized. Further, some
variance remained in the official designation of graduates. In March 1939, this
issue was also settled. Previously, recent attendees were designated
Fuhreranwarter or ehemaliger Fuhreranwarter (leader candidates or former
leader candidate). However, according to the Head of Reich Organisations, such
a title failed to sufficiently differentiate the graduate from the Politischer Fuhrer
designation already in use. Therefore, to suggest the arrival of a "new breed",
graduates were designed Nachwuchsfuhrer. But in 1943 Krossinsee
commandant Otto Gohnes successfully lobbied for the designation to be
changed to Ordensjunker. Interestingly, while this came long after the
Gebietskommissars graduated Ordensjunker remains the designation by which
they are consistently identified. Sawinski, Die Ordensburg, 12.
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practical experience. The final educational leg was attendance at Ordensburg
Sonthofen where students received the practical political training essential for
commanding various party organizations.144 Not only was the selection process
rigorous but graduation from each course was not automatic. Rather, at each
level between fifteen to twenty per cent of the participants failed. According to
one participant, practices in the school did not ignore the demands for "absolute
physical and mental health." Simply, the significant failure rate was due primarily
to the stress of extensive physical training. While ideological preparation was
certainly a part of the regimen, prospective candidates could expect a gruelling
four to five hours of physical training daily.145
Evidently, the Ordensburg pedagogical philosophy proved a reflection of the
Nazi worldview. Academically, students received a seven part curriculum:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Racial theory comprising biological and philosophical components.
History (ancient, early modern and modern)
Worldview (Weltanschauung) and philosophy
Art and culture
Economics and Soziallehre
Military science

7. Practical political Party work
Parallel to the academic process, future Ordensjunkerabsorbed a
comprehensive physical education.146 Overall, the intention was clear, over the
course of four years, the Party would educate Ordensjunker at several facilities,
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each with its own training emphasis.147 The first courses at Vogelsang, with an
initial enrolment of about 500, began 1 May 1936 and ran until March 1937 while
the second course began in May 1937, ending 30 June 1938.148 Only in October
1937, did Krossinsee officially open its doors to students.
The Ordensjunker day at Krossinsee began at 6:00 with personal grooming
and hygiene followed by sports (Fruhsport), breakfast and "flag parade." The
remainder of the morning was spent in lectures given by the senior instructors
followed by more athletics in the early afternoon. At Krossinsee this consisted
mostly of water sports.149 Beginning with the second training course in 1938,
some trainees participated in basic flight training at the local airfield.150 The
afternoon was then spent engaged in military exercises and drilling. Obviously,
the disgruntled trainee's assessment that 4-5 hours per day were taken with
physical exercise appears accurate. Prior to the evening meal, served at 19:00,
Ordensjunker students met in small study groups to prepare for the next
morning's lectures. Following dinner, candidates could finally enjoy some free
time until lights out at 22:00.
Life at the training schools was not without distraction. Candidates could
expect inspections from visitors and dignitaries as well as a variety of cultural
events. Monthly, the Krossinsee Ordensjunker traveled to nearby Stettin to
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attend the local theatre or, on occasion, further afield. Additionally, interaction
with the local population and the staging of cultural events proved reciprocal. For
example, in March 1938, Krossinsee hosted a Kultur-Abendopen to the general
public. Not surprisingly, the program proved typically Nazi. Musical selections
featured four periods: the classical period, the 1813 war of liberation, the National
Socialist "time of struggle", and after the Nazi seizure of power.
The beginning of the war in 1939 signalled the end of the practical training for
Ordensjunker. Trainees were transferred immediately to the Wehrmacht offices
in their respective Gau. Despite less than three years of operation, the Nazi
training schools made a significant contribution to the initial war effort. In
January 1940, the Main Personnel Office of the NSDAP reported that
Stammfuhrer (353) and Ordensjunker (1109) from the Ordensburgenwere well
represented in the military and civil administration areas.151
With the start of the "real war" against the USSR, Ordensburg Krossinsee,
recently re-named the more dramatic Die Falkenburg am Krossinsee opened its
doors to the OMi. With only 39 original Stammfuhrer spread through the Nazi
Ordensburg system, emphasis had shifted from preparation to action. Yet, the
facility remained a centre of learning even after 1939. For example, as
Gebietskommissars moved east to take up their positions, Krossinsee continued
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as a training centre. In late September 1941, the first courses for disabled
soldiers began.152
Beginning in the late summer 1941, Rosenberg envisioned Krossinsee as the
launch pad for his various agencies (OMi and Sonderstab 'R') into the newly
occupied areas. Here the civil administration officials would be assembled,
trained and deployed for eastern service. Not surprisingly, with the immediate
need for administrators in occupied areas, the training regime was significantly
shortened. Rather than receiving the traditional three-part program, as of
summer 1941 recruits were posted to Ordensburg Krossinsee as their last stop
before going to the east.153 Thus, whatever serious or significant training and
preparation future Gebietskommissars received would certainly have taken place
prior to their appointment.
The 1941 summer training at Krossinsee proved little more than a
preparatory "pep talk." According to Generalkommissar Waldemar Magunia, the
effect was dramatic. As the noose tightened on Nazi Germany in 1944, he wrote
that at Krossinsee otherwise reasonable men had their heads filled with simplistic
rhetoric.154 Clearly, the strict yet comprehensive nature of training at Krossinsee
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did not extend into 1941. Rather than the bio-philosophical underpinnings of the
Nazi worldview taught in the 1930s, the 1941 preparatory lectures consisted of
crude rants reinforcing the basest elements. Repeatedly civil administrations
were reminded they went to the east as gentlemen representing the majesty of
the Reich. "You are Kings", they were informed, "with everything at your
disposal." The result, Magunia contended, was as striking as predictable.
Attending courses long on speeches and short of practical training, otherwise
competent men failed to understand the exact obligations and work ahead of
them.155
Be that as it may, clearly the final round of training served as a clear
break for students from either previous assignments as well as an indication that
something dramatic and permanent had occurred with the invasion of the USSR.
For Ordensjunker, the majority of whom had moved to the military after their
Ordensburg experience in the 1930s, the Krossinsee 1941 summer school
clearly signaled a break from the structure and demands of the military. Moving
from a "corporal to a king" would have had an important impact on the outlook
and behaviour of civil administrators. Also, preparatory inoculations would surely
sharpen the sense that one would soon be moving beyond the pale. If the
moniker of the OMi suggested occupation, the Krossinsee experience could
leave little doubt in the minds of the students of the permanence of their stay.
The overtly "imperial" language of the lectures surely reinforced the reality that a
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genesis process was underway in the east. The Gebietskommissars would be
pioneers in creating a new reality, morality and society.
Finally, the tone of the language suggests prospective Gebietskommissars
were encouraged to be more autocrat than benevolent monarch. Perhaps the
most significant effect of such coaching was the level of authority that
Gebietskommissars could expect to wield. Even if the specific "Arbeit und
Verpflichtuncf remained foggy, there could be no confusion in the expectations
raised by lectures reinforcing civil administrator's role as Konig. Such
proclaimations were not foreign to Nazi functionaries educated within the Party in
1930s. However, what the Krossinsee summer school ensured was that the
contours, if not the specific attributes of occupation were made clear prior to the
Gebietskommissar assuming his post. In short, Krossinsee broadly established
both the expectations for him and of him. Akin to the spirit of permanence
suggested by the language, the parting words to civil administrators bore the
sense of victory euphoria that resulted from the rapid military success in the east
and the understandable expectation that more would follow. Gebietskommissars
(and their staffs) left Falkenburg fully aware that the nature of their work in the
east was permanent, imperial and absolute. Whatever realities on the ground
might later temper such expectations, the behaviour of the Gebietskommissars in
the east must be considered in light of the combination of experience, training
and coaching received prior to their arrival in the east.
The scarcity of surviving personal data (particularly personnel records)
complicates a broad- based construction of a collective biography. Broad
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conclusions on the sociology of the civil administration as a whole certainly
cannot be made from available data. However, enough material exists to answer
core biographical questions that will allow us to sketch the social contours of a
select group of Byelorussian Gebietskommissars as a collective.
The offices of the civil administration at the local level consisted of some
Reich Germans. To this number must also be added the families of these OMi
personnel. However, certainly, the number of Germans permanently assigned to
a Gebietskommissar remained limited. Of this number, the vast majority were
men. While women, generally support staff and spouses, were on site, women
remained in subordinate positions. However, while limited to administrative or
domestic concerns, their relationships could create space for the application of
soft or unofficial influence. Apart from spouses and secretaries, the
Gebietskommissars and their staff were exclusively male.
Gebietskommissars ranged in age from thirty-one to forty-eight.156 In
general, they tended to be in their mid to late 30s with an average age of 38.
Thus, Gebietskommissars were born under the Kaiserreich. They would all have
had at least some memory of life before the Great War. Most were teenagers at
the time of the Armistice and received the upper levels of their formal education
under the Weimar Republic. Given this range, these administrators straddled
three ages, Kaiserreich, war years, and new republic and came of age amidst
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sweeping changes that impacted their entire civilization. Patterns in their
response to this reality can certainly be identified.
Given the consistency in the age range, age was likely one criterion for
selection. As experienced Party men, their age matched their position as a kind
of upper management of the lowest level of the civilian administration. In their
late 30s, Gebietskommissars made up an important Nazi cadre: old enough to
remember the "old world" and young enough to have rejected its Weimar
successor.
Gebietskommissars would have received their formal education prior to
the Third Reich. Yet it must be recognized that this formal education, at least
beyond primary school, took place within the context of war, defeat, revolution,
economic misery and broader social upheaval. If the formal education was
conventional, their supplementary education would be military and later Nazi
ones. Significantly, most came of age in uniform within a militarized culture.
Further, as young adults they would find an identity in the Party with the
movement serving as a framework. For many, therefore, their identity and career
was intractably tied to the Party.
As for broader development, by their late 30s, with personality formation
largely completed, older men were in a better position to square pre-set (age
specific) characteristics, behavioural norms and long held personal
idiosyncrasies with the realities found in the east. Thus, the Gebietskommissar
was less malleable than younger personnel serving at the front or in the occupied
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rear areas, again suggesting the value of considering age in the selection
process.
In terms of geographical origin, the sampled Weifiruthenien
Gebietskommissars prove diverse, representing seven different German regions:
Saxony, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, Baden-Wurttemberg, North
Rhine-Westphalia (Ruhr) and Upper Silesia. From this group, most prominently
represented was Saxony with three. Two hailed from Lower Saxony and one
each from the remaining Lander. While no distinct pattern emerges, important
trends are discernable.157
Many came from frontier regions with Reich borders. Importantly, six
cases represented areas of "lost lands" or regions in neighbouring states that
benefited at Germany's expense with the re-drawing of the European borders in
1918. While there were certainly significant differences in the relations between

Origin by Area
• Lower Saxony: 2
• Saxony: 2 (3 with RKU Marschall)

•

Bavaria: 1

• Schleswig Holstein: 2
• Baden-Wurttemberg: 1
• North Rhine-Westphalia, Ruhr: 1
• Upper Silesia: 1
Origins by Place:
Braunschweig, Lower Saxony- city, 200, 000
Buoch, Baden-Wurttemberg (small town/rural-less than 1000)
Chemnitz, Saxony (city 351,000)
Dortmund, North Rhine-Westphalia, Ruhr (city 541, 000)
Grossruckerswalde, Saxony (town less than 10000)
Hannover, Lower Saxony (city 444,000)
Lobau, Upper Lusatia, Saxony (small city)
Mittenbruck, Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien) (town 1000)
Schleswig Holstein
Wurzburg, Bavaria (city 100,000+)
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Germany and each of the benefiting states, specifically in the east and south,
border areas are overrepresented. Thus, the majority of sampled
Gebietskommissars originated in regions that had experienced considerable
resistance to new post-war geopolitical realities. In four areas (representing six
cases)158, subsequent resistance was particularly acute and in three regions was
accompanied by significant paramilitary violence over re-drawn boundaries.159
Second, Gebietskommissars tended to come from urban rather than rural areas.
Four were born in large cities (Braunschweig, Chemnitz, Dortmund, Hannover),
two in smaller cities (Lobau, Wurzburg), two in towns (Grossruckerswalde,
Mittenbruck) and only one in a very small town.
Determining the social background of members of the Nazi Party has
proven a challenging task. Certainly, the availability of data for determining the
social origins of the Nazi Party's membership proves limited. In general, the use
of membership cards offers both valuable data for analysis but also raises
questions of interpretation and extrapolation. For this study, membership cards
are supplemented with data gleaned from other sources, primarily personnel
records that provide a fuller picture of select members.
Despite methodological difficulties, the social background of the
Gebietskommissars may be addressed by considering several factors.160
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Detlef Muhlberger's "Social ranking and occupational distribution" formula
provides a valuable means by which the social background of the
Gebietskommissars may be accessed.161 Based on sufficient supporting data
available in six cases, their social ranking is:
Name
Werner
Sohlmann

Marschall

Class
Lower class
Lower
middle class
Lower
middle class
Middle class

Erren

Middle class

Muller

Upper
middle class

Buschmann

Occupation/Training
Skilled Worker
Salesman
Pharmacist
White collar office
worker
Physical Education
Teacher
Party
Functionary/University

Using this formula, together with data from individual biographies, in terms of
social background, the lower middle and middle classes are strongly
overrepresented in the ranks of the Gebietskommissars.162
In terms of education, the Gebietskommissars received their formal
schooling before the Nazi seizure of power and all completed Volksschule under
the Kaiserreich. Thus, as was the norm, all Gebietskommissars did receive a
basic elementary education. However, following graduation from primary school,
educational paths diverge significantly. In general, the majority moved on to a
secondary education in the Weimar years.163 For most, this was in form of trade,

Ibid, 24.
Ibid, 68.
This development occurred in five of seven cases.
58

technical or professional schools.164 Finally, a small number did attend
University.165
Educational level suggests several conclusions. Their educational
experience was either limited to lower levels, or, for those going on to postsecondary environments, was strongly directed towards a particular occupation
or profession. In most cases, this meant trade or professional schools which
prepared the individual for a working life in a particular occupation. Therefore,
the pedagogical goals were generally limited to achieve specific careerorientated outcomes.
In many cases seminal life events outside the classroom suggest that
studies were not the only consideration for future Gebietskommissars.
Throughout the 1920s, as they were coming of age, formal educations were
generally either interrupted, supplemented or closely followed by paramilitary and
radical political participation. At this level, life revolved on an axis outside the
classroom which involved paramilitarism and radical politics. While most
certainly did receive higher education, participation in such activities and their
later career paths suggests individuals preferring action over academics. This
cohort can therefore be understood as being educated but not particularly well
nor broadly learned. Further, whatever authoritarian tendencies or racist
ideologies they may have later subscribed to likely did not come as a component
of their studies. Rather extra-curricular involvement in sub-cultures of violence

In four of seven cases, this proved the educational experience.
Only one of seven attended a university.
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contributed in creating Nazis not unaccustomed to considering "tough solutions"
and radical problem-solving.
However diverse their formal schooling paths may have been, in all cases
a levelling took place after enlistment in the NSDAP. At a basic level, all
Gebietskommissars enjoyed some measure of "Nazi education." For most, this
came in the form of attending Nazi schools such as Ordensburg Vogelsang and
Ordensburg Krossinsee beginning in the second half of the 1930s. In all cases,
as a final preparation for eastern deployment, all Gebietskommissars participated
in a training course at Krossinsee in mid-1941. In general, future
Gebietskommissars tended toward a combination of "life learning" and a
voluntary learning path associated with radical politics and paramilitarism rather
than a higher formal education.
One of the most striking findings in the biographical data is the universality of
military, paramilitary and radical activity as military service or membership in a
Freikorps organization generally proved a precursor to later Nazi Party
membership. Further, for a significant number, war service and paramilitary
membership entailed more than strutting in uniform and parading through the city
centre. Importantly, their activities intimately involved pre-Nazi violence.
For most, opportunities for violent performance came at a young age. Not
surprisingly, these young men tended to train and qualify in (para)military roles
heavily favouring infantry service and first-hand familiarization with weapons and
methods of killing. Even those who had seen action in the war tended to be
front-soldiers. Seen in this way, the initial stages of adult self-definition and
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identity took place in a militarized and radical setting in which "might made right"
and grievances, as well as place and status, were tied to martial prowess.
Equally, for these young men an understanding of human relations, hierarchies
of authority and problem- solving would be developed within, if not entirely
shaped by, the particular modes and constraints of military life. This Army and
Freikorps cohort surely possessed a fuller experience with violent coaching,
violent performance and magnified hierarchies of authority. Simply, for most,
they came of age fully immersed in a culture of violence antithetical to the norms
of civil society.166
In some cases, service in the Imperial Army (or its attendant agencies) was
experienced even prior to paramilitary involvement. For these men, Freikorps
service signalled a continued acceptance of martial solutions. Further it also
suggests a rejection altogether of the constraints that kept the military reasonably
loyal and accepting of civilian oversight and to its right to sole interpretation of the
national will.
Finally, a significant number of Gebietskommissars returned to military life
either after leaving the Krossinsee training school or with the outbreak of war in
1939. While none were career professional military men, most seemed wellsuited and inclined to involvement in the soldier's life and initiated in violence and

The concept of a "lost generation", men disillusioned in the trenches and
unable to integrate back into "normal"society was well developed and applied by
Michael Wildt in his study of the leadership of the Reich Security Main Office.
This leadership corps however differed from the Gebietskommissars in a number
of ways including subsequent education and experiences in the Nazi Party and
agencies. Michael Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten: Das Fuhrerkorps des
Reichssicherheitshauptamtes (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2003).
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martial culture. Considering the existence of a strong continuity from
(para)military to SA to Gebietskommissar, local civil administrators were not
entirely out of their element upon arrival in the east. As well, their trajectory from
soldier to Nazi functionary ensured a relative familiarity with institutional
arrangements and norms.
By the late 1920s, the post-Landsberg transformation of the NSDAP from
a largely regional party to national reach was largely complete. In 1929, for
example, the party issued 70,000 membership cards. Yet however effective Nazi
political machinery may have been, world events proved a cardinal factor in its
explosive growth of the early 1930s.167 As the rest of the western world,
Germany plunged into crisis as the effects of economic collapse in the United
States spread depression and misery across the Atlantic. This period lent new
opportunities and fresh appeal to radical political solutions, whether Red or
Brown, a reality effectively exploited at both fringes. Beginning in 1930, the
Nazis effectively made use of the growing climate of uncertainly, deprivation,
disillusionment and fear and party enrolment exploded.
The Gebietskommissar cadre followed a common enrolment pattern. With
the exceptions of Hanweg and Buschmann who joined the Nazis in 1928 and
1929 respectively, the remainder all enrolled after the infamous Wall Street crash
that plunged Weimar Germany into economic and political turmoil.168 Fully half of
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the sample enrolled between 1930 and the seizure of power in early 1933, a
pattern of enrolment mirrored in wider enlistment trends. Interestingly, the two
latecomers were also the two Gebietskommissars who would end the war in the
ranks of the notorious SS, Gerhard Erren (1933) and Wilhelm Traub (1937).169 In
terms of year of enlistment, 1930 proves overrepresented. However, it was
precisely this year in which the Weimar experiment entered its death throes. Yet
it is unlikely that the five enlistments between 1930 and 1931 were the result of
either precognitive intuition of a German Sonderweg or the effect of
disillusionment wrought by sustained deprivation. Rather most entered the Nazi
Party early enough to suggest that they possessed an overwhelming anxiety or
feeling of acute threat to place and position engendered in the earliest stages of
the depression and a longer-standing attraction to and disposition towards the
ideas and goals of the NSDAP. Seen in this way, the pressures of the 1930s
appear more a nudge towards a third way for vulnerable individuals not
unaccustomed to the comforts offered by paramilitarism, radicalism and jackbooted political solutions.
Age at the time of enlistment provides some further important insights.
Prior to the 1929 collapse and the harsh political climate of the early 1930s,
previously rather than some acute insight into the long terms effects of events in
Manhattan. BA-L AR-Z 262/59. "Testimony of Heinrich Carl," 15.12.1959.
169
Erren's reasoning for his late enrolment is detailed in Appendix 1. Given his
admission that he supported the NSDAP publicly beginning in 1931 but was
unable to enlist due to previous commitment, he might well be effectively placed
in the cadre that joined the Party from 1929-1933. It is likely that Erren would
have enrolled if he could have. Traub, born in 1910, joined the Party the latest
and was also the youngest Gebietskommissar in WeiBruthenien at 31. His
relatively young age did not impede his ruthlessly effective knack for mass
murder. Yad Vashem, M-33/1159.
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membership in the NSDAP tended to attract younger men and, as evidenced in
the case of Fritz Buschmann, practiced agitators.170 Enrolment in 1930-1931
shows a Nazi Party appealing broadly to diverse age groups and resonating with
individuals beyond their twenties. Finally, the post-January 1933 enlistments
again suggest the Party's attraction to young men whose entire political
consciousness, development and experience was rooted in the Weimar
experiment. In general future Gebietskommissars came to the Party at a
relatively young age.171 Given their martial experience and attendant worldviews,
coupled with the troubling socio-political developments in late Weimar Germany,
affiliation with the Nazi Party seems an eminently likely, if not predestined,
outcome. Yet participation was not limited only to membership in the NSDAP.
A final important consideration remains the span of Nazi activism in
relation to other adult activities. For almost the entire cadre, by 1941, over onethird of their adult life was spent in the Party, with nearly half spending fifty
percent or more.172 Given the significant portions of adult life spent within the
Nazi movement, personal identity would certainly be largely inseparable from the
Party. Moreover, ties to the party would be reinforced at the career level. For
these men, the NSDAP offered career opportunities in a time of severe labour
crisis. Additionally, given their social origin, previous profession and
extrapolating the realistic chances for social mobility, a career with the Nazi Party
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provided prospects better than could be expected elsewhere. Nazi political
success and the seizure of power could only buttress such perceptions. In
simplest terms, participation in the Nazi movement not only helped define who
one was but what one was and could be. While individual self-awareness of this
dynamic remains impossible to determine, such motives did not undermine, but
in fact strengthened the ideological solidarity and motivations at the heart of
identification with and continued support of the Nazis. Consistent with their
previous experience and life-choices as men of action, enrolment in the SA was
the next step.
While the NSDAP's membership rolls swelled in the early 1930s, so too
did the ranks of attendant National Socialist organizations. The Sturmabteilung
(SA) exploded as tens of thousands flocked to its banner. In just over a year, the
SA grew from 30,000 in August 1929 to about 60,000 in November 1930.
Growth would continue through 1931-1932.173
The majority of Gebietskommissars were SA members in long standing
prior to eastern service in 1941.174 Almost universally, they held leadership
positions. While they tended to rise through the ranks of the SA from relatively
humble beginnings in the SA, by 1941, for example, this sample contained an
Oberfuhrer, Standartenfuhrer, Obersturmbannfuhrer, and a Hauptsturmfuhrer.^75
As Conan Fischer noted, the SA leadership proved predominantly middle class
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and few working class and lower class men ever enjoyed promotion above the
rank of Scharfuhrer?76 According to Miihlberger, 86.6% of the SA leadership
was either of lower middle class (74.5%) or upper middle class (12.2%) origin.177
As higher ranking SA men, future Gebietskommissars fit in this pattern as about
83% (5/6) of the sample were from these social groups.178
The SA consistently attracted youth: "given that over half of the
stormtroopers were under 25 years old and around 80% under 30 years of age
before 30 January 1933."179 However, in this area Gebietskommissars diverged
from national norms as only 44% were under that age at their time of enlistment.
Yet if the age grouping is expanded to under 35, the figure jumps to 77%.180 The
result suggests that while age was broadly consistent with wider trends, they
were generally drawn from a slightly older cohort. Importantly, future
Gebietskommissars tended to enjoy frequent promotion and SA leaders were
generally older than their men. At the rank of Sturmfuhrer and above, only
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26.3% were under age 30.181 In this area, where adequate data exists to
determine SA rank and age, Gebietskommissars conform very closely to the
trend toward an older leadership cohort, more experienced in both adult life and
Nazi radicalism.
As mentioned, the lower middle and middle classes were strongly
overrepresented among the ranks of the Gebietskommissars. Given links
between class and leadership position in both the NSDAP and the SA, this reality
runs in line with broader trends. In general, those of high social origin tended to
finish better than their inferiors in the "scramble for posts" within the Party.182
Further, as leaders, most Gebietskommissars possessed some form of higher
education suggesting a level of "administrative competence" valued by the SA
and reflected in the tendency to promote those with more education.183
While the movement itself slowly moved to a more heterogeneous
reflection of wider German society, the social background of functionaries
remained considerably more rigid, as the "functionary corps...at the lower and
intermediary level of the party's organizational hierarchy in the Gaue" remained
in the hands of "individuals with a middle class background."184 In short, the
further up the ladder the position, the greater the proportions of middle class and
elite backgrounds were represented. As Michael Kater noted, this reality should
not be surprising as the Nazi functionary corps "was closely related to the
181
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complex system of administrative tasks to be performed by the party hierarchy:
the higher the degree of skill required, the more qualified and sophisticated were
the administrative personnel."185 Further, Kater stated, this was firmly in step
with the "the same laws of rationality that governed other institutions,
corporations, and even other political parties in the Weimar Republic."186
Competition for positions in the party tended to give a distinct advantage
to those of a higher social background. A university education proved a "leg up"
over working class comrades as the Party tended to perceive formal education
as an indicator of expertise and ability. Consequently, while the party did steadily
move toward a more homogenous reflection of the broader German society,
changes proved more wide than deep.187
A similar pattern emerged in the ranks of the SA, where lower class
representation was even higher. Akin to other associate organizations, the
middle class and elites were again strongly over-represented in leadership
positions engendering a distinct disconnect in terms of social origins between SA
"chiefs and Indians." Within the higher echelons (Standartenfuhrer and above),
the split was acute as "before the Nazi seizure of power, the higher ranks of the
SA leadership corps were the almost exclusive preserve of the middle class and
elite with a few workers reaching the higher ranks of an organization which had
predominantly working class rank and file."188 Only at the lower ranks were
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recruits from the lower classes able to make their mark. Again, like the Party, the
"complexity of the administrative tasks which were performed by the middle and
higher-ranking SA leaders generally excluded the less educated from advancing
within the SA hierarchy beyond the non-commissioned officer level."189 Simply,
the lower classes were seen as being better street-brawlers than paper-pushers
or party big-wigs.
Future Gebietskommissars generally reflected these patterns. As
mentioned, they conformed to norms in terms of social background, education
and age. Further, Gebietskommissars reflected the "military ethos" that
permeated the SA in general and particularly the leadership.190 While most were
not war veterans, as were 50.4% of SA Sturmfuhrer or above, they were not
without some form of combat or military experience. If military and paramilitary
service is taken together, Gebietskommissars again conformed to broader
characterizations of the SA leadership. Like most SA leaders, they possessed
military and political experience that both assisted promotion and matched wider
patterns of right-wing activity and the SA leadership's links to paramilitary
organisations.191 In significant ways, future Gebietskommissars backgrounds
were generally consistent with other SA leaders.
Given their later reputation as "eastern nobodies, these "party hacks"
could hardly have been expected to exhibit significant ability.192 However, later
judgments notwithstanding, evidence suggests an important number enjoyed
189
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successful, even mercurial careers in the SA. Three examples demonstrate how
successful pre-war SA careers could actually be.
Despite his late entry into the Party and SA ranks, Gerhard Erren
successfully moved from Scharfuhrer to Sturmfuhrer prior to eastern deployment.
A teacher by profession and a Nazi by inclination, he parlayed his experience
and commitment into an instructor's position at Krossinsee by 1939. Fritz
Buschmann, the former Wehrwolfmann and pharmacist, experienced similar
success. In 1931 he held the rank of Truppenfuhrer but just three years later
was an Obersturmbannfuhrer and the leader of Standarte 205 in Soldin. The
case of Rudolf Werner proves the most remarkable. From Truppenfuhrer ir\
1931, he shot through the ranks of the SA to attain Standartenfuhrerby 1934 and
Oberfuhrerln 1940.193 While Werner was exceptional is this respect, future
Gebietskommissars, in general, enjoyed successful careers in Nazi Germany.
They exhibited a consistent vertical movement in the organizational hierarchy.
Outside the Party, one was consigned to a middle class occupation or minor
NCO (usually corporal), but by donning the Brown shirt a transformation
occurred. Only when they were transferred to the military after the outbreak of
war, was any significant career regression evident.
It is difficult to imagine a career that offered such open-ended
opportunities. Certainly, the SA and later the civil administration presented future
Gebietskommissars with opportunities that were simply not possible in the civil
service or the Army. While certainly not the norm, the transformation from
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corporal to officer, proved possible within the ranks of the Gebietskommissars.
Indeed, the importance of the career factor must be recognized. Steady
promotion and generally positive assessments suggest that many had found their
place, demonstrated some measure of ability, cultivated advancement through
the ranks and at a minimum appeared committed Nazis. Such aptitude certainly
is not universal but does suggest that Gebietskommissars genuinely were men of
ability and ardent Nazis. Whatever their capabilities, eastern deployment in 1941
would provide their grandest stage and greatest opportunity.
This sketch of the social profile, combined with other key biographical
data, yields a composite picture that allows for a Weberian "ideal type"
characterization of a Gebietskommissar archetype.194 While duly recognizing
that Gebietskommissar motives and choices were legion, there is a certain level
of commonality suggesting a chain of likely outcomes leading the individual from
youthful paramilitary to Nazi functionary and radical problem-solver. While
aspects of personal disposition, the filter through which historical circumstance is
most intimately filtered, is perhaps impossible to fully understand, broader
processes, cultures and relationships prove more accessible. Consequently, it
is possible to construct a composite formula that illuminates the path to the east
and allows for the construction of a Gebietskommissar X archetype.
Gebietskommissar X was born on the fringe of the fin-de-siecle
Kaiserreich into a lower class family. He was educated in a local primary school
before completing his education in a trade school. Throughout this process he

See Appendix I for full biographies.
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could see the apparent rise of Germany to the centre of the world stage and
enter a war for European hegemony. The Great War dominated his youth.
Defeat in 1918 shook the foundations of his worldview and demand participation
in the action. In war and defeat, the transformation from boy to man would be
forged in institutions of violence. Clearly, the cardinal lesson of both the Great
War and subsequent chaos was that dominance and power established through
violence was the cornerstone of human relations. Significantly, he also became
a decorated and experienced killer. Voluntary participation in (para)military
activities proved an entirely likely outcome. With his early adult life set firmly
within this context, his career trajectory altered radically from one rather narrowly
defined by class and formal education to one of open-ended possibility based on
martial virtues and the meritocracy of violence.
The continuity of violence throughout his career suggests the strength and
lure of the uniform, the regimented life of paramilitarism and the understandable
tough talk of radical ideologues. By the early 1930s, it was clear that life on the
"outside" offered, at best, the grind of class-specific work and at worst, joining the
swelling ranks of the unemployed and impoverished. Nazism clearly offered a
solution: the re-creation of familiar institutional cultures and power relationships
and the opportunity for individual recognition. Outside the movement,
Gebietskommissar X was nobody; within it, his experience was valued, ability
praised and commitment rewarded. The Party trained, employed and valued
him. By mid-1933, the outsider was now the insider as the core power dynamic
shifted from the centre to the fringe. As a functionary within the power
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apparatus, Gebietskommissar X's identity and basis of his individual selfrecognition was intimately tied to his Brown shirt. Such links were reinforced
throughout the 1930s as he attended marches, courses and training schools. He
was not Arbeiteror Kaufmann but Ordensjunker o\ Teutonic lore. He rose
through the ranks and learned his methods of rule and relationship management
there.
War in 1939 was an important reality check. Despite the apparent
success of his Nazi career, the invasion of Poland saw his return to the military.
Importantly, he retained neither the rank nor the associated privileges attendant
to his party status but rather returned to combat as an infantry corporal. In 1941,
his selection to the civilian administration would allow a return to the good days
of his pre-war Nazi career. Even more, eastern deployment not only removed
important constraints but also actively cemented his ascension from nobody to
eastern royalty. For Gebietskommissar X, this validated his life-choices and
affirmed the correctness of the institutional culture. In the late summer of 1941
as he drove into his new fiefdom, how could he be anything but dizzy with
success?
Gebietskommissars were likely Nazis. Overall, most were drawn from
constituencies favourable to the National Socialist worldview. In terms of social
origin, they fit firmly into the broader membership pattern of the early 1930s that
saw significant lower middle and middle class elements moving into the Party's
ranks. For religious confession, again the broader trend of Protestant
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(Evangelical-Lutheran) predominance is duplicated. At least in these aspects,
future Goldfasanen seem entirely "ordinary."
While the majority of enlistment occurred under the age of 35, it remains
difficult to see enrolment as the result of youthful impulsiveness or idealism.
Rather most came to the Party with a significant life experience which certainly
predisposed them to the Nazi worldview but left space to consider their
enlistment based more on rational consideration than youthful rashness or
radicalism.
For most, already quite mature upon entering the Party, their youth was
not spent in a political or ideological vacuum. In fact, a core cadre was involved
early and youthfully in violent performance, in the military ranks or various
Freikorps. Perhaps the most significant outcome of this early experience was the
initiation of a "violentization process" at a young age.195 Active membership and
certainly combat ensured that members had, at minimum, undergone the first two
stages of this process: brutalization and belligerency. The brutalization stage
was marked by the individual's subjugation to an authority figure and violent
coaching reinforced by the glorification of violence. This allowed the overcoming
of religious and cultural norms that had ensured civil behaviour. In the second
stage, belligerency, the resolution of provocation and conflict by the use of force
and violence was engendered and reinforced. For those who saw military action,
two final stages were experienced, violent performance and virulence, during
which actual violent behaviour was inflicted on victims and the combatant
195
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perceived a change in social status as a result of the violent performance. He
was feared while simultaneously being rewarded and congratulated by his
"intimates." Consequently, future violent performance often resulted from
minimal provocation. While this did not mean either a predisposition or tendency
toward violent performance, it confirms both experience and capacity with it.
This socialization in a wider culture of violence did not necessarily lead to Nazi
affiliation. However, it does help explain the ideological preference towards
Nazism and a familiarity with the language and later, the actions of such a racist
ideology.
In terms of when most joined the movement, the cohort can be classified
as older, if not, Old Nazis (Altkampfer). The majority joined the Party between
1929 and 1933, prior to the seizure of power. While electoral prospects certainly
improved within the context of the socio-economic crisis of the early 1930s, it is
difficult to see Party membership as simply opportunism. While
Gebietskommissars were rarely pre-Depression Nazis, neither were they "March
Flowers" who flocked to the Party after January 1933. Still their post-enlistment
Nazi careers suggest a strong core of commitment expected of full-time Nazis.
In short, future Gebietskommissars enjoyed relatively successful and longrunning careers in the lower/mid echelons of the Party apparatus throughout the
1930s. In important ways, they were career Nazis.
Intimately tied to the positive outcomes of membership are the possible
negative outcomes in living outside the Party. Given the social and educational
background of the Gebietskommissar cadre, what counted was not only what
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membership allowed but also what it prevented. The majority came from classes
that, by the early 1930s, were particularly vulnerable to social marginality,
downward mobility and unemployment.
Gebietskommissars prove the consummate "foot-soldier made good."
Almost exclusively drawn from the lower middle and middle classes they
represented the German "everyman." But Gebietskommissars were not "ordinary
men," they were long-term Nazis by the time of eastern deployment. While most
joined the Party after 1929, the role of a particular social context of crisis as well
as ideological solidarity with Nazism must be recognized. In terms of continuity,
a disproportionate number had records of pre-war radical activity, paramilitarism
and political violence. Most Great War soldiers simply went home and even
fewer youths flocked to the Freikorps. But most future Gebietskommissars mark
an important divergence from the broader post-war male experience. In the early
1930s, socialization and ideological preference favoured affiliation with the Nazi
movement and upon enlistment they enjoyed established careers within the Party
itself.
Collective biography provides important clues and insights into
Gebietskommissar behaviour and performance in the east. Additionally, it also
sheds important light on the way the local administration functioned and the ways
in which occupier and occupied interacted. Ultimately, this approach raises
significant questions: how did a Gebietskommissar's background interact with the
demands of eastern deployment? In what ways did previous experience shape
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responses to these demands? Did similarities in background prompt similar
responses?
Finally, collective biography provides an important element in our better
understanding of the Nazi occupation of the Soviet Union. By examining and
detailing the background and "path" of Gebietskommissars to the east, a stronger
sense of the process of cumulative radicalization of Jewish policy is possible.
Consequently, collective biography not only highlights the individual, but
important aspects of the Nazi regime itself.
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Part II
Jewish Policy and Genocide in the Gebietskommissariats, 1941-1943
"When the Lord your God brings you into the land you are entering to possess and drives out
before you many nations . . . then you must destroy them totally. Make no treaty with them, and
show them no mercy." Deuteronomy 7:1-2

Operation Barbarossa unleashed Germany's Weltanschauungskrieg
against the Soviet Union. At the heart of this worldview were the twin pillars of
Nazism: race and space. From its very inception, the OMi possessed a keen
sense of the importance of the Jewish Question and eastern expansion. In
Memorandum No.1, of 2 April 1941, Rosenberg offered his initial and provisional
"systematic construction plan" for the occupied territories. Here Jews were
specifically mentioned in regards to their concentration in WeiBruthenien and
implicitly linked to the region's cultural and economic underdevelopment.196
Rosenberg's position was more clearly stated at the end of the month when
detailing the organization and tasks of the OMi in "handling problems in the
Eastern territories."197 Here the need for a "general treatment" of the Jewish
problem was recognized and forced labour and ghettoization were offered as
"temporary solutions."

This necessity was the first task specifically detailed for

the yet to be created political office of the eastern administration. However, by 7
May 1941, such temporary solutions had become, in Rosenberg's mind,
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"decisive" solutions modeled on existing practices in Lodz.198 While organizing
the OMi in the days prior to the Barbarossa invasion, Rosenberg envisioned the
exploitation and concentration of Soviet Jewry, a vision that did not include
genocide as a solution to the Nazi-defined "Jewish Question." However,
potentially lethal intent was not outside Rosenberg's worldview. In the case of
Russians, the Reichsleiter understood that feeding Germans sat "at the top of the
list of Germany's claims on the East." Consequently, the new masters bore no
responsibility for feeding the indigenous Russian population. Yet even here
Rosenberg envisioned "extensive evacuation" rather than systematic murder as
the harsh necessity in store for the conquered population.199 The fact remains
however that at an official level, mass murder was not directed by Rosenberg.
The most sophisticated official declaration of OMi Jewish policy prior to its
widespread assumption of control was the working guidelines issued on 3
September, 1941. This statement, in Rosenburg's Braune Mappe, predicated
Jewish policy on four important concepts: (I) After the war, the so-called "Jewish
Question" would be "solved for all Europe," (II) given that Eastern Jews formed
the largest concentration of European Jewry, "the experiences in the east could
be definitive for the solution in general," (III) any solution would not involve unGerman "chicanery," (IV) as the solution to the Jewish problem would ultimately
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be a massive undertaking, "occasional actions against Jews on the part of the
local population [were not] to be hindered."200
In terms of ghettoization, both the process and the final product took on a
kind of ad hoc quality in occupied Soviet areas. If the OMi's Jewish policy was
formulated broadly in Berlin, Reichskommissar Heinrich Lohse in Ostland proved
considerably more concrete and practical. In mid-August 1941, Lohse circulated
"provisional directives on the treatment of Jews in the area of the ReichsKommissariat Ostland" based on oral instructions given at an address in Kovno
on 27 July 1941.201 Lohse understood that his directions, however provisional,
were the basis for realizing the "final settlement of the Jewish question" in his
realm.202 This basis, deemed preliminary, encompassed five chief minimum
measures to be applied by the civil administration, including Gebietskommissars,
"where and for as long as further measures are not possible in the direction of
the final solution of the Jewish question."203
Not surprisingly, Lohse's first task was to determine who, exactly, was a
Jew and which Jews would be subject to the directives. In short, Jews were
defined both biologically (racially) and religiously and extended to include
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spouses (married and common-law) of racially and religiously defined Jews.204
Further, only those Jews originating from areas directly occupied by the regime
would be subject to the directives.205 "Foreign Jews" and gentiles "not ready to
share the fate of their Jewish spouses" were not subject to the directives
themselves but were still restricted in terms of movement and obligation and to
be closely monitored.206 Significantly, Lohse recognized the potential for
difficulties in defining Jewry. Echoing Karl Luger's infamous claim, Lohse
empowered his Gebietskommissars with the right to determine "who is a Jew" in
the spirit of the directives, if the need arose.207
While the printed directives were intended primarily for the upper levels
of the civil administration, Lohse clearly detailed a number of responsibilities and
prerogatives of the Gebietskommissars, reinforcing the importance of the local
level in both the proper functioning of the administration in general and in Jewish
affairs more specifically. Broadly, Lohse decreed that the civil administration
would ensure the registration and identification of Jews, and would institute an
extensive series of prohibitions and restrictions to effectively remove Jews from
mainstream social, economic and professional life.208
Lohse's guidelines were not without critics. Most important was the
reaction of Reinhard Heydrich who objected to "the new Jewish policy" on the
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grounds that not "a word about cooperation or Security Police jurisdiction" was in
evidence. The upshot for Gebietskommissars at the local level was the de facto
"autonomy of Heydrich's office to operate without civilian interference."209
Of primary concern was the question of property.210 Based on the
requirement that Jews report their property, all property was to be immediately
"confiscated and secured" subject to deadlines set at the General and
Gebietskommissariat level. Also, reports were generated at these levels in
addition to those originating with "government offices which were not supplied or
equipped by the civil administration." All reports were then to be submitted to the
Gebietskommissar.211 The entire process of property confiscation ended at the
local level and, in very practical terms, became part of the portfolio of the
Gebietskommissar.
A similar process occurred in terms of the "duty of delivery" imposed on
the Jewish population. According to the guidelines, the civil administration
(including the Gebietskommissar) enjoyed the right to make special demands for
property and assets from both individuals and the community. As a result, any
requisitions made by the civil administration that did not impede "scanty
subsistence" were not only condoned but, in most cases, demanded.212 Further,

^

Haberer, "German Police," 23.
Martin Dean, "Die Enteignung "judischen Eigentums" im Reichskommissariat
Ostland 1941 -1944,"Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust
(Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2000), 201-218.
211
Reprinted in Nazi Conspiracy, v.3, 802-3.
212
Ibid, 803. In these terms the value of the directive became very clear with
arrival of the administration. Given the administration's need to provision itself
with everything from accommodations to dinner sets, local Jews became the
primary providers. According to Lohse's directive, Jews need only retain "that
210

82

Jews could not hope to recover any losses through subsequent employment or
labour. Not only was economic activity and employment severely restricted but
wages themselves were set at a fixed per diem rate of 0.20 RM for each family
member, paid monthly in advance.213
In this manner, Jews would be stripped of all currency and other
financial assets such as securities, stocks, gold and jewellery. Once confiscated,
these liquid assets were registered and the records as well as the articles
themselves delivered "to the fund of the area Commissar [Gebietskommissar]...to
be safeguarded by the latter."214 Consequently, from the beginning of the
occupation, the Gebietskommissar played a central coordinating and
administrative role in the liquidation of Jewish assets and their effective removal
from everyday life. Shortly, they would also become central in the liquidation of
the Jews themselves.
After receiving Lohse's directives in August 1941, the Gebietskommissar
understood that Jews no longer had a place in what passed for civil society.215
Accordingly, guidelines to ensure this was "emphatically striven for" were, if need
be, provided even if consideration was to be given to "local economic
conditions."216 In line with the broader understanding of the centrality of food
economics and provisioning, Jews were to be "cleaned out of the countryside"
and removed from trade, particularly agricultural. No means to effect this were
portion of their household articles necessary for scanty subsistence (furniture,
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specified. Simply, while local and economic conditions might impact (perhaps
mitigate) the process, the administrator must have understood that he was
expected to vigorously remove all Jews from rural areas, trade and participation
in any agricultural dealings by means of his own devising. Apparently, Lohse
was more concerned with result than process.217 Conversely, in terms of
ghettoization, the process was clearly spelled out.
The overarching principle in the location of residential concentration was
to ensure the removal of Jews from not only economically important areas but
also militarily and culturally significant ones.218 To this end, Lohse provided
practical guidelines to shape the ghettoization envisioned by Rosenberg. Rural
Jews were to be concentrated in urban areas already supporting a heavy Jewish
population. Residents, dubbed "inmates," would not be allowed to leave. Food
and consumer goods would be provided only as much "as the rest of the
population can do without" and, lest a surplus arise, "no more than suffices for
scantly nourishment."219 Ghetto administration and policing was deemed an
internal matter for the Jewish population under the supervision of the StadtGebietskommissar and the "external hermetic sealing of the ghettos" was to be
ensured where possible by local auxiliary police.220
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The final measure Lohse stipulated was work guidelines for Jews. All
Jews capable of working were required to perform forced labour subject only to
the economic interests of indigenous Christian population. The nature of this
labour proved comprehensive. Jews were expected to work in labour parties
both within and outside the ghetto and, in areas without formal ghettos, would toil
individually in whatever workspace available. Not surprisingly, Lohse mandated
that remuneration not be based on the actual labour performed but on the
familiar principle of scanty sustenance of both the worker and dependents and
with consideration to "his present cash holding."221 Rather than working directly
for the civil administration, Jewish labour was to be "farmed out" to private firms
and individuals who made the appropriate payment to the Gebietskommissar
who, in turn, paid the workers themselves. In this way, the civil administration
established not only physical domination over the Jewish population, but
economic control as well.
The Reichskommissar ensured his subordinates enjoyed a certain degree
of flexibility in the development and implementation of his guidelines.
Specifically, Lohse decreed that ordering concentration, ghettoization and
exploitation measures uniformly were up to each Generalkommissar. For those
unwilling to micro-manage the "proliferation of details" arising in the process of
implementation of the measures, the process could be turned over entirely to the
Gebietskommissar. Additionally, subsequent details could be issued at the
"be distinguished by the wearing of the white arm bands, with the yellow Jewish
star" and "equipped with rubber truncheons or sticks..." In practice however,
many "ghettos" were not sealed or fenced. Sluzk was an excellent example.
221
Ibid, 804.
85

Generalkommissariat level or, upon their authorization, at the Gebiet level.
Within this context, the Gebietskommissars played a significant role in the
evolutionary radicalization of Jewish policy.
While the persecution of Jews generally demonstrated a local and ad hoc
quality, premeditated murder was in the air from the earliest days of the invasion.
In Glebokie as elsewhere in the captured areas, Soviet prisoners of war were
quickly interned. In short order, the nature of this internment became apparent
and marked a distinct shift from traditionally accepted treatment of captured
enemy soldiers. Clearly, the experience of Soviet prisoners of war demonstrated
that the occupiers played by different rules and were willing to undertake radical
and murderous means to deal with administrative and logistical problems
resulting from rapid military success and conquest.223
For the indigenous populations, the treatment of POWs, in most cases,
interned locally, proved an important "first impression" of their new overlords.224
Whatever the truth about Soviet uses for the Berezvetcher Prison outside
Glebokie, the Germans quickly realized its value as a detention center where
prisoners of war from the surrounding area might be concentrated. In the prison
barracks, the remnants of 47,000 Red Army prisoners were interned in large,
uncovered pits. Obviously, this installation could not be hidden from the general
222
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population. Rather posted announcements warned the local population that any
effort to provide comfort to the internees was punishable by death. Such
warnings accompanied by a consistent willingness to carry out the threat and
punishments, effectively isolated the prisoner community from the local
population.225 Throughout the hard winter of 1941 -42, the prisoners of war
subsisted on a straw and sawdust "bread" supplemented on rare occasions by
rotten potatoes.226 By spring, only those lucky enough to escape the camp
managed to survive.227 Akin to the fate of the mentally ill, Gypsies and
Ghettoized Jews, the Nazi solution was final and total.
Belligerency was almost immediately manifested in the vicious treatment
of the civilian population. Later Soviet war-crime investigators termed this "stick
discipline."228 In Glebokie for example, this behaviour generally took the form of
beatings, public humiliation and robbery, often masked as quasi-official
confiscations and contributions. While such activities were rarely deadly, they
took place within an increasingly radical context highlighted by the plight of
locally interned Soviet prisoners of war.
Beginning almost immediately after taking his post in September 1941,
Gebietskommissar Hachmann worked closely with his police assets in the
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imprisonment, interrogation and murder of "undesirables." Perhaps most horrific
was the regular transportation of villagers from outlying areas to the local forest
in the middle of the night. Accused of "anti-German activities," they were shot.
However arbitrary these murders were in reality, the Gebietskommissars retained
a fagade of legality by ensuring that the killings were classified as sentences for
specific crimes.
The killing of "undesirables" in rural areas began shortly after the arrival of
German military forces. Consequently, while the transition from belligerency to
widespread violence in urban areas proved more gradual, in the surrounding
rural areas the shift often proved more rapid. Simply, precedent compacted the
ad hoc persecution stage as the incoming civil administration quickly traded their
bludgeons for bullets.
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Chapter 4
"Where War Lived": Case Studies in Genocide
We used to wonder where war lived, what it was that made it so vile. And now we realize that we
know where it lives...inside ourselves. Albert Camus

Perhaps the most extreme case of genocide and mass murder was in the
killing fields of Byelorussia. The areas under the control of the civil
administration incorporated territories both formerly under pre-1939 Polish
control and from within the Soviet Union (BSSR) proper.229 With the 1941
invasion, German occupation authorities presided over a population of
10,528,000, about one million of whom were Jewish.230 Upon assuming office in
Minsk, Wilhelm Kube remarked that the goals of the civil administration in
WeiBruthenienwere to bring "progress, culture, land and bread, the path to work,
discipline and decency."231 In the end, the Germans brought only work and
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discipline.

By the time of Soviet re-occupation in 1944, about 80% of the

Jewish population had been destroyed.233
As the front line Army pushed through Byelorussia, a military occupation
administration was set up behind it. As planned, the violence that accompanied
the invasion did not move on with the combat units. In captured areas, the
administration fell to military officials familiar with violence and reinforced by the
glorification of aggression.234 As a result, atrocity and brutalization of both the
captured enemy and at least elements of the indigenous population was hardly
an unlikely outcome.
This increasingly poisoned atmosphere of premeditated political violence
in the newly conquered territories marks an important transition from a stage
where the occupiers and, to some extent, segments of the occupied population
increasingly overcame religious and cultural norms that ensured civil behaviour.
Dangerous precedents were set and attitudes cemented in an environment
favouring and rewarding belligerency regardless of the actual threat posed by the
supposed provoker. In this way, the civil administration would enter a "wild east"
already primed for the next phase: deadly, if not yet genocidal, actions. In less
than three years, German civil administrators assisted in effectively ending some
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six hundred years of Jewish life. To this butcher's bill can also be added other
groups including Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and the indigenous populations
comprising ethnic Poles, Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians.
The civil administration and the office of the Gebietskommissar
contributed in several critical parts to the broader process of genocide. The
practical process of genocide, in which actual murder proved neither the last nor
the most difficult step, began with five stages. While the military administration
certainly undertook initial cursory preparations, with the arrival of the civil
administration the process was most fully initiated. The Gebietskommissars
assisted in the genocide by concentrating Jews, establishing ghettos, registering
and compiling lists, removing Jews from surrounding populated areas, and
selecting and preparing shooting sites.
Micro-chronologies supplied by Gebietskommissariat case studies detail
the "proper" functioning of the local civil administration and the path to genocide.
Along this path, Gebietskommissars moved through increasingly radical stages
ending with repetitive violence. However, while Jews immediately threatened in
the wake of Operation Barbarossa, mass murder was neither the central
mandate nor even the first order of business of civil administration. Nonetheless,
even prior to the transfer of the area from military to civil administration, an
atmosphere of violence and fear was evident. Immediately after occupation, the
Jewish community experienced a kind of garden variety brutality not uncommon
to invasions. German forces moving through robbed and beat local Jews as the
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opportunities presented themselves.235 In some areas, the treatment of Jews
took on a far more violent character from the start. For example, the first Jewish
action in Hansewicze occurred prior to the arrival of the civil administration.236
According to later testimony, SS units shot local Jews and buried the corpses in
a mass grave outside town.237
At another level, the invasion unleashed dormant inter-community fears
and animosities, sometimes resulting in violence. Clearly, whatever civil society
that had existed under the Soviet regime rapidly fell away. Given the deadly
uncertainty of the previous months, the arrival of the civil administration
suggested to many Jews that the situation would stabilize and some sense of
normalcy return.238 This, however, proved a forlorn hope.
In Glebokie, rumours began to circulate among the local Gentile
community that Jews had assisted the evacuating Soviets with the arrest and
murder of 2500 Red Army deserters at the nearby Berezvetcher Prison.239 This
rumour was followed by a wave of looting, as Jewish property was pillaged by
local "Blackshirts" independently of any order or supervision by the occupying
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Germans. Yet this event also revealed that however strained the bonds within
the community, they were not yet entirely severed. Despite the concerns of the
Jewish population, the majority of the Gentile population did not engage in
widespread looting nor did the rumours result in a much feared local pogrom.
Significantly, Jewish survivors credited the local council with calming tensions
and exhorting local Gentiles not to be "influenced to do evil." The survivors of
Glebokie even claimed that "where the local population did not let themselves be
easily inflamed, the Germans were not able to carry out their extermination policy
against the Jews easily."240
Apparently, no such sympathies extended to the Gypsies, the first victims
of the Gebietskommissar's involvement in genocide. In late 1941,
Gebietskommissar Hachmann employed his local police assets to have Gypsies
in the rayon captured, transported to Glebokie and "exterminated wholesale."241
In December 1941, 100 gypsy men and their families were brought into the city.
The group was stripped naked and left in the cold. Particularly vulnerable, the
children gradually froze to death while their parents pleaded with their killers to
^4U Rajak, Memorial Book of Glebokie, 27.
241
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shoot them out of mercy. The adult survivors were then marched to the forest,
made to perform traditional songs, shot and dumped in pits. According to Jewish
survivor testimony, not only Germans but local policemen and citizens seemed to
revel in the de-humanizing ritual.242 The murder of gypsies and other rural
undesirables marked acceleration toward killing on a massive scale. The 1941
murders of gypsies but also of local non-Jews established the two types of
violence that the civil administration would repeat, targeting Jews, in the coming
year. For local gentiles, killings were generally selective, targeting rural
"undesirables," useless feeders and those deemed a security risk.243 For
gypsies, the killing was total as the administration destroyed every single one
they could get their hands on.
For Jews, ghettoization facilitated the transition from belligerency to
widespread violence. In Glebokie, formal ghettoization began on 22 October,
1941 when Hachmann personally ordered the relocation of the Jewish population
to the open ghetto. Located, ironically, on Marx and Engels Streets the ghetto
contained 8000 inhabitants at its peak.244 In June and November 1942, fifteen
killing actions took place in the Glebokie district.245 The majority of shootings
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were carried out in June 1942 by Einsatzkommando 9 (EK 9/Trupp Lepel).246
Within the city, mass shootings began on 3 June 1942 with two further actions
quickly following on 20 June 1942, and again in August in the Borok forest about
1.5 km outside the city.247 By the end of the killing, EK 9 supported by the
Gebietskommissar had cut the ghetto population in half.248 In August 1943, the
remaining 5000 inhabitants were murdered.249
The "second sweep" of shootings in 1942 marks not only the transition of
the civil administration from belligerency to violent performance but also details
their continued participation in two types of killing operations generally applicable
to all areas under civilian control. Mirroring earlier murders of Roma, in the
district's hinterland, Hachmann and his staff engaged in total killings. This
highlights the first type of killing operations in which entire communities were
destroyed without a specific selection process. In smaller ghettos located in rural
towns not only were shootings carried out on the order of the Gebietskommissar
but also overseen by his staff personally. The case of Dokschizy (May 29-30,
1942) suggests that the civil administration and the office of the
Gebietskommissar played a primary role in both the coordination and execution
of killing actions even prior to the widespread campaign of EK 9 in June.250
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On May 30, the killers arrived by truck from Glebokie. According to Soviet
witnesses, this group was composed of forty "German gendarmerie under the
leadership of District Gebietskommissar Hebeling."251 The Gendarmerie first
encircled then began to clear the local ghetto containing about 250 Jews. Under
orders, the head of the Judenrat, Rabbi Kats [sic], ensured that the Jews were
assembled with their belongings and moved in to a local social "club."252 For half
an hour, the Jews waited unmolested. Then, Hebeling arrived and ordered his
men to "start working." The victims were forced to undress and led from the club
in groups of five in the direction of the railway station where pits had been
prepared. Along the way, the Jews were beaten and humiliated.
Initially, the killers intended to bring groups of five to the pits where they
would then be shot in large numbers. However, due to the several escape
attempts, Jews were brought, four at time, to pits. Forced to sit on the edge of
the pit, most were shot.253 Numerous witnesses definitively identified who
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headed the "whole operation": Deputy Gebietskommissar Hebeling. In this case,
witnesses stated that "the Jewish population was shot on his order."254
The June 1942 shooting operations in Glebokie city highlight the second
type of killing operation, selective shootings. Before dawn on 20 June, an interagency taskforce consisting of the Gebietskommissar and staff, local police and
SD elements surrounded the ghetto. Whatever interagency disagreement
infected the upper levels of the Nazi regime in terms of Jewish policy, it was not
reflected in these operations. The murder of the Glebokie Jewry was certainly a
joint venture.
Under the guise of distributing work permits, Jews were removed from
their homes into the Sports Plaza. Once assembled, Hachmann addressed the
victims, assuring them of their safety and informing them that they were
assembled to determine those for transportation to other cities for labour and
those to remain in Glebokie. Jews selected for transportation were moved to the
left, those to stay to the right. In reality, the civil administration and the SD
selected "useful Jews" to be spared. The majority did not fall into this category
and were sent to the right. Characteristically, the shooting area was located
outside the city. The doomed population moved on foot to the site, where they
were shot. The civil administration, cardinal in the planning and exectution of the
operation, then arranged that the site be secured and the pits covered.
By 29 June 1941, German forces were in complete control of Lida. The
killing of Jews and other "undesirables" in the area began shortly. On 8 July,
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1941, some twenty members of Einsatzkommando 9 (Einsatzgruppe B) rounded
up between about eighty and 180 Jewish men, mostly members of the
"intelligentsia."255 Identified by local gentiles, these initial victims were
transported about two kilometres outside the city and murdered, their bodies
dumped in bomb craters.256 This killing was followed by a second shooting on 8
July when 120 patients at a local psychiatric hospital were murdered.257 In
August, about 200 members of the Jewish intelligentsia were killed near the
village of Stoniewicze in Ivje rayon.258 Throughout the fall and winter of 1941 and
into early spring 1942, additional similar small scale actions were undertaken.
Such actions did not always follow a clearly outlined or predetermined plan. For
example, in November 1941, a Lithuanian commando conducted a shooting of
some 300 Jews. First imprisoned in a movie theatre, the victims were "brutally
mistreated" prior to their murder. The origin of the killing order was not
determined.259 The military too was involved in early killings in the area. In fall
1941, 12th Company, 3 Battalion, Infantry Regiment 727 shot Jews in the
Shchuchin rayon.260
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Between September 1941 and May 1942, the office of the
Gebietskommissar worked closely with police assets in the imprisonment,
interrogation and murder of non-Jewish "undesirables."261 Throughout this time,
regular executions, mostly of Jews and ranging from five to thirty people, were
carried out. While the shootings were mostly at the Lida jail, executions of larger
groups were conducted at more remote settings outside the city.
The Jewish community of Lida crossed class lines with diverse
professional, business and labouring, dubbed "extremely poor," segments.262 In
addition, German assessment determined that the bulk of "business and industry
were predominantly in Jewish hands, as well as practically all the skilled labour."
Classification of Lida Jewry began immediately after occupation.
Identified and registered Jews were set to work en masse clearing the largely
destroyed city. As the new administration began to establish itself, Jewish policy
was further refined in accordance with the "Interim Guidelines for the Treatment
of Jews" issued 18 August 1941 by the OMi.263 Predictably, "restrictions on their
accustomed way of life [were] more severe."264 Proscribed from changing
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residence, Jews were also prohibited from walking on the sidewalk or using
public transportation.
In line with developments across the General Commissariat, Jews of the
Lida area were moved into ghettos on the order of the Gebietskommissar.265 In
these ghettos, both urban and rural Jews were interned. Not surprisingly, terrible
conditions proved the norm.266 Aware of the toll such conditions would have on
the population and in line with the goal of exploitation, able-bodied Jews aged 14
to 60 were separated according to gender and "treated differently."267
While the region's six satellite towns each supported a single ghetto, the
larger Jewish population in Lida itself required three. Spread around the city, the
Jewish sections were located on the outskirts and (initially) were not "proper,"
sealed ghettos.268 However, the practical reality was that the entire Jewish
population of the city was interned in some form of local ghettos.
Akin to developments in Poland, the military administration undertook the
initial steps in establishing the Judenrat as a "self-governing body" consisting of
component members and a president.269 In Lida, nine to twelve members
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composed the Judenrat. Initially, a local teacher, Lichtmann, acted as president.
In March 1942, Lichtmann, along with the majority of the Judenrat were
murdered.270 His successor, Altmann, enjoyed a significantly better relationship
with the administration than did his predecessor.
The Lida Judenrat was responsible for "self-governance" of the ghettos
and maintaining order through the Jewish Order Service. In terms of interaction
with the occupation regime, its primary role in Lida was the provision of work
schedules for workers requisitioned by both the Gebietskommissar in Lida and
mayors of surrounding towns.271 Interaction with the administration was primarily
through the Judenreferent, Stabsleiter and head of the Politics, Race, and
Nationality Division, Leopold Windisch. In this capacity, Windisch acted "on his
own authority" on all matters concerning Jews.272 Not surprisingly the
relationship between Windisch and the Judenrat was far from reciprocal.
However, while Windisch was characterized as "very fixed" and "tolerating no
objections," he apparently did [get] "along well with Judenrat president Altmann."
Given the fate of his predecessor, Altmann's willingness to ensure a positive
relationship proved entirely understandable. As the primary organiser of the
Jewish labour pool, the Judenrat also came into contact with the administration
through Rudolf Werner's Economics and Industry Division.273 In this regard, the
Judenrat acted as a kind of buffer, however ineffective in the long run. To many
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of its members, the survival of the community depended on its utilitarian value to
Nazi occupiers as workers.274
In late 1941, the Gebietskommissar ordered identity papers be issued to
the entire population of the area, including Jews. Listing name, age, gender,
address and occupation, the papers ensured that the administration possessed a
complete list of all Jews easily allowing skilled workers to be identified.275 This
more comprehensive listing followed a widespread poster campaign that
encouraged Jews to register at the offices of the mayor, county mayor or at the
local police station. While the civil administration produced the documents and
local mayors distributed them, ultimately, the Judenrat was tasked with the
"practical problems" of generating the list; ensuring that all Jews actually
registered.276
Concurrent with the issuance of these new papers, the administration also
produced additional work permits, special papers conferring the status of
indispensable on those employed in skilled trades and distributed by individual
workshop foremen.277 These permits not only established the recipient's identity
as a "useful" Jew but also allowed one to leave the ghettos and, more
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importantly, receive extra or "supplementary" rations.278 By early 1942, the civil
administration of Lida had effectively prepared local Jews for exploitation. This
process of separation, concentration and identification, particularly into
categories of utility, proved important initial stages on the path toward
genocide.279
As the civil administration established itself in the area, it played a cardinal
and active role in a number of killings. For example, from its earliest days in the
area, the administration targeted local Gypsies. During the fall and winter of
1941-42, the auxiliary police shot eighty-six Roma in custody in the Lida jail.280
This killing occurred after the group had been in custody for some time and their
fate discussed by senior administrators.
The sporadic murder of Jews also continued. For example, on 14
February 1942, the Gebietskommissar provided a written order to the
Gendarmerie that sixteen Jewish workers who had arrived late to work be shot.
The execution was carried out in a field outside the Koscharowa ghetto.281 Later,
in April 1942, both Gebietskommissar Hanweg and his Staff Leader, Windisch,
took a personal interest in ordering the detainment of the local nail factory's
Jewish accountant. After independently ordering his arrest, the bookkeeper was
forewarned and able to flee, most certainly saving his life.282 Finally, in late April-
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early May 1942, the administration ordered the killing of eighty Jewish workers
employed by a "warehouse for confiscated goods." Whether or not all such
killings originated with Hanweg is impossible to determine. However, it is certain
that the orders came from the civil administration.
While the severe winter temporally prevented widespread shootings
across WeiBruthenien in 1941, the spring thaw saw the killing campaign begin in
earnest. For the Lida region, the murders were conducted over four days in early
May 1942. Before dawn on 8 May 1942, an inter-agency death squad consisting
of both local police and SD elements surrounded the three Jewish areas of
Lida.283 The previous day, in preparation for the operation, the civil
administration had prepared an updated list of all Jews and their residences with
the assistance of Judenrat officials. Under the guise of an identity check, Jews
were removed from their homes into the streets, assembling into "scantily
dressed" columns. Those unwilling or unable to muster were shot. The columns
massed at three different selection areas on the outskirts of town.
Members of both the civil administration and the SD began the selection of
"useful Jews" to be spared. Staff officers of the civil administration traveled
between collection points throughout the morning to oversee the process.
"Indispensable workers," working youths and "skilled artisans" were shunted to
the left. The majority did not fall into this category and were sent to the right. In
283
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this manner, no less than 5670 Jews were slated for destruction.

En masse,

victims were walked a short distance outside the city to the killing site. Under the
eyes of numerous agencies, they were shot, primarily "by Lithuanian and Latvian
execution commandoes, some of whose members were visibly under the
influence of alcohol."285 As they had in Glebokie, the civil administration secured
the site and covered the pits.
While this shooting appears a model operation, during the selection
process, a peculiar divergence emerged. At two selection points,
Gebietskommissar Hanweg and his deputy Windisch clashed over of the
selection of individuals for execution. In the first case, Hanweg's intervention
saved the life of a Jewish house decorator whom Windisch had sent to the
right.286 Later, at another selection point, Windisch publicly "reproached"
Hanweg for sparing too many Jews by sending them to the left.287 Perhaps more
significantly, later Jewish testimony asserted that Windisch was not alone in his
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criticism claiming that Hanweg also "received a severe reprimand from those in
charge of the SS and SD and was formally and politely requested not to interfere
or hinder the action."288
Not surprisingly, the relationship between Hanweg and his deputy soured
in the wake of the May shooting operation. In what appears more the result of
professional and procedural differences, in late summer 1942, Windisch
appealed for his superior's removal. Turning to Generalkommissar Wilhelm
Kube, Windisch charged Hanweg, whom he characterized as a "failure," with
being entirely "too soft and too lax."289 Based on these charges, a meeting was
convened in fall 1942 composed of Kube's representative Rein, Hauptkommissar
Fenz (Baranowitsche), Windisch and Hanweg. In this forum, Windisch
repeatedly criticized Hanweg but, ultimately, was squelched by Fenz. However,
the matter reached beyond WeiBruthenien as Kube himself reported Windisch's
"stink" to the personal Referat of the OMin Berlin. Beyond the public dressing
down received by Windisch, the matter was simply dropped.
Whatever Hanweg's incompetence, it was not significant enough to
warrant either his removal or censure after the May shooting operation.
Ultimately, however, Hanweg was replaced. In early 1944 he was removed from
his position and posted to a Wehrmacht unit in France; not for his "soft and lax"
demeanour nor even as a result of the failed attempt to protect his Jews. Rather
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Hanweg was removed because his long-standing and flagrant extra-martial affair
with his secretary offended the moral sensibilities of his superiors.290
Gerhard Erren, head of the civil administration in Slonim was the mold
from which the characterization of Gebietskommissar as murderous "butcher"
might well have been cast.291 As Christian Gerlach has noted, Erren's case
clearly demonstrated the "active role that the Gebietskommissars played in the
murder of the Jews...."292 In Slonim, during the "second sweep," some 14,000
Jews were murdered, leading Erren to report that by mid-summer, "the...country
was Jew-free and in the city Slonim a residue of approximately 500 ghettoized
craftsmen and skilled workers [were] available."293
On 29 June, 1942 Erren's civil administration orchestrated the largest
mass shooting in the area.294 Judenaktionen in surrounding districts had not
gone unnoticed by the Jews of Slonim. Consequently, not only did the loss of the
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element of surprise lengthen the required time to carry out the various Aktionen
but also enabled some measure of resistance in the form of attempts at hiding or
fleeing the area. As a result, the civil administration coordinated a number of
agencies in a cooperative and combined effort to realize the destruction of the
Slonim Jewry. Where earlier operations in western WeiBruthenien were carried
out primarily under the auspices of the Security Police (KdS) detachment in
Baranowitsche, operations in Slonim were a joint venture featuring elements of
the Minsk Security Police (KdS)295, a company of an SS-Police Regiment and the
usual assistance of the Wehrmacht and local police units (Gendarmerie and
Schutzmannschaften).296 To this number was also added civilian officials of the
Gebietskommissariat.
In the early morning, Jews in the surrounded ghetto were ordered to
assemble. Indispensable workers were then separated. Those selected for
destruction, the majority, were transported to the prepared shooting site located
in the hills outside the city. Here, indigenous volunteers, under the watchful eye
of their SS handlers, massacred the Jews of Slonim.297 In western
WeiBruthenien, Erren's Gebietwas the first to be completely Judenfrei.
Prior to the appointed day, Erren decreed that all male members of his
staff would participate, in some capacity, in the shooting operation. Having
instructed his employees to turn up, rifle in hand, on the morning of the 29th,

A platoon of Waffen-SS "under Strauch personally."
BA-L AR-Z 228/59, 295, 298-300. Also see Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 701.
Ibid, 297.

Erren personally inspected and spoke to his men.298 As the Jews were rounded
up and transported to the killing site, he made his administration indispensable,
providing trucks, drivers, additional security and ghetto guides to ensure that the
wheels of destruction were well-greased.299 That evening, Erren held court.
According to witnesses, he assigned praise or blame to each of his staff,
according to their actions. After the discussion, levity returned and "one drank
and one celebrated."300
In Hansewicze, the head of the civil administration in the area was the
thirty-four-year-old former SD man, Willy Muller. The Jews in this Gebiet were
concentrated in the southern areas of Lenin and Lohyshin. As late as the end of
1941, there were no Jews in the city of Hansewicze nor did the area even contain
an SD Post. This changed in 1942. At the instigation of the Gebietskommissar
about 200-300 Jewish craftsmen and specialists (Arbeitskrafte und Fachkrafte)
were moved to the city from southern Kreise into eight to ten houses in the
northwest of the city.301 While segregated physically, this area was an open
ghetto remaining unguarded and unenclosed. Interestingly, work Jews also
remained unguarded going to work. Issued work permits by the
Gebietskommissariat, the Jews were employed primarily in the local shoe
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factory, tannery and various construction sites.

While other Jews were

slaughtered wholesale across the OET, Willy Muller actively repatriated Jews to
the city to work for the civil administration. Ominously, in mid-year the SD arrived
and set up shop in the main town of Hansewicze.303
In late summer to early fall 1943, word of the executions in Lenin reached
the Hansewicze's "work Jews." Despite the trust shown them in the maintenance
of an open ghetto, most began to fear for their lives, panicked and fled under the
cover of darkness, with only a small group remaining.304 Not all the escapees
were successful nor were local agencies passive. Both the SD and Muller's
police assets hunted escapees and returned those captured to the city.305 Also,
as the difficulty of eluding recapture became evident, some returned voluntarily.
Not surprisingly, reprisals were harsh, carried out by gallows erected at the top of
the street in the Jewish quarter.
Muller offered an extraordinary story to West German investigators
concerning the punishment for the 1943 ghetto break. He stated that in summer
1943, as was his custom, he walked home at noon from his office. On the day of
the reprisal killings, he claimed that while passing the ghetto, he saw a large
crowd standing around a newly erected gallows complete with twenty to thirty
Jewish corpses.

Ibid, v. 3,1165. Muller claimed the ghetto consisted of "five to six houses."
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The perpetrator of the hanging, Muller asserted, was the SD. However,
his language remained tentative and suggestive rather than definitive. He
claimed to recognize some of the SD personnel, but could not remember if they
were Germans or their local cronies. Only by their uniforms, he claimed, did he
make them out as SD. The most substantial evidence he offered was his
assessment that only the SD could accomplish such a task nor could he imagine
what other agency should undertake such an action.306
However, Willy Muller's testimony omitted important details and
procedural particulars in the "ghetto-break" affair. Given the role of the civil
administration in overseeing the ghetto, even at the most basic level, Muller
simply could not be entirely unaware of the events that would necessarily follow
the escapes. Naturally, the SD leader Alfred Renndorfer reported the break-out
to Minsk. Not surprisingly, he received instruction that such occurrences were to
be avoided in future. A harsh lesson was obviously in order. Rather than the
usual shootings, a more public killing was in order. A gallows would be
constructed near the Jewish housing and hangings conducted as a public and
macabre spectacle. According to Renndorfer, the construction of the gallows
and execution of the recaptured Jews by hanging was not his unilateral decision
or action. Rather, Renndorfer, Muller and Polizeikommandant Max Steinert had
convened on the problem. All had understood that deterrence was in order and it

Mb
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was either Muller personally or through his proxy, Letter fur Politik und
Propaganda Hermann Opitz, who selected the victims for hanging. These
victims were of course, the most obvious, Jews unable to work and the
ringleaders of the escape.307 Muller understood that despite their offenses, he
did not wish the punishment to entirely cripple the labour capacity of his work
Jews. Equally he understood that the escape could not go unpunished and it is
not difficult to imagine his disappointment at having his leniency, in maintaining
an open ghetto, betrayed with Jewish "treachery."
The location of the hangings in the ghetto area is unsurprising. However,
even the site of the killing was the result of inter-agency cooperation. According
to Renndorfer, he, Opitz and probably Muller himself collectively determined the
site of the hangings.308 On the order of Renndorfer, gallows were erected near
the Jewish quarter and the hangings personally overseen by the SD leader.
However, while accepting his cardinal role in the hangings, Renndorfer also
recalled asking and receiving the support of the civil administration, through Opitz
and Muller, in constructing the gallows. The hangings were conducted in
batches of four to five victims at a time after Renndorfer gave the order to
commence. The executioners were other Jews who were tasked with pushing
each victim off the gallows. In this manner, twenty to thirty Jews were hanged.309
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The hastily constructed gallows were not fool-proof. In several cases, the noose
snapped and the victim dropped to the ground. Knocked unconscious by the fall,
they were shot dead where they lay. The hangings were widely attended by both
Jews and Germans. SD men, Latvian auxiliaries, local gendarmerie and
members of the civil administration, including Opitz and Gebietskommissar Willy
Muller were all in attendance.310
Perhaps the most remarkable chapter of this brutal episode happened
behind the scenes in a telephone exchange between Renndorfer and his
superior in Minsk, the notorious SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Eduard Strauch.
Strauch at first instructed him that "all the Jews of Hansewicze be liquidated."311
Renndorfer's response was remarkable.312 He objected to Strauch's instruction
on the grounds that "the Gebietskommissariat attached great importance to the
workshops in Hansewicze, in which the Jews worked." While Strauch did not
relent completely to his subordinate's protestation, neither did he dismiss him out
of hand.313 Rather he suggested a public hanging to achieve the maximum
deterrence. Importantly, Strauch did not order Renndorfer to carry out a
complete liquidation nor did he react negatively to his subordinate's concern for

erhangte Oder ob einzelne Juden bestimmt worden waren die anderen Juden
erhangen mussten. Ich weiss auch nicht, was mit den letzten oder dem letzten
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310
Ibid, 1543.
311
Ibid.
312
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the wishes of the local Gebietskommissar. Rather Renndorfer's intercession on
behalf of the civil administration suggests both men favoured accommodation
over confrontation.
Equally, Strauch deemed the work Jews to be marginal threat. At least
tacitly, he also expressed confidence in the local civil administration and the SD's
ability to keep the situation under control despite the previous security lapse.
While Strauch did set the limits of the impending response to the escape, the
reprisal was adapted to fit local particularities and carried out in consideration of
the interests of the Gebietskommissar. His own involvement and that of his staff
in the hangings confirms that Muller was in agreement with the punishment.314
Further, at some level, he must have understood that hangings were going to
take place regardless of his need for work Jews.315 Thus, rather than making a
futile stand, Muller involved his agency in the process. Central to this was also
his ability, through participation, to retain these Jews most valuable to his local
enterprises.316
Even after receiving Strauch's compromise, Renndorfer still thought it
prudent to discuss the matter with Muller and his staff. Whatever objections he
may have had, Muller agreed to the measure and even managed to determine
which Jews would be killed, thereby preserving the "cream" of his labour force.
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Certainly, the relationship between the civil administration and the SD in
Hansewicze was more than cordial.
This remarkable event suggests that a Gebietskommissar could perceive
which way the wind was blowing, could compromise and could accommodate. It
also confirms important limitations on both the theoretical and practical power of
the individual Gebietskommissar. However, equally important is the reality that
at the local level, interagency cooperation was both possible and practiced. In
terms of wider context, it is significant that this event occurred shortly after the
confrontation between Strauch and Kube in Minsk.317 Whatever Renndorfer
might have thought of Kube and the higher echelons of the civil administration,
he seemingly did not share his boss' distrust in the ability of the
Gebietskommissar and favoured an inclusive approach at the local level. Here,
at the sharp end of the action, the inter-agency disconnect so much in evidence
in Minsk was not a reality. Rather, despite the venomous tit-for-tat exchanges
between their superiors, Renndorfer and Muller continued a cooperative and
mutually beneficial relationship in Hansewicze.
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In July 1943, Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube and SSObersturmbannfuhrer Eduard Strauch engaged in a high level uncivil war.
Essentially Kube accused Strauch of barbarity in the murder of seventy of his
Jews. Kube was enraged that his authority had been undermined by the zealous
Strauch as the Jews were killed without his approval. Strauch struck back with a
scathing report to SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Erich von dem Bach Zalewski. Citing
Kube's failings, he questioned his overall commitment to the implementation of
Nazi Jewish policy and recommended his dismissal. In his report he not only
detailed Kube's short comings but also those of his administration in general. His
report also named Gebietskommissars Janetzke and Hachmann. Unfortunately
analysis of Strauch's motives in penning the report and the difficulties
engendered by his broad tarring of the civil administration remains lacking.
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In early 1943, prior to the hangings, Renndorfer went to Minsk to
personally report his concerns about a Jewish partisan unit operating in
Hansewicze. Comprised of escaped ghetto Jews from the southern areas of the
district, this band was closely connected with local Soviet partisan groups.
Despite the fact, as Renndorfer learned, that the Jewish partisans were only
lightly armed, he understood that they originated from the same areas as the
work Jews ghettoized in Hansewicze.318 The danger was obvious. In
collaboration with Soviet units and despite the lack of weapons, the band
increasingly endangered the security of the area.
In response, Strauch ordered the elimination of the area's Jews. The
order however, did not seem to include, for the timebeing, the work Jews in
Hansewicze itself. According to Renndorfer, Strauch mentioned that he had
received instructions from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main
Office: RSHA) that all of the Gebiet's ghettos be liquidated. The order in which
they were to be liquidated was left open.
The last wave of ghetto liquidations began in spring or early summer
1943, when Renndorfer led a Jewish action in Lenin in compliance with Strauch's
order. In the execution of this action, the close collaboration between the SD and
the Gebietskommissar continued. Prior to the arrival of the shooters,
preparations had already been made in Lenin by the civil administration.
As was customary, the killers arrived in the early morning, including
Renndorfer and Steinert. The detail moved immediately to the local

BA-L AR-Z 94d59, v. 3,1544.
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Gendarmerieposten which had been informed by the Gendarmeriegebietsfuhrer
of the planned action.319 The various tasks assigned and necessary forces in
readiness, Renndorfer then enjoyed his first cup of coffee of the day before the
proceedings began.
When the killers arrived at the ghetto, the Jews were already standing in
the street. Obviously, this show of force indicated something was terribly wrong.
Frightened, Jews standing in the streets protested and moaned and cried
(Jammerten). According to Renndorfer, this was the only time that the victims
openly protested their impending fate. Under the watchful eye of German
officials, native auxiliary policeman from Lenin moved through the ghetto, evicting
those not already in the street. SD men stood ready to move through the ghetto
in force to maintain order.
Once assembled the Jews were then transported en masse to the killing
site. Renndorfer's men drove the Jews to the killing site under the guard of ment
from the local Gendarmerie post. The execution site was, characteristically,
located away from the town and was composed of a number of old World War I
trenches that had been deepened by the civil administration (Opitz) with the help
of the Gendarmerie a few days earlier.
Their fate now obvious, the Jews undressed and in a variation from the
usual shooting archetype, "were led individually to the ditches and killed with
neck shots" delivered by pistols.320 Over the span of a single morning, 180-300
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men, women and children went to their deaths.321 As many male Jews able to
work had already been transported to Hansewicze, about seventy-five percent of
the victims in Lenin were women and children and the portion of working-age
men very small.322 Small children were removed from their mother's arms to be
shot separately.323
The lion's share of the shooting was carried out by the SD and their
Latvian helpers.324 However, the entire affair, apart from the killing stage, had
been organized by the local gendarmerie and Muller's administration. All that
was required of Renndorfer's men was to pull the trigger. Even in this task, they
received assistance from the local administration.
The killing was attended personally by Renndorfer and (likely) Steinert,
Opitz and the Gendarmeriepostenfuhrer.325 Others included Gendarmerie and
Schutzmanner from Lenin. At the Lenin killing, the line between "bystander" and
"perpetrator" was simply eradicated, as everyone who stood at the pit shot at
least one victim. Renndorfer freely admitted his own participation in the
shootings. His admission raises problems with understanding motive. Were
Exekutionskommandos einen Juden von dem Platz, wo die heraustransportierten
Juden auf die Exekution warteten, holte und ihn an den Graben erschoss."
321
Renndorfer claimed: "Eine Panik unter den Juden ist bei dieser Exekution
nicht entstanden. Die Juden sind verhaeltnismaessig ruhig und gefasst in den
Tod gegangen." Ibid, 1546.
322
This perhaps accounted for ( a) why Lenin was liquidated first (b) why later
escapes did not happen in Hansewicze.
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Renndorfer did not speculate on how many children initially survived their
gunshots and were still alive in the pit. He did however acknowledge this
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This detachment consisted of 25-28 men. BA-L AR-Z 94d59, v. 3, 1559.
Ibid, 1546-48. At least two members of the civil administration were there,
including Opitz for certain. Steinert was killed by partisans (shot from the
saddle), only a few weeks later in summer 1943. Ibid, 2138.
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most really "willing executioners" or coerced into committing heinous acts under
duress? In 1962, Renndorfer claimed that Strauch had personally instructed him
to ensure that everyone at the execution site shoot at least one victim.326 While
neither Strauch nor Renndorfer had the authority to order them to, members of
the Gebietskommissar's staff (including Opitz) followed the SD chief's lead and
took part in the killings.
In the wake of the liquidation, Opitz did not return immediately to
Hansewicze. Rather he remained in Lenin to secure the possessions of the
murdered Jews and ensure its transportation back to Hansewicze.327 Apparently,
Muller's second also kept for himself some of the dead Jews' clothing. This theft
he justified as necessary due to the shortage of such items and material brought
on by the war.328
The Hansewicze "sweep" in mid-1943 encompassed several more
actions. About two weeks after the Lenin killing, Pohost-Zahoradzki was
"cleared" followed by actions in Telechany and Lohiszyn. In a now familiar form,
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Renndorfer asserted: "Strauch hatte mir namlich den Befehl gegeben darauf
zu achten, dass jeder, der am Exekutionnort verweilt, auch selber mindesten
einen exekutieren miisse. An diesen Befehl habe ich mich gehalten." Those on
the security detail were apparently excluded. Ibid, 1548-49. Renndorfer
concluded: "Bei dieser Aktion in Lenin musste daher jeder Angehoriger meiner
Dienstelle zumindest eine Einzelexekution vornehmen. Ich selbst habe ebenfalls
geschossen. Opitz die ebenfalls am Exekutionsplatz waren, haben gleichfalls
mindesten je einen Juden bzw. Juden erschossen. Bemerken mochte ich, dass
der erwahnte Befehl Strauchs, dass jeder einmal schiessen musse, sich nicht auf
die Absperrungsposten bezog."
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these operations were carried out by a small number of German SD and their
Latvian helpers with the assistance of Muller's police in the various posts.329
There is no doubt that Muller administered a blood-soaked Gebiet.
However, from the everyday violence of occupation, the final liquidation of all
Jews in Hansewicze was justified as a necessary response to the partisan threat,
whether Jewish or Soviet. Specifically, the small Jewish partisan presence
seemingly vindicated the belief in the portrayal of Jew as threat, whether passive
or active. Renndorfer claimed that Strauch personally ordered he "liquidate all
Jews in the area of Hansewicze" and that the actions were to be carried out by
local SD assets.330
Renndorfer acknowledged, even as he returned from Minsk with the order,
that the children he would kill could not possibly be partisans. However, he
remembered that whatever the justification, Strauch had also impressed upon
him the order's role in the Final Solution of the Jewish question. Except for the
remaining Jews "belonging" to Muller in Hansewicze, the days of partial ghetto
liquidations had passed. In the guise of a partisan war, the area's Jews would be
destroyed. By 1943, clearly "Das bewegende Motiv warjedoch die Endlosung
der Judenfrage."33^ Here, in mid-1943, Renndorfer claimed to finally understand

The tasks of his Gendarmerie and Schutzmannschaft remained primarily
transport and security [Absperrung] of the victims. Ibid, 1549-51. Soviet
perceptions of the occupation and actions are detailed in RG 22.002M Reel 26,
7021-90-30,31,32,33.
330
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the enormity of the project. The assault to "liquidate all Jews in WeiBruthenieri'
was underway.
The liquidation of all Hansewicze's ghettos marked an intersection of
centrally mandated ideological prerogatives and local conditions. The
destruction of Byelorussian Jewry was underlined by motives which were
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Undoubtedly, Strauch feared the
deteriorating security situation and entered the Jewish support for the partisans
into the equation. Consequently, he expanded the RSHA's ghetto liquidation
order to include all Jews in the region.332 At this level, ideological and security
motives intertwined and supported one another. As in so many cases, 'intention
and feasibility' coalesced with deadly result.
Given the context in the testimonies of Muller and others were taken, all
possessed significant reasons to downplay their own involvement through lies of
commission and omission.333 However, the sources providing clear evidence of
Muller's direct involvement are also not without problems. The two sources
which implicate him expressly, the testimony of former SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer and
leader of KdS-Aussenstelle Hansewicze Alfred Renndorfer and the Soviet NKVD
Extraordinary State Commission reports, are not completely reliable. However,
332
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For example, Muller misrepresented the position of Opitz calling him an
inspector when in reality he was in charge of the Gebiet's Policy and Propaganda
department (Referate). However in his testimony Muller later confirmed Opitz's
real position stating: "...Opitzals Letterdes Referates I." Ibid, 1165. The head of
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the Soviet penal system and resulting ill health prominently. Ibid, 1151,1159.
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circumstantial evidence suggests that a more accurate account of the events
would blur the line between Muller as by-stander and Muller as perpetrator.
First, the Soviet findings are damning of Muller. Rather than affirming the
"bystander" persona he created in his witness statements, Muller is portrayed as
perpetrator and organizer.334 Immediate reports and testimony identified him and
his agent Hermann Opitz as the "direct heads of the annihilation of the Soviet
citizens."335 While specific details are largely omitted, there is no question in the
Soviet document that atrocities in the region originated from the desk of the
Gebietskommissar.
Second, Karl Renndorfer's lengthy testimony paints a very different picture
of the fall 1943 "ghetto-break" and reprisals. Clearly, Renndorfer's motives in
implicating Muller must be questioned. However, what resonates clearly is that
while 'fingering' Muller, he never denies his own direct involvement in
atrocities.336 Rather, in this account, the SD and the civil administration enjoyed
a positive, reciprocal and cooperative relationship. Certainly, this appears
consistent with Muller's background in the SD and established personality rather
than the account he himself provided.
While a definitive reconstruction of Muller's involvement remains elusive,
he certainly was more than a mere bystander. Muller initiated the transfer of
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These reports were compiled almost as soon as the area was reoccupied. In
the case of Gantsevicheskiy rayon, NKVD reports and interrogations date from
as early as 11 November 1944.
336
Renndorfer remarked: "I would like to stress however that the responsibility
for this execution was mine." BA-L AR-Z 94d59, v.3, 1543.

Jews to Hansewicze, his administration oversaw the ghetto and his staff
supervised the slave labour. He was aware of killings in other areas, had
ordered executions in the past and had actively deployed his police assets in
outlying rayons with Jewish populations. 337 In terms of the killings in the wake of
the "ghetto break", Muller was almost certainly forewarned and involved, at some
level. At minimum, such an action required that the ghetto be sealed and guards
posted. This security, essential in carrying out the hangings, was initiated by the
Gebietskommissar.338
Finally, Renndorfer understood that the wording of the official instruction to
liquidate the ghettos held a deeper meaning. He stated that Strauch deemed it
necessary to remind him that failure to carry out the order "would be a refusal to
obey orders." Thus, Renndorfer explained , he merely "followed orders."
Further, he claimed that Strauch had it in for him. Following an earlier argument
with Strauch, he did not want his political reliability to come into question.
Renndorfer feared Strauch's motive for deploying him in Hansewicze in the first
place, declaring: "Strauch sent me to Hansewicze with the notice, there I could
die a hero's death." Ultimately, not only did Renndorfer just portray himself a cog
in the machine but also as a man under duress, fearing for his life. In this
inversion, the perpetrator became the victim. While Renndorfer did not meet a
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"hero's death" in Hansewicze, he was wounded in late fall 1943 just a few weeks
after the areas was made Judenfrei.339
Renndorfer readily admitted his murderous activities in the east. Yet, on
several levels, he worked to establish wider contexts of fear, stress and
magnified hierarchies of authority that raise the question of his responsibility and
liability. If he is to be believed, Alfred Renndorfer was an unwilling executioner.
He did what the day demanded because he was ordered to and because the
machinery of destruction in which he was trapped would not allow him to do
otherwise. What impact his confession had for the man himself is perhaps a
question best posed by theologians. However, for the writing of history, the
impact of such tactics has been enormous. In simplest terms, his account asks
the question: "Under the circumstances, could anyone have done otherwise?"
Perhaps the most well-known case of dissent to genocide was that of
Gebietskommissar Heinrich Carl of Sluzk, Byelorussia. In September 1941, Carl
visited Generalkommissar Kube personally in Minsk. At this meeting, he
attempted to negotiate the application of Jewish policy. Carl objected to the
concentration of the Jews, arguing that local conditions in Sluzk made
concentration and guarding impossible. He later recalled that he told Kube he
wanted the Jews to remain free. When Jewish concentration became impossible
to avoid, he implemented "resettlement" only slowly and partially. Local Jews
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came and went as they pleased, subject to a dusk curfew. However, whatever
his efforts, the Jews of Sluzk were doomed.340
On 30 October 1941, Carl wrote a scathing letter, marked "secret," to
Kube in Minsk based on their 27 October telephone conversation.341 At about
8am that morning the adjutant of Reserve Police Battalion 11 entered Sluzk and
informed Carl that his unit had been delegated to liquidate the area's Jewish
population. The Gebietskommissar then arranged a conference with the
commander of the Battalion, First Lt. Brodeck who arrived about thirty minutes
later with the remainder of his unit.342
At the subsequent impromptu conference, Carl explained his concerns
about the impending action. First, as the civil administration had not been
informed in advance, no preparations had been made. In fact, all the Jews had
been sent to work and any effort to remove them "would lead to terrible
confusion."343 Carl then reminded Brodeck that "it would have been his duty to
inform [him] a day ahead of time" and suggested the action be postponed by one
day.344 Brodeck immediately rejected the request on the grounds that his
demanding schedule allocated only two days to the actions in Sluzk.345
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Carl reacted "violently" to Brodeck's refusal. He then raised his second
objection; the economic viability of Sluzk depended on Jews. Accordingly,
"indispensable" Jews deemed tradesmen as well as their families had not yet
been "resettled" and "were not simply expendable."346 Indeed, even some
expendable Jews had remained outside their quarter in the town. In an effort to
retain his labour force, Carl offered to move everyone to the Jewish quarter
where administrative officers would segregate registered tradesmen and their
families. As Brodeck failed to raise any objections, Carl assumed his plan
acceptable and "had therefore the firm belief" that it would be put into practice.347
In fact, Brodeck simply ignored Carl. Several hours after the conference,
the factories and shops were cleared of Jews. Many were taken from their
workplace, loaded onto trucks, taken to killing sites and murdered. Some were
simply shot in the street. While his motivation may have been to protect his
labour force, Carl also worked in the Jewish quarter, segregating "expendable"
from "indispensable." Sometime in the early afternoon, Carl moved to stop the
killing and salvage some measure of "economic life."348 As Brodeck had already
moved on toward Baranowitsche, Carl was forced to negotiate with his executive
officer. The deputy commander had clear orders: "clear the whole town of Jews
would allow him to contact Kube. Carl sent a telex to Kube asking for assistance.
Remarkably, Kube agreed to do whatever he could.
345
Nazi Conspiracy, 786.
346
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Carl ensured that bodies left in the streets were collected and buried.
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without exception in the manner as they had done in other towns." When Carl
asserted the need to consider the economic impact of the killing, the German
policeman appeared "greatly surprised" and remarked on the primacy of political
considerations above all others.349 Interestingly, where Carl had initially failed to
dissuade Brodeck, he enjoyed considerably more success with his deputy. After
some "energetic intervention," Carl forced an end to the killing spree by late
afternoon.
Carl claimed that his prediction of economic chaos was immediately
confirmed, arguning, that by midday, local factories could no longer function in
the absence of their Jewish workers.350 Having informed Kube of his
economically- minded concerns, Carl raised several objections to the means,
procedure and consequences of the killing. The Gebietskommissar remarked on
the sheer brutality, near "sadism" of the operation. In the town, the Jews were
publicly beaten, robbed and shot. The random shooting was so intense that Carl
remarked that his "own police...had often to leave the streets...to avoid being
shot themselves."351 Further, the activities at the killing site outside Sluzk
seemed to further offend the Gebietskommissar who expressed his shock and
horror at wounded Jews digging their way out of the covered pits. Carl
characterized a killing operation that quickly spun out of control. Indeed, the

Nazi Conspiracy, 787. "...economic reasons had never played a role
anywhere."
350
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scene "looked like a revolution" rather than "an action against the Jews." In
these terms, the Gebietskommissar raised concerns about the maintenance of
law and order, detailing widespread looting, extortion and vandalism. Finally,
Carl feared the impact that the arbitrary and brutal behaviour of the police (and
its "Lithuanian partisans") would have on the local ("White Ruthenian") Christian
population. In the orgy of violence, many non-Jews were also rounded up,
robbed and beaten. Further, many residents seemed shocked and
"dumbfounded" at the treatment of the Jews. Carl feared that the Police
Battalion's actions had shaken a people who previously "had full confidence in
us" and destroyed any achievements the civil administration had enjoyed.
While the killing operation in Sluzk clearly demonstrated some of the limits
to the Gebietskommissar's authority, Carl was not entirely powerless. For
example, he claimed to have forcibly ejected "German police officials as well as
the Lithuanian partisans from the shops" at gunpoint.352 Further, Carl employed
his own police assets for this task, stating that they did not assist the killers as
was the case elsewhere. Lastly, Carl exercised his authority in terms of policing
and arrested two "Lithuanian partisans" for looting. In concluding his report, the
Gebietskommissar remarked that he could not continue the Jewish action

Carl and his police did intervene in the late afternoon. According to his
testimony, this required his armed presence and willingness to physically
separate perpetrator and victim. Whether this was to defend against looting or to
protect working Jews is not stated. However, when Carl mentioned looting (788)
he made only specific reference to homes rather than businesses being pillaged.
Further, Carl wrote that he and his staff had "been in it all day long in order to
save what could yet be saved." Ibid and BA-L AR-Z 262/59, 8-10.

intended to restore civil order and "revive the economic life despite the
difficulties."353
Carl's protest and the events of the Sluzk operation raise two further
considerations. First, the Gebietskommissar remarked that his demand (to the
deputy commander) that the action be stopped was based on the disregard of his
instructions.354 His willingness to formulate his demands in such terms suggests
he believed that he actually had the authority to give instructions to the battalion's
police commander. While Brodeck certainly failed to recognize this authority, his
deputy was less certain. Indeed, despite the need for energetic intervention, Carl
did manage to dissuade the adjutant from continuing the operation and exercise
some measure of authority.
The events of the Sluzk operation prove decidedly raw, disorganized and
inefficient suggesting a kind of "alternate model" of a killing action undertaken
without the active assistance of the civil administration. In Sluzk, the
administration did not "grease the wheels," at best proving unsupportive and at
worst, obstructionist. If Sluzk provides a glimpse of what operations might have
been like without the cooperation of the civil administration, their importance as
both active perpetrators and facilitators seems more readily understandable.
As we have seen, mass murder in the civil-administered areas took a
number of forms. Some, like the operations in Slonim and Lenin, were total, a
complete "cleansing" of the Jewish population. Others like Lida, Glebokie,

Carl closed his letter with the appeal: "In the future, keep this police battalion
away from me by all means." Nazi Conspiracy, 789.
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Hansewicze and Sluzk were less complete, partial operations in which the
population was culled rather than liquidated immediately.
In the case of selective and total killings, a four-phase process is evident
that is broadly applicable across all areas under civilian control: namely, the
close coordination of the civil administration with other agencies in the planning
and preparation for the shootings. This included preparing both the victims and
the killing sites, generally carried out locally without the assistance of other
agencies. Next, the Gebietskommissar, his staff and his police assets were
central in the rounding up of victims and guarding the ghetto. Here the civil
administration played a crucial role in not only getting the victims to the selection
point but also preventing panic and widespread disorder. Furthermore, the
Gebietskommissar himself often actively participated in the selection of victims.
While not a feature of the total shootings, the exercise of this ability in numerous
cases suggests that the Gebietskommissar wielded significant power and could,
within limits, spare Jews deemed useful. And finally, the civil administration
coordinated with other agencies in the actual killings. At a minimum, the
Gebietskommissariat personnel, including the gendarmerie, assisted in the
transportation of Jews to the killing sites and securing the area. At the extreme,
as in the case of most total killings, the civil administration itself, with its police,
carried out the shootings without requiring the assistance of outside agencies.
Finally, the administration was responsible for the collection of Jewish assets and
hunting any Jews who had managed to evade the killing.
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The civil administration participated actively in the planning and
perpetration of genocidal shooting operations. In some cases, as we have seen,
the Gebietskommissar even provided the shooters. It is important to note that
the Gebietskommissar did not assume his post as a criminal killer. His
transformation to genocidal perpetrator, like Nazi genocide itself, was the result
of a process. Ideologically indoctrinated prior to service in the occupied USSR,
civil officials quickly were propelled towards widespread belligerency.355 Faced
with the conditions, expectations and demands of administering vast regions in
the east, this belligerency often took the form of "stick discipline", the harsh
treatment of the indigenous population. By early 1942, in the context of an
overall push for genocide from Berlin, the civil administration demonstrated
autonomy and initiative in its implementation of the policy, thereby entering the
third and final phase on their path to genocide. This violent performance is
clearly reflected in archetypical readiness to commit murder. While local
variances and grey zones existed, by 1942, this archetype is broadly applicable
to all Gebietskommissars in Byelorussia.
From the early stages of the occupation, Gebietskommissars did not have
an entirely free hand. As early 15 August 1942, civil officials were made aware
that orders for mass murder came from the very highest levels of the regime and
that Heydrich's "hope for successful cooperation" between agencies was more

A 1944 post-evacuation report from the Generalkommissar of Kiev stated that
the Gebietskommissars were instructed in training: "Ihr geht in den Osten als
Herrenmenschen. Ihr musst ganz groG reprasentieren! Ihr seid Konig, Euch
steht alles zur Verfugung!" BA R6/15/146-178 "Erfahrungsbericht 0ber2 1/2 jahrige Tatigkeit im Generalbezirk Kiew," 31.5.1944.
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than a wishful suggestion.356 Further, "uncooperative responses" to mass
murder offered little chance of success in the long run and certainly made
painfully obvious the practical limitations on Gebietskommissar authority.
Effectively painted into a corner, even those that might object, their "notions of
territorial authority" offended, were quickly apprised of the murderous realties of
the occupation and the power of Heydrich's agency.357
Thus, a definitive line demarcating acceptable from unacceptable
translation of policy certainly existed.358 Yet at another level, as seen in Lida and
Sluzk, acceptable behaviour was more elastic than previous scholarship has
allowed.359 Within limits, sharp criticism was indeed possible.360 Further, Carl's
and Hanweg's cases raise the prospect that these men had little to fear even
when they did not "fall into line." For Hanweg, neither his "soft" personality nor
his very public attempt to protect his Jews, however conditional and ill-fated, led
to his removal or punitive actions against him. As for Carl, his letters of protest
did nothing to either redress his grievances or undercut his authority.
Yet whatever their initial responses, Gebietskommissars generally
proved able to adapt and find a place in the order of things. Certainly, the
significance and influence of the SS-police complex in the process of genocide
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must not be downplayed. However, the actual behaviour of Gebietskommissars
in the process of mass murder suggests that a significant broadening of killers to
encompass a "lethal combination of Sipo/SD and civil-police administrative
agencies" is needed.361 In short, able to imitate and in some cases initiate, the
civil administration was not marginalized or swept aside but proved central to the
extermination process.

Haberer, "German Police,"391-2.
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Chapter 5
"The Demands of the Day": Gebietskommissar as Perpetrator
"Was aber ist deine Pflicht? Die Forderung des Tages."
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 62

As we have seen, Gebietskommissars were intimately involved in murder.
In important cases, they acted not only as accomplices but initiators and as the
very linchpin of mass murder.363 The central question is: what drove
Gebietskommissars to cooperate, facilitate and ultimately, in some cases,
personally commit crimes of genocide? An attempt to answer this question
requires an examination of Gebietskommissar motivations on various levels.
At the most basic level, proving a crime requires the demonstration of
means, motive, and opportunity. For the Gebietskommissar, culpability can be
established on at least two levels: (a) in regard to representing the regional civil
administration involved in crimes and (b) personally permitting, endorsing and
committing various crimes.364 On these two levels, a range of behaviour is
evident, particularly in regard to (b). At both levels, administratively and actively,
the actus reas seems clear enough. But only by establishing mens rea and
therefore motive, can the civil administrator be understood as personally liable
and culpable. Guilt therefore remains a complex and varied issue.
Gebietskommissars were not guilty by association but rather because they held
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and maintained positions inherently encompassing command responsibility. In
short, the buck stopped at their desks.
While larger Aktions generally were executed by other agencies such as
the KdS, the local civil administration proved an important participant in the
organizational preparation and execution of mass killings as shown in the
previous chapter. Certainly, Gebietskommissars represented an administration
that within the framework of the "Final Solution" generally conformed and even
lent active assistance to the grisly work of mass murder.
Individual commission of crimes, beyond those directly related to or
demanded by the office of Gebietskommissar, prove less consistent. With these
crimes, they went above and beyond their official tasks, modifying behaviour to
conform to what was perhaps expected or to meet some other, more personal
motive. On this level, a range of behaviour is discernable. While some were, at
least initially, hesitant, others displayed a remarkable degree of brutality and
became eager killers. However, while not usually engaged directly in the killing
during larger operations, many got their hands dirty in individual, isolated cases.
However, administrative participation is hardly less culpable than active
participation. Whether or not a Gebietskommissar personally engaged in killing
is often difficult to establish. In specific cases, some did, as they and their
subordinates engaged in extracurricular cruelties and murder.365 Yet what
remains clear is that, at minimum, they were generally "on site" and active in the
commission of crimes in the line of duty, as it were.
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This phenomenon was certainly evidenced in Lida, Wilejka, Slonim and
Glebokie.

Their first task was representing the interests of the Reich.

Of course,

such a broad responsibility would be realized in more concrete or ideally,
manageable forms. In terms of Germany's "Jewish problem,"
Gebietskommissars regularly and consistently used the means at their disposal
to assist and, in some cases, manage, the destruction of Jews in their
jurisdiction. The district civil administration made consistent and highly effective
efforts to be valuable, even in tasks with which they were not officially charged.
Their relative autonomy in the "wild east," to use Ben Shepherd's expression,
certainly made their efforts easier to realize.367 The primary means by which this
was achieved was the utilization of police assets and the experience and role in
ghetto administration.368 In carrying out their responsibilities the
Gebietskommissars could carve out an important place for themselves in the
"machinery of destruction." Their concrete responsibilities for these portfolios
meant that they had acquired important experience and familiarity in "Jewish
affairs" on which the SD could rely, particularly by 1942 when the direction of
Jewish policy became abundantly clear. While not indispensable, the local civil
administration certainly had means to facilitate murder, ensuring that the
Gebietskommissar was often not only an accessory but in many cases a key
operator.
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In several instances, anticipatory obedience and a voluntary spirit to
perform according to Nazi dictates led Gebietskommissars and their staffs to
engage in activities that were outside their jurisdictions. Thus, there was a
hidden transcript within the constant negotiating of the Gebietskommissarfor a
"seat at the table." In Glebokie, Hachmann had Roma shot out of hand; in Lida,
Hanweg's Stebs/e/te/" Windisch consistently tormented and murdered individual
Jews; in Slonim, Gerhard Erren ensured his staff "got in on the action" of
cleansing his domain of Jews; and in Hansewicze district, in the town of Lenin,
civil officials stood at the pit's edge shooting women and children in the head.
The line between concrete responsibilities and acceptable supplementary
behaviour seems vague indeed. By exploiting necessities on the ground and
carefully making use of personal networks, space existed for a
Gebietskommissar to prove his ideological commitment and reinforce the value
of his office by linking it to the officially sanctioned Nazi killing campaign.369 At
the local level, Gebietskommissar initiative and a willingness to cooperate could
engender close collaboration and a relatively positive interagency working
relationship.370

This dynamic certainly mirrors what Hans Mommsen identified as "cumulative
radicalization." Further, it is also similar to "the working towards the Fuhrer"
process asserted by Ian Kershaw whereby "initiatives formulated at different
levels, and by different agencies of the regime attempted to accommodate the
ideological drives, the "ideas" of National Socialism, located in the person of the
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A capable Gebietskommissar could ensure both continued relevance and
an important role in Jewish policy right to the end. In their jurisdictions, they are
not swept aside by other agencies. Rather than being detached, they were
central to the realization of the core Nazi reality: a world free of Jews. Within this
context, an ambitious and wily Gebietskommissar could effectively juggle
ideological imperatives and the needs of his own local administration. While
limits certainly existed, power must be understood in its application rather than
simply being what was stated officially. Willy Muller, for example, understood
that some of his work Jews would die in summer 1943, but through his personal
relationship with the local SD chief, he was able to select who was hanged.
Similarly, in Lida, Hermann Hanweg's personal involvement in the "right-left"
selection of Jews was certainly influenced by his own personal needs and tastes.
Therefore, while in hindsight it is clear all Jews would die eventually, some
Gebietskommissars did effectively wield considerable influence and power to
actually preserve "their Jews." As we know, in Lida, Hanweg's assistant, Leopold
Windisch claimed that his boss allowed his own needs to cloud his judgement in
determining who would die. He charged Hanweg with softness and possessing a
rather lax attitude toward "his Jews." For his part, Windisch revealed himself to
be a sadistic thug and brute in addition to his ideological commitment.
In terms of Jewish policy, a Gebietskommissar could take advantage of
the ill-defined policies and decentralized power through his own initiative and

very candid situation reports showed both the positive cooperation that took
place and also, in some cases, the growing pressures on inter-agency relations.
Also see Browning, "German Killers,""! 42.
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improvisation. In this environment, effective power and the ability to make things
happen was, at the local level, highly diffused rather than the sole property of a
single agency. This reality was clearly evident in liquidation operations. While
the overarching context was set in Berlin and interpreted primarily through the
RSHA, at the regional level responsibility and power was more shared, with ad
hoc solutions more appropriate and interagency coordination and cooperation
more necessary. Here the Gebietskommissar was a key player.371
But why and how did a Gebietskommissar become a perpetrator? What
shaped his responses to authority, in this case the necessity to plan and
participate in carrying out mass murder? To more fully understand the
Gebietskommissar as perpetrator, consideration of both the individual's past and
the specific nature of eastern deployment prove critical elements. External or
situational influences can be understood as elastic, both constraining and
enabling individual conduct. Such influences have long been portrayed as
primary in understanding behaviour, particularly in deviant forms. Certainly, the
immediate context of the occupation is essential to more fully comprehending
Gebietskommissar behaviour and motives. Whatever their interests and belief
systems, eastern deployment and the realities of rule provided both the demand
and opportunity to kill. Just as Timothy Mulligan noted that the ideological
imperatives ensured the particular contours of the occupation, so also did the
immediate context of life on the fringe form more links in the murder chain. It
remains unlikely that Heinrich Carl or Hermann Hanweg or even Gerhard Erren,

This stands in contrast to Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected," 621.

the "Bloody Kommissar," would have been mass murderers without the local
events, conditions and opportunities in the east.
People kill but the larger question to address this is: why these people?
To understand why these people engaged in atrocities without either much
prompting or protest, the interplay between personality and historical context or
contemporary realities is equally relevant. In general, Gebietskommissars were
not "ordinary Germans." But this does not exclude the fact that, in many ways,
they were subject to the same motives and behavioural traits common to all
humans. This common experience can be understood as having three core
components: ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and the desire for social dominance as
expressed in aggression and violence.372
Regional origin is an important factor in understanding the foundations of
ethnocentrism. Gebietskommissars tended to hail from border regions. Pre-war
experience, regional origin and the disputed nature of the frontier could not only
engender, but reinforce the "us-them" aspect of national identity and group
membership. Between the wars, Germany's borderland was frayed, fusing
historically and within the regional and national consciousness with the post-1918
"lost lands." On this frontier, clear ethno-national divisions existed, heightened
by the experience of war and defeat. In this context, clear lines between
communities, imagined or not, promoted and intensified tendencies toward
ethnocentrism.373
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Regional origin, life experience and professional association also reinforce
innate xenophobic tendencies. Similarly, such tendencies were certainly
exacerbated by the experiences of national defeat, paramilitary service, socioC
economic turmoil and the rise of the Nazi alternative. Seen in this way,
ideological solidarity with the tenets of Nazism could act to reinforce additional
factors such as group solidarity, careerism and previous involvement in violent
actions. The Weltanschauungskrieg in the east heightened already existing
elements of xenophobia and ethnocentrism required for war-making, introducing
a genocidal imperative. Not only was "us" and "them" determined and reinforced
by experience, but also actively evoked through the militarized and ideologically
charged atmosphere of the occupied territories. The Gebietskommissars knew
who was "in" and who was "out."374
In the extremely ideologized conditions of the east, these sensibilities
were more amenable to the genocidal radicalization of Jewish policy. In this
culturally alien atmosphere, Gebietskommissars were exposed to large numbers
of "real Jews." Many of these were unassimilated and conformed to Nazi
caricatures and negative stereotypes that also encompassed indigenous Slavs
and gypsies. Not only were German faces in short supply but so too were those
others who couldd be considered safe or familiar. Far from familiar or safe, the
east was alien and dangerous, both physically and in racial-ideological terms.
For Gebietskommissars then, two central pressures, racial ideology and an alien
Co., 1999), 59-95 and Rites Of Spring: The Great War And The Birth Of The
Modern Age (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1989), 208-38, 300-31.
374
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20.9.1941.

war-ravished environment influenced behaviour. In short, ideas and experience
determined categories of insider and outsider. This lowered whatever barriers to
violent behaviour that may have existed.
Collective biography also provides important insights into the development
of rank and status. As noted, "Gebietskommissar X" tended to begin his life
humbly.375 Further, education was largely career focused and offered little
prospect of significant upward social mobility. The opportunities that did exist
generally depended on two factors, martial prowess (or at least engagement) and
a social context of turmoil and perceived deprivation. Military service, combat
experience and ideological extremism acted as cardinal means by which a
transformation from nobody to somebody could be engendered. These factors
confirmed familiarity with violent performance and provided a means to achieve
vertical social mobility and dominance. Aggression as a tool and expression of
social dominance began early in life and was intimately tied to the transformation
from outsider to insider.
Adherence to Nazi tenets that, among other things, praised and rewarded
the human predisposition to aggressive responses provided a natural next stage
in the evolution of the regional commissars. Further, Nazism held sacred the
importance of the leader as expressed in the Fuhrerprinzip. This ideology then
certainly propagated and reinforced the value of a strong authority tempered by
(para)military life, combat and party service.376
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Ideological indoctrination within the party affirmed past experiences and
life choices and codified the ill-defined ideology of para-fascism.377 Additionally,
formal ideological training, particularly attendance at the Ordensburg schools,
marked an important rung in the ladder of ascension through the party ranks. In
these schools, "Gebietskommissar X" became more fully indoctrinated with Nazi
Utopian ultranationlist ideology. In the summer of 1941, they were told to rule, if
not told to kill.
While ideological commitment is not necessarily principal in understanding
murderous behaviour, it has to be seen as a key factor to genocidal
involvement.378 Nazi ideology was an important facilitator, a totalitarian embrace.
Within the precepts of Nazism, significant social and cultural inhibitions,
particularly in terms of violent performance and dominance and race war, could
be overcome. Moreover, its racial-nationalist contours provided a safety net
whereby sense could not only be made of the world in general, but also the
particular and peculiar world of the occupied east and the tasks at hand there.
There are important limitations to the extent of ideological commitment as
a factor for genocidal involvement; it certainly cannot stand as a mono-causal
explanation. As a complementary cause in determining motive and action,
rational self-interest provides an explanation in which the ideological care of a
command paired with the less Utopian notion of self-interest.

While Koch does suggest that this is particularly important for staff of the RK and
GenK, the notion of a trickle down seems implicit. BA R6/228, "Zentralblatt des
RKUNr. 7," 6.2.1943.
377
Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: Routledge, 1993), 120-28.
378
Waller, Becoming Evil, 184.
143

Rational self-interest also ensures a vital degree of agency be credited to
historical actors. By featuring self- interest as a factor in understanding the
Gebietskommissars, vital aspects of choice and decision-making enter the
equation and help explain important realities of their behaviour and perpetration
of mass murder. No Gebietskommissars resigned rather than kill. In general,
disagreements tended to be over perceived violations of authority and
jurisdiction, rather than the morality of mass shootings.379 In general, the
demands of the day meant that the Gebietskommissars would protect their turf.
They protested the means and procedures of Aktions rather than the murderous
actions themselves.
Importantly, personal pursuit of status, rank and dominance was facilitated
by the experiential and socio-economic realities evident in the lives of future
Gebietskommissars. Affiliation with the NSDAP benefited the individual and
confirmed the desirability of membership as a key component of achieving,
maintaining and expanding personal power and status. Conversely, this
reinforced natural tendencies toward aggressiveness in relation to outsider
groups. In a contested environment, such as the occupied east, aggression was
more easily expressed in violence. Faced with escalated scales of violence,
Gebietskommissars maintained their social status vis a vis the insider group by
making themselves indispensible in servicing the "machinery of destruction."
Simultaneously, violence also promised to maintain and expandtheir dominance

The two most compelling cases are Sluzk and Brest-Litovsk.

in relation to outsiders. In terms of both garden variety brutality and mass
murder, the Gebietskommissars "killed two birds with one stone."380
Striving for social dominance is certainly a fluid, negotiated and vulnerable
experience. Clearly, there exists the potential to express dominance through
aggressive responses. This predisposition towards aggression as a means to
both secure and maintain status is also evident in the collective biography of
Gebietskommissars. The Gebietskommissar's position as the "sole
representative of the Reich" in his fiefdom set the pecking order from early on.
While other agencies certainly were present throughout the occupation, the
Gebietskommissar sat a long way from Riga, Minsk or Kiev and even further from
Berlin. He had been instructed to see himself and act as a "king of the east."381
At his disposal were not only the mechanisms of socio-economic dominance vis
a vis the indigenous population, but also the tools of coercion in the form of
police assets. Indeed, whatever the limits of his power and therefore social
dominance, on most days he was supreme.
The role and centrality of Gebietskommissars in local killings shows them
to be autonomous actors capable of specific "subjective calculations" promoting

It must be noted that while "stick discipline" was certainly a hallmark of the
regime, there was a realization among some at the local level of its limitations
and dangers. While the application of violence was re-thought by some, the
tendency was to consider who the target was rather than the overall limitations of
the actions themselves. In short, some local officials began to realize and report
that violence did not solve all problems and could actually do more harm than
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Infra, Chapter 6.
381
See earlier discussion on selection and training, Supra, Chapter 3.
145

benefit in relation to perceived cost and acting accordingly.

Rational self-

interest promoted the pursuit of positive outcomes and was not incompatible with
ideological commitment. While the positive outcomes of mass murder for
adherents to the goals of Nazi racial policy were, by 1942, fairly obvious, for the
individual Gebietskommissar as perpetrator, rational self-interest added two
valuable elements: professional and personal self-interest. By pairing these with
ideological commitment, a fuller explanation of both why they engaged in mass
murder is possible.
Eastern deployment in 1941 certainly marked the pinnacle of their power.
Upon deployment they could take what they wanted and largely do what they
wanted.383 They also had the power of life and death. Additionally, eastern
deployment meant Gebietskommissars were at the centre of the action. The war
in the Soviet Union was the "real war" and Gebietskommissars were not only at
the heart of it but charged with an important role: constructing the Nazi new world
order. For these men of humble origin and status, could any more important
position of authority have been imaginable, could any task, any demand have
been too onerous? Not only did deployment mark a professional high-water
mark but it also cemented the reality that, as Henry Friedlander noted in relation
to Nazi doctors, they were quite significant.384 In this way a blurring of
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professional and personal self-interest is evident. As long-time political soldiers
and cogs in the party machinery, their position as functionary was central to
defining their identity.385 As Andreas Zellhuber noted, the position of
Gebietskommissar marked both a professional and personal fulfilment and the
prospect of both promotion and financial gain. As a "career-break" or a reward
for service, eastern deployment represented professional ascent.386
However, given the relative scarcity of the documentation, understanding
personal self- interest as a motivating factor for Gebietskommissar is difficult.
But some important clues suggesting its relevance are evident. At the local level,
regional commissars played big roles. Three examples are indicative of the
egotistical aspects in their personality and behaviour.387 Heinrich Carl
aggressively intervened to end the wild killing spree in Sluzk and even protested
in writing to his superior in Minsk, Wilhelm Kube.388 While in this case, the limits
of Gebietskommissar authority were certainly exposed, Carl's forceful personality
and belief in his authority are striking. Whatever the message the killers were
sending, Carl did not take it kindly.
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In a different vein, Gerhard Erren viewed himself as an ideologically
reliable, aggressive and efficient problem-solver.389 He valued "high standards"
and "peak performance" from his subordinates and saw to it personally that the
"whole lifestyle" of his office "embodied German culture and the prestige
appropriate to it." As for the indigenous population, Erren sought to teach them
the "manners which command the respect.. .towards the master race." Survivor
testimony further confirms Erren's nature both as a Nazi fundamentalist and a
thoroughly unlikable person.390 In terms of Jewish policy, he displayed a deadly
combination of ideological correctness, professional ability and ruthless personal
pride in the tasks. Hermann Hanweg also seemed not only confident but willing
to revel in the grandeur of his position. He ruled Lida largely as he wished and
even survived the efforts of his subordinate, Deputy Gebietskommissar Leopold
Windisch, to have him ousted for his not being Nazi enough.391 Hanweg was an
adulterer who openly flaunted his extra-marital relationship despite his wife's
presence. Further he cultivated a particularly paternalistic relationship with local
Jews, so much so that after the war he received credit in the Lida Memorial Book
(Sepher Lida) as the "godfather of the Jews."392 Yet, during the May 1942
shooting operation, and particularly during the infamous selection process, he
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played a central coordinating role, not only inserting himself in the process but
also attempting to make his agency indispensible.
Gebietskommissar behaviour represented in these three cases shows that
personality played an important role in how a particular area was ruled. It
suggests that they invested both their attention and energy in the task and also
ruled in accordance with individual egotistical needs and demands. However
they ruled, it tended to be more "hands on" than not. In short, in their roles on
the grand stage of Nazi theatre in the east, they thought highly of themselves
indeed.
Concepts of superiority were both magnified and threatened in the east.
On the one hand, threats to life and limb were an everyday reality of deployment.
While for much of 1941-1942, the partisan war had relatively little impact on daily
life in the Gebiet, Nazi propaganda and racial ideology continued to blur the
distinction between military and civilian as enemy. On the other hand,
Gebietskommissars found themselves in a precarious position in which interagency conflict at higher levels could, potentially, work against them on the
periphery.393 While they did tend to "rule as they pleased", clearly limits and
potential dangers lurked within the system itself. Seen in this way, the east
magnified threats and the potential for loss and negative outcomes, whether
personal or professional. Consequently, when faced with the demands of the
day, Gebietskommissars proved equal to the task, able to insert themselves at

In practice this was the exception (i.e. Carl) rather than the rule.

the very centre of a Judenaktion, either in support like Erren or in opposition, like
Carl.
In terms of killing operations, Gebietskommissars, as the representatives
of the civil administration, refused to be ignored. Carl's intervention and
subsequent protests to Minsk centered on jurisdictional considerations. He
would not allow his agency to be irrelevant. Erren, for his part, involved his entire
administration in the process of the killing operation and Werner, in
Baranowitsche, ordered the killings of Jews personally.394 In all of these cases,
from jurisdictional squabbling to active participation and anticipatory obedience,
Gebietskommissars made important efforts to make themselves and their
agencies relevant and indispensible in tasks that by 1942 had clearly become an
integral component of occupation policy. Individual and institutional ego does
not engender violence alone. Yet when threatened, the transition to brutality and
repetitive violence becomes likeier. From the outset, Gebietskommissars faced
professional and personal threats from both the environment and nature of the
occupation. Their actions can therefore be seen as simultaneously reactive and
proactive efforts to maintain, reinforce and perhaps expand their authority vis a
w'sthe indigenous population and within the Nazi polyocracy. At some tasks,
Gebietskommissars fared poorly while in others, particularly murder and
genocide, they proved remarkably adept.395
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The nature and function of the occupational administration is also relevant.
Nazism magnified hierarchies of authority, while it also provided access to power,
dominance and personal fulfillment.396 Yet Nazism in turn made important
demands on Gebietskommissars. Some of these demands proved too much,
while others, particularly the evolutionary radicalization of race policy met with
more success and ingenuity. Ideological imperatives ensured a particular flavour
to occupation.397 Mass murder and genocide routinized violence. The demands
of the hour required the willingness to kill. More often than not the civil
administration responded, as did so many other agencies, "voluntarily,
spontaneously and enthusiastically."398 With rare exceptions, in the pressure
cooker of the east, Gebietskommissars fulfilled their duty with terrible efficiency,
with truncheon, noose and rifle.399
By 1942, clearly Gebietskommissars were well primed to be killers. The
final link in the murder chain, the process of escalating commitment was
participation in the large-scale Jewish liquidation operations and ghetto clearings.
Whatever the local specifics and idiosyncrasies of each particular operation or
the ragbag nature of what had previously passed for Jewish policy, these largescale actions implicating the civil administration tended to be as brutal as they
were analogous.
396
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Ideology, history and ethnicity do not kill people. Yet, to an important
extent, these factors do matter in understanding perpetrator motivation and
decision-making. People and ideology matter. On the one hand,
Gebietskommissars were fully immersed in the violent culture of radical paramilitarism and Nazism.400 On the other hand, beginning in 1941, they found
themselves within the context of a Weltanschauungskrieg that built on and
magnified both their natural and experiential proclivities towards aggression.
Gebietskommissars existed in an environment that not so much changed as
heightened both latent and learned characteristics.401
However evolutionary the radicalization of Jewish policy was, whatever
the contours of that murderous problem-solving, Gebietskommissars were
eventually tasked with assisting in the genocide of Soviet Jewry.402 In the end,
the demands of the day meant the liquidation of all Jews regardless of whether
they were "productive Jews" or useless-eaters. The practiced "muscle memory"
of long-time Party functionaries and radical paramilitaries could certainly prove
influential. By 1942, whatever their previous anticipatory obedience,
Gebietskommissars faced the demand to kill and the opportunity to comply or
not. Whatever their personal motive, in every case, whether the results were
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positive or negative for their effective rule, Gebietskommissars complied. When
asked "Was aberistdeine Pflicht?", Gebietskommissars responded: "Die
Forderung des Tages."
Gebietskommissars were not ordinary men.403 They were long-term Nazis
with practice and ability in the application of political violence. Still, despite their
backgrounds in the trenches, Freikorps and Party machinery, despite their longterm allegiance and affiliation with the Nazi world view, they did not arrive in the
east as mass killers. In 1941, they arrived at their posts knowing that a new
reality was in the making and that they would be expected to rule with an iron fist.
Yet none could have known the terrible enormity of the radical racial restructuring
in the east. Surely, they understood that there would be no place in the new
world order for the gypsy, Jew, communist or the mentally ill. But the scope and
certainly their role in realizing final solutions to these problems could not have
been or ever been guessed. Like many agencies engaged in genocide, the civil
administration and the Gebietskommissars were not created or intended for that
purpose. But in the undertaking of mass murder, Gebietskommissars and their
personnel fashioned and maintained concrete responsibilities. In WeiRruthenien,
they proved central to the entire undertaking. Time and again, the local civil
administration aided and assisted, in some cases even without formal request,
agencies specifically charged with the cleansing of Germany's new Lebensraum.
Consequently, such concrete responsibilities demonstrate their important place
within the process of mass murder.
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As noted, the Gebietskommissar did not arrive at their posts as mass
murderers. It is not surprising therefore that some would hesitate to act, still
trying to comprehend that the Nazi project had reached a geonocidial stage.404
Perhaps the most common form of foot-dragging was partial compliance. Orders
were carried out reluctantly, complied with technically, if not in spirit. Closely
related was the stratagem of prudent selection. In several cases,
Gebietskommissars attempted, with varying degrees of success, to exclude
some victims. In Sluzk, Carl attempted to retain his Jewish office personnel.
While certainly framing his appeals in pragmatic terms, he none-the-less risked
raising the ire of his superiors in Minsk. In this case, mixed motives were
certainly more evident.405
In other cases, "uncooperative responses" do not seem to have been
altruistically motivated despite the sometimes good relations enjoyed with the
Judenrat and local Jews prior to killings.406 In Lida for example, Hanweg craftily
maintained the persona of "ghetto-godfather", deceiving local Jews. Even on the
appointed "killing day" actively participated in the selection, saving some and
dooming others. Thus, we see a variation on leadership style rather than any
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principled objection or. resistance to the killing project itself. In Hansewicze, Willy
Muller engaged in 'selective selection' even as late as summer 1943.407
The most extreme end of the spectrum is protest. Perhaps the most
dramatic instance was the infamous Kube-Strauch affair over the killing of
German Jews in Minsk. At the local level however, the immediate and official
protests of Heinrich Carl in Sluzk stand out. Yet, as stated, Carl's protests were
focused on process and power rather than the actual necessity of the killing itself.
Perhaps he showed only a limited degree of insight and lacked the kind of ability
possessed by others who better recognized that effective power came from
compliance and cooperation. However, it must be acknowledged that Carl did
indeed protest, and regardless of the outcome, his authority was real and his
wishes and opinion mattered. Yet, in the end whatever their hesitations and
evasive tactics, all Gebietskommissars complied to various degrees with the
Final Solution.
The ranges of response to mass murder confirm that Gebietskommissars
could negotiate orders. They possessed sufficient powers in their areas of
jurisdiction to generally act as they wished, modify expectations and create a
place for themselves in projects undertaken by other agencies. As all power is
relative and dependent on the ability to apply it, the Gebietskommissar's capacity
to navigate a hidden transcript confirms the polyocratic nature of power whereby
authority diffused from the centre to the periphery.
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Given the Nazified, violent and radical backgrounds of the
Gebietskommissars, it is unsurprising that eager killers were present in their
ranks. With rare exceptions, these individuals, whatever their initial hesitations,
quickly embraced violent performance and inserted themselves and their
administrations into the broader killing process. Eager killers engaged in violent
performance beyond the ordinary run of the mill brutality common to the
occupation and attributed ideological significance to their actions. For them, the
eastern mission demanded the most radical solutions. Their actions also
suggest the existence of motives that were not entirely self-serving or base.
While eager killers were not necessarily ideological killers, motives that
perversely saw murder as virtue and necessity are in evidence. Perhaps the
most representative and prolific were Gerhard Erren, Paul Hachmann and
Wilhelm Traub.408 Erren's later sponsored enrolment in the SS and Hachmann's
glowing inspection report strongly suggests that a certain level of professional
pride 409
While Gebietskommissars certainly were radical problem-solvers, they did
not just stumble into mass murder. True, not all understood eliminationist antiSemitism as the cardinal principle of Nazism nor was there universal agreement
on the place or fate of Jews. Yet, there was an ideological consensus that Jews
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were at the bottom of the racially-defined food chain. While component
motivations might have varied in terms of influence on individuals, most
Gebietskommissars in WeiBruthenien engaged in violent performance and all
cooperated at some level with the mass murder of Byelorussian Jewry. As
mentioned already, not a single Gebietskommissar in the region resigned his
post. Not one offered more than temporary, conditional, unenthusiastic and
woolly efforts to save victims of Nazi racism.

Part III
"Kingdom of the Blind": Management of the Unmanageable
"If you can do a half-assed job of anything, you're a one-eyed man in a kingdom of the blind."
Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.

In January 1939, Hitler infamously prophesized that the result of another
world war would "not be the Bolshevizing of the earth, and thus the victory of
Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe."410 At the local level,
Gebietskommissars and their administrations played important roles in efforts to
realize this vision. Clearly, the overarching theme of eastern deployment was the
radical racial demographic revolution central to the Nazi worldview. Of course,
race policy was more than anti-Semitism, rather an imagining of a multi-runged
racial ladder in which the needs of the superior, represented most fully by the
Reich, required fulfilment necessarily at the expense of the inferior. In short,
Jewish policy was not the sum of the Gebietskommissars' actions and activities.
Genocide was neither their primary nor over riding mandate in the east. While
certainly not extracurricular, mass murder proved only a part of their activities.
Ironically it was the task that they did best.
The question remains as to what the Gebietskommissars did, what they
should have been doing and how they did it after their areas became "Judenfrei."
For most, with the noted exceptions of small, remaining pockets of "work Jews,"
the conundrum of the "Jewish Question" had largely been solved by the "Second
Sweep" and even more definitively by 1943. Even as he engaged himself and
410
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his administration in the macabre work of mass murder, the Gebietskommissar
had many irons in the fire, many tasks and many demands to meet.
As the widespread killing operations wound down, efforts at transforming
the occupied space, fully imagined in ideological-racial terms, continued.
Gebietskommissars sat at the centre of efforts to meet the needs of the Reich
and ensure the continued and increasingly contested occupation of the USSR
ran smoothly. In this context, the place and proximity of the Gebietskommissar
to the sharp end meant that he was deemed indispensable as paramount agent
on the ground for implementing policies and demands from above in the most
immediate and direct sense of administrative work.411 It should be recognized
that, with the large scale killings out of the way by autumn 1942,
Gebietskommissars still retained their fiefdoms for nearly another two years.
In the broadest of terms, the activities and actions of the Gebietskommissar
beyond the Jewish question can be understood as encompassing two core
themes: Supplying the Reich (spoliation-exploitation) and restructuring-rebuilding
the east. Even at this very general, theoretical level, the eastern mission
conformed to the broad brush-strokes of Nazi race and space ideology. Yet, in
the Gebiete, racist-ideological intentions often took on a far more practical focus.
Hitler ordered the utilization of the occupied east in service of the German
war economy. To this end, the Four Year Plan {Vierjahresplan) was central in
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developing and directing the course of economic exploitation. To carry-out the
order and oversee its implementation, the Wirtschaftsfuhrungsstab Ost
(WiFuStabOst) was established under State Secretary Korner as an "umbrella
organization" of the Four Year Plan.412 Given the importance of the economic
aspects of the occupation, other agencies, including the Wirtschaftsstab Ost
(WiStabOst) under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) and the
increasingly dominant SS, operated throughout the occupied areas.413 Finally,
agencies such as Organization Todt (OT), Reichsbahn, Reichspost, the
Zentralhandelgesellschaft Ost (ZHO) and some private firms were also active at
the local level. While registered with the civil administration, they were not,
technically, subordinate to a Gebietskommissar.414 Certainly the responsibilities
of the various agencies were often "foggy" and their jurisdictions sometimes illdefined. Further, agencies at times worked "across" each other, if not directly
against, compounding the demands and difficulties that faced the civil
administration.
While a certain degree of overlap and redundancy was inevitable,
Rosenberg initially stressed the importance of cooperation between the civil
administration and the other authorities, primarily the Four Year Plan.415 Goring
and Rosenberg were, however, often at odds, particularly over the nature and
application of economic policies. In general, each held a significantly different

412

Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, 18.
Theo Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia,
(Oxford: Berg, 1989), 62-5.
Lower, Nazi Empire Building, 104; Berkhoff, Harvest, 40-1; Appendix II.
415
Zellhuber, Unsere Verwaltung, 285.
413

outlook on the economic uses of the east. Where Rosenberg produced the
Braune Mappe, Goring's Grunen Mappe laid out his own intentions for the
territory.416 Each agency codified a very different understanding of the process
and means for the fullest "utilization" of captured areas. In the end, while
negotiations attempted reconciliation, conflict rather than cooperation was largely
the norm at the higher levels.
In February 1942, yet another authority arrived at the local level. The
appointment of Fritz Sauckel as plenipotentiary of labour procurement
{Generalbevollmachtigte fur den Arbeitseinsatz. GBA) meant that
Gebietskommissars were expected to manage both a relationship with another
agency and also the negative consequences of its policies and practices.
Sauckel's goal was to extract the maximum number of foreign workers for
employment in the Reich. Consequently, as Zellhuber noted, the GBA "in a
number of respects collided with the political objectives of the RmfdbO and other
vital interests of the National Socialist state."417
Working through the Labour Departments and Labour Offices at the
various levels of the civil administration, the GBA imposed strict quotas. For
example, in October 1942, 250,000 workers were required from OMi area while
in March 1943, 5,000 workers a day were expected. By 14 April 1943, Sauckel
reported to Hitler that "in one year...3,638,056 new foreign workers have been
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added to the German war economy." Six weeks later, an "846,511 additional
foreign laborers and prisoners of war were incorporated."418
Initially, Rosenberg stressed cooperation between the civil administration and
the GBA. Not only did he believe Sauckel a close comrade but, in fact, had even
considered him for the post of Reichskommissar of the Ukraine. However, GBA
demands and practices, from recruiting volunteers to brutal "round-ups"
beginning in mid-1942, undercut Rosenberg's intentions.419 At the local level, the
civil administration soon found quotas disproportionately large, threatening their
own needs.420 Additionally, increasingly coercive means of "recruitment" only
exacerbated the partisan threat. For Gebietskomissars, GBA policies proved a
dual threat. On one hand was the danger of administrative redundancies and an
increased workload while on the other was the threat of a loss of influence.421 In
the end, irreconcilable differences and conflicting aims were never fully rectified.
Thus, if the goal of maximum exploitation of the east was a straight-forward,
coordination, specific policies and practical application was not.
The plethora of Nazi agencies such as the Wehrmacht's Wirtschaftsstab,
Goring's Wirtschaftsfuhrungsstab and Sauckel's labour procurement office and
their often conflicting objectives is clearly evident in the Gebietskommissars'
struggle to cope with the demands made on them in the exploitation of labour
418
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and agriculture. Indeed, investigating food economics and labour procurement
on the local level offers insights to a better understanding of the nature of the
German "colonial experience" and the Gebietskommissars' "management of the
unmanageable." Although much has been made of the tug of war at the higher
levels, these conflicts assume a different complexion when examining the place
of food economics and labour policy in the districts where the priorities and focus
of the Gebietskommissars tell a different story.
Between late 1941 and early 1944, occupation officials in Brest-Litovsk
produced a flow of reports to their particular superiors detailing the goals,
methods and travails of implementing their particular slice of Nazi policy. The
following two chapters are based on a case-study of Brest Gebiet (Brest-Litovsk)
due to the rich source material regarding the region. However, the findings are
reflective of both conditions and problems throughout OMi occupied areas.422
Brest Gebiet and Brest-Litovsk Stadt were included in the RKU and
maintained both a Gebietskommissar (Curt Rolle) and a Stadtkommissar (Franz
Burat) until the two offices were merged in early autumn 1942.423 Located on the
western fringe of the occupied territories, the district and city were part of
Generalkommissariat Wolhynien-Podolien. In total, Brest Gebiet was 2,600 km2
with a population of about 200, 000 while the population of the city was some 54,
422
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200. Demographically, the area contained Ethnic Germans, Poles, Ukrainians,
Byelorussians, Russians, Jews and Gypsies.
In terms of food economics and labour, as well as partisans, the reports of
the Gebietskommissar (and Stadtkommissar), the Gendarmerie District Leader
and the District Agriculturalist paint a compelling portrait of everyday life in the
region, offering an often surprisingly candid look at the goals, achievements,
short comings, pressures and adaptations of the incumbents. The following
chapters reproduce in microcosm the "real realities" of food exploitation, the
pressures and cul de sac of the historical situation facing the Gebietskommissar.
In chapter six, the application and impact of taxation and food policies at
the local level are addressed. Given their centrality to the "eastern mission,"
Gebietskommissars possessed a relatively clear understanding of these
economic demands upon arrival. In the RKU, each one received a thorough
briefing from Reichskommissar Koch laying out his expectations. For
Gebietskommissars, "the first priority in regards to economic matters [was]: to
bring in the harvest and carry out the tilling in autumn. Every Gebietskommissar
is personally responsible to me in regards to the fulfillment of the above. The
utmost must be done to implement it."424 Clearly, this policy was not to be
constrained by any consideration of its impact on the indigenous population or
the practical difficulties of agriculture planning, procurement and distribution in a
war-ravaged environment.

USHMM RG 31.002M 3206/1/69, 5.9.1941.

The reality of the occupation was indeed a rather straightforward one: the
problem was not that there was not enough food, but rather who would get it.
The interests of the Reich and the local Nazi apparatus always came first. Seen
in this way, the seeming contradiction of a dire food situation and excellent
harvest reported in the same situation report can be reconciled.425 While quantity
(and in some case quality) fluctuated, the baseline formula remained unchanged
if not unchallenged. A harvest, a sowing season, a crop were good or bad only
in terms of meeting quotas and extracting the last full measure from the east.
How the indigenous population fared was another question entirely, one holding
little interest for the high echelons of the administration but one that
Gebietskommissars and their staffs were forced to consider.
The application and interpretation of labour policy, discussed in Chapter
seven, marked another fundamental challenge for Gebietskommissars.
Compulsory service through a Labour exchange, regulated wages, and an
alienated population were the order of the day. To this volatile mix, German
authorities added deportation and forced labour in the Reich. As early as late
1941, the civil administration faced increasingly acute shortages. Consquently,
not only did the civil administration often struggle to meet quotas but the policy
itself fundamentally undercut their relationship with the indigenous population.426
Yet, as we shall see, effort and adaption at the local level was present, even if
the desired results were not.
425
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Try as he might, the multiple strains and demands of the environment
undercut the efforts of a Gebietskommissar to meet goals and challenges.
Further, when discussing efficiency and ability, the contested nature of
occupation must remain clearly in focus. Civil administrators, like all historical
actors, interacted in a disputed context in which they too were acted on by the
situation and by those around them. Further, far from being an orderly
Lebensraum, the East was a complex and fluid situation necessitating
negotiation and compromise.

Chapter 6
"Every Single Thing Demands Decision": Taxes and Food Economics

The Fuhrer alone is the present and future German reality and its law. Learn to know ever more
deeply: from now on every single thing demands decision, and every action responsibility. Martin
Heidegger

Once up and running, the civil administration was expected to be financed
directly from a central fund raised through taxes levied within the
Reichskommissariats themselves. All the taxes were to be collected locally and
flow into the central fund. Actual collection and transfer was to be supervised by
the Gebietskommissar.427 By late December 1941, the tax collection system in
Brest-Litovsk was progressing well, apart from the Sabinka region.428 Staffed by
specialists, the Gebietskommissar noted that not only did tax departments
"perform their work satisfactorily" but also that the taxes coming in were indeed
flowing upstream to the Generalkommissariat.429 Yet such successes cannot be
entirely credited to the ability of the Gebietskommissar. The tax collection
system was the old tax system familiar to the indigenous population. In this way,
the new regime co-opted both the former district system and also institutions
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such as tax collection.

Where these did not exist they were created, with

considerably less success.
Despite getting off to a generally good start in fall 1941, the situation did not
long remain positive. In Brest-Litovsk, Gebietskommissar Curt Rolle noted that
the problems in the region of Sabinka were due to the need to establish a tax
department and tax collecting apparatus from scratch which meant that, by late
1941, "the work is going very slowly."431 Further, this diffusion of responsibility
meant that the work of the indigenous administration could be unreliable. In late
summer 1942, Rolle reported that despite his personal intervention, explanations,
instruction and admonishments, the regional administrations had consistently
failed to complete requisite income and expenditure reports.432 Very early on,
ambitious Gebietskommissars understood that to be effective "we cannot just sit
in the District Commissar's office, we have to go out to ensure the law is
observed and issue personal orders."433 Both the nature and the goals of the
occupation therefore seemed to demand that a successful Gebietskommissar be
more involved than not. By early 1942, the enormity of the task of financial and
budgetary planning was obvious. In late January, Rolle reported that "it will be a
year before it will be possible to draw up the final budget plans. We will have to
430
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manage things here for a year before we obtain a rough idea of the
requirements."434
Further, Rolle remarked on the core dilemma facing Gebietskommissars
when he stated: "...it is vitally important that the Gebietskommissar is not
overwhelmed with red tape." Faced with a shortage of German personnel in his
office, regional administrations were not flush with bureaucrats, having to make
do with one official doing the work of "three or four in the more senior
department."435
While the system of taxation and methods of collection were familiar, the
actual taxes themselves were not. Despite assurances of the initial Wehrmacht
administration in summer 1941 that the population would not be required to pay
any taxes, the military administration did impose them, even introducing new
ones such as "a poll tax, dog tax, a scale of fees and a tax on Jews."436 The
Gebietskommissar's administration did nothing to lighten the load. The
population, already "not very happy about having to pay taxes," were faced with
an administration that was "continuously imposing new taxes."437 Despite the
destruction caused by the war and limited crop yield in 1941, the appeals of
indigenous regional chiefs that land taxes be adjusted downward were not
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heeded. Seeing that "so far the land tax has been paid without any great
problems," it was not reduced.438
In accounting for the "extremely low" level of tax income in late summer 1942,
the interplay between taxation, propaganda and the partisan war was not lost on
Gebietskommissar Rolle. Noting that collections were "an increasing source of
annoyance to the people," he suggested that only the "usual" taxes be collected
or his regime risked placing "propaganda in the hands of the partisans."439
Evidently, his recommendations went unheeded as taxation continued, yet
"sources of income from the regional administrations [were] even smaller" by
year- end.440
By mid-1943, the tax system was all but in shambles. Due to large scale
budget deficits, each district in the Brest-Litovsk Gebiet was required to make a
monthly payment of 17,500 RM. The town itself was an economic catastrophe,
operating with a 12,000 RM deficit every month by summer 1943.441 This
financial haemorrhaging resulted from not only the "special tasks for which the
town [was] responsible" but also the growing success of Soviet partisan bands.
The presence of partisans in rural areas alone made tax collection difficult but, by
July 1943, "several places...in the region [were] run by bandits." Not surprisingly
populations in such areas failed to pay their taxes.442 In August, Rolle conceded
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that "as tills are plundered by bandits virtually everyday, it [was] difficult to keep
account of the tax receipts in the country areas."443
In Brest-Litovsk, the Nazi regime continued to offer the population two
certainties: death and taxes. In the important role of financial exploitation
through taxation, the Gebietskommissar faced an increasingly difficult task which
presented, in microcosm, an example of the more general failure of the regional
civilian administration to effectively carry out their assigned tasks and duties.
Taxation was clearly an unpopular policy, like many other Nazi measures. Not
only was the increasing tax burden seen as unfair but also, given the prevailing
security and provisioning problems facing the population, would not appear to
return any tangible benefits. Further, the tax policy was systemically difficult to
enforce. As Gebietskommissar Rolle clearly noted, the administrative apparatus
in certain regions had to be built from the ground up. Additionally, his office was
forced to make use of an indigenous administration that did not meet the
demands made on them. Both the unpopularity of policy and the administrative
difficulties in its execution were further complicated by the increasingly contested
and violent nature of the occupation. The growing partisan war ensured that not
only were practical aspects of taxation aggressively challenged but also that the
population had other options.444 In July 1942, it was reported that partisans had
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BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 21.8.1943. This
reality he contrasted with the relatively smooth tax collection in areas "where the
bandits have no influence."
444
In an interesting case of indigenous resistance, Gebietskommissar Burat
reported that when the "Ukrainian-German newspaper announced officially that
the rouble notes would be withdrawn and a new currency would be issued...we
achieved the opposite of what was intended by the secret order. When the

begun to steal the taxes from village mayors even before it could be passed on to
the civil administration.445 Increasingly, as Rolle noted, taxation policy was a
propaganda disaster. Additionally, the binary nature of partisan war meant that
as Soviet influence spread, the Gebietskommissar's influence waned thereby
reducing even the potential for meeting tax goals. Gebietskommissars were
painted into a corner from which they could not escape. Whatever their ability, or
lack thereof, they were expected to carry out unpopular tasks while
simultaneously confronted by an increasingly deteriorating and untenable
situation. Taxation policy, akin to food and labour policies reveal critical
incompatibilities within Nazi occupation policies and lays bare the
Gebietskommissars' failure to either enforce or practically reconcile them.
More important to the local administration than extracting taxes from the
indigenous population was the need to meet food quotas. After all, food was a
far more practical means by which occupied areas would meet the interests of
the Reich. Again, the incoming civil administration continued where the military
administration left off. In terms of food and agricultural exploitation, the
Gebietskommissar's department collaborated closely with the District Agriculturist
["my District Agriculturalist"] and the indigenous administration, headed by a
Rayonchef.446 Through this organisational arrangement, food was planted,
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harvested, stored and distributed according to a quota imposed from high levels.
Quotas and planting-harvest projections tended to be "one size fits all", imposing
levels that did not reflect the realities of a particular area or district but rather the
expectations of the regime.447
The civil administration also repeated the widespread practice of mirroring
what had gone before. As they had done in some many instances, from dividing
up the occupied areas to taxation, significant changes to the economic and
agricultural systems already in place were resisted.448 In terms of agriculture, the
state farm retained an immense importance and the efforts of the
Gebietskommissariat officials tended toward working within an already existing
framework. Further, agricultural changes were not to the system itself but rather
to the process, directed towards achieving greater output and more efficiency
under the watchful eye of German agriculturalists.
Not surprisingly, the massive damage and displacement caused by
Operation Barbarossa, wreaked havoc on the initial food situation under the
military administration. In early August 1941, the military reported "the food
situation is bad" forcing immediate bread rationing at 200g a day. Whatever food
was possible to procure in the countryside was moved to the city, reducing the
rural population to a subsistence level.449 In the city, the Army oversaw the reopening of "40-50 food shops" to service the population with what little food could
447
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be stocked.450 Empty store shelves would be the hallmark of the occupation for
the duration. Still, despite this inauspicious start, within a few days the situation
began to improve, by August 14, bread rations had increased to 400g and more
shops opened due to the work of the Army's Economic Office. So improved was
the situation that "a certain quota" was even granted to local Jews.451 So positive
was the recovery that an Army report gushed that "the markets are well attended,
one can hardly talk of poverty any longer."452 Unfortunately for the indigenous
population, late August 1941 would prove the high water mark.
By November 1941, the transfer from military to civilian administration was
complete. From the outset, the previous ration levels were a thing of the past.
Retaining the ration card system established by their predecessor, the
Gebietskommissar's or Stadtkommissar's office, as in this case, initially set levels
at 250g of bread daily and 200g of meat and fat, per person, per week. Jews
were to receive 200g of bread.453 Those employed by German agencies would
receive a supplementary soup ration supplied by the civil administration.454 By
late November, Gebietslandwirt (District Agriculturalist) Werner Dressier deemed
this meagre level unsustainable, forcing the immediate reduction in rations from
250g to 200g of bread with meat and fat dropping from 200g to 100g "due to the
450
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problem with food supply."455 With the onset of winter, the civilians saw their
bread staple reduced twenty percent and their meat protein and fat chopped by
fifty percent. Thus by year's end, the population faced two competing pressures:
a lack of food and a low income making the black market as increasingly
expensive as it was indispensible. From the occupier's view, the volatility of the
situation had yet to sink in. In late November, Brest Stadtkommissar Franz Burat
even stated that food supplies were satisfactory as a result of the local's foresight
to "stock up."456
Given the timetable of the 1941 invasion and subsequent administrative
restructuring of the captured territory, it was expected that only in 1942 could
food production and exports get into full swing. In 1942, "Guidelines for Spring
Planting" were produced and circulated for implementation. According to this
plan, projections for planting and crops foresaw significant rises in food
production. The difficulties inherent in exploiting the RKU to feed the Reich were
not entirely discounted; the projections themselves seemed to largely ignore
them. Whatever the potential pitfalls to RKU agricultural exploitation, the
guidelines clearly expected a bumper crop anticipating, for example, a 250%
increase in corn production.457 At the local level, such projections must have
seemed highly theoretical and removed from the realities and pressures of
everyday life. As early as December 1941, the Gebietskommissar of Brest-
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Litovsk reported to Generalkommissar Klemm that already the demands of
provisioning were proving difficult to meet. Army demands for increased cattle
(up to 3000 a month) could not be met "without causing damage" while the
provisioning of potatoes and bread (to the Army) remained "feasible" only at the
cost of cutting civilian rationing.458 So important was troop provisioning that Rolle
even hoped to keep a local brewery open to supply the Army with beer despite
his concern that only three months worth of barley remained. Beer-making in the
face of reduced rations certainly reveals the priorities of the local regime.
Yet continuous interest in the mood and, to a limited extent, the welfare of
the indigenous population is also in evidence. To help ensure continued
continued passivity, Stadtkommissar Burat doled out a free lunch in late
December 1941, and reported that: "so far, no ill-feeling as a result of the
reduction of the food rations has been identified."459
However, despite the supposed lack of "ill-feeling" noted by the
Stadtkommissar, Gebietskommissar Rolle clearly understood the link between
security assets on hand and the continued success of provisioning and
spoliation. On Christmas Eve 1941, he cautioned his superiors against a plan to
remove military forces from his Food and Agricultural Department stating:
"Removing them would result in the immediate standstill of the Food and
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Agricultural Department.

However accurate and prophetic his year-end report

would prove, Rolle's overall assessment of his food economics situation
remained positive. As predicted, he reported, the harvest was a good one, to the
extent that ghettoized Jews were given some potatoes and bread in an effort to
prevent epidemics.461 Yet the clear purpose of the Food and Agricultural
Department remained sharply in focus as the report projected that while "the
supply of food for the troops and the German employees in the district is
guaranteed," the supply of food for the local people is only partially
guaranteed."462 As early as the end of 1941, the contours of the relationship
between the civil administration and food economics had largely been
established. The interplay between extraction, provisioning and security would
increasingly come to dominate not only official reporting but also the day to day
work and life of the Gebietskommissar.
In early 1942, the civil administration had yet to oversee a full planting
season. As planting projections came from the centre to the periphery, the
situation on the ground remained "satisfactory" but clearly tenuous. For the
civilian population, the winter of 1941-1942 was survived not by Nazi generosity
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but rather by living off stockpiled food.

At the same time, the Army Supply

Office continued to make larger demands, particularly for cattle. However, the
Gebietskommissar remained confident in his thrift and forethought, boasting of
the 2000 tonnes of potatoes stored away for "the Wehrmacht and some for the
civil administration."464 Yet the overall situation was far from ideal. Clearly
briefed by the Food and Agricultural Department, the Gebietskommissar provided
a frank assessment of the challenges faced in the district. Not only were cattle
stocks "very poor due to the management of the Bolsheviks" but the fifty-six state
farms in the region were in poor condition requiring "great effort" to develop in the
upcoming year. Finally, nature too seemed to conspire against the occupiers as
the fall frost had prevented about forty percent of the fields in the region from
being sown.
By February 1942, the food situation of January had clearly deteriorated,
evidenced by the dwindling supplies of the indigenous population. While the
various German agencies continued to be well supplied, within about half a year
of assuming their posts, the Gebietskommissar faced a pattern of subsistence
and starvation, a hallmark for the remainder of the occupation.465 Beginning in
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Throughout the occupation, both the police and the civil administration
reported that, at minimum, "adequate" provisions were on hand. BA R94/6,
"Situation Report from SSPF Brest," 15.3.1942 and BA R94/6, "Situation Report
from SSPF Brest," 12.6.1942 provide representative examples. It should also be
noted that these provisions were not always fully extended to the families of the
indigenous police nor were they always particularly plentiful. "Extras" such as

1942, the discourse of reporting also shifted, generally in relation to the everyday
realities of survival and starvation confronting the Gebietskommissar. Over the
next twelve to eighteen months not only were the efforts, goals and limitations of
food economics in the districts exposed, but so too was the focus of the
Gebietskommissar: (1) food and the local population; and (2) food for the
Germans both inside and outside Reich.
Reports sent to superiors detailing the situation on the ground tended to
be as candid as they were personal. In terms of provisioning, the
Gebietskommissar talked in first person, stating: "I cannot feed the local people
with the twenty percent meal wage. The Jews have not had any bread for three
months. The Aryans have been put on half rations." Surprisingly, Rolle laid the
blame not on the "usual suspects" but rather on "the efforts of the predecessor of
my District Agriculturalist, who took every last thing from the farmers."466 His
remedy clearly showed his detachment from the ideological imperatives
underpinning the occupation and the expectations of policy makers in Berlin. Yet
his ideas were neither extraordinary nor particularly original. As winter slowly
turned, Rolle still understood that indigenous farmers could "work voluntarily for
us and...with us" and therefore "we cannot let them starve." The alternative to his
plan seemed obvious: "the risk that in the coming year they [the peasants] will
use all their skills and arts to deceive us."467
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The tone of the reports and its language provides important insights into
the possibilities and limitations for the Gebietskommissar. In terms of food
economics, broad policies mandated by the centre were, at the local level, more
practically and specifically applied. Akin to Carl's experience with mass murder,
Rolle believed that his ideas were valuable or at least relevant and that he
possessed long-standing ("I still maintain") and first-hand experience that his
superiors might be interested in hearing. While the reports do show a
Gebietskommissar who understood that decisions were at levels above his head,
as it were, he did continue to involve himself intimately in the application of policy
and to offer both his suggestions and candid criticisms. Further, the reports often
portray a pattern of local initiative, followed by a report to that fact. In this way,
superiors could be presented with a fait accompli resulting from the leadership
style of the Gebietskommissar and/or the substantial local pressures. In using
the collective "we" to express his views on policy and direction, he clearly saw
himself and his office as part of the process. Finally, while exculpatory motives
should not be dismissed, neither should the blunt nature of reporting.468 While
expectations in the occupied east proved increasingly more Sisyphean than
Utopian, the local occupation administration's frustration became increasingly
obvious and shrill. Clearly, even at the lowest level of the Nazi hierarchy, some
space existed to offer a dissenting perspective.
By mid-spring 1942, a limited amount of food had made its way into the
market, yet the rations remained small, insufficient to meet the needs or, to
468

Note that other agencies such as the SSPF and the District Agriculturalist
were often equally candid.

"solve the problem of hunger in the population.

Increasingly, the local

population turned to the black market. However, its high prices meant that the
better off proved the more regular customers.470 The black market filled an
important need, yet its very existence would certainly have sent the wrong
message to the indigenous population about both the nature and the current
state of the occupation regime.471 As early as spring 1942, local Nazi authorities
began to show concern that not only was their command of the "food war"
slipping but also of the propaganda war. Despite the ration card system, rations
themselves were irregular. Some locals had even started to claim they were
better off "under the Bolsheviks" while Wilhelm Rohde, the Brest SS-und
Polizeistandortfuhrer (SSPStOF) noted an increase in the local crime rate.472 By
mid 1942, local agencies spoke now of a "hunger problem" and offered both an
assessment and critique of the current occupation trajectory by co-opting a
Nazified ideological framework. In an extraordinary situation report from midJune 1942, the Gebietskommissar's SSPStOF reported: "Even the most
uncultivated of people lose all interest in work if nothing is done to solve the
problem of hunger." He continued: "Have people forgotten that in the German
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Reich communism was not vanquished solely by Nazi philosophy, the main
factor was the resolution of the hunger problem."473 The dangerous results of
missing this reality were presented as threefold: partisan growth, lost work and
increased crime.474 The importance of these reports lie not only in what was said
(and why) but how and when. Clearly, local occupation agencies felt compelled
to offer their comments and solutions into situations and problems with which
they had both first-hand experience and an important investment. In short, they
were doing more than following orders but also engaging in a two-way discourse
between the centre and periphery. Whatever the value placed on their insights, if
any, it is important to note a kind of interagency awareness at the local level.
Given the close and generally positive collaboration between the various
agencies in the districts, it is not surprising that the critiques, insights, warnings
and frustrations voiced by the various organisations were similar in both tone and
regularity.
Yet in the face of obvious deprivations and attendant dangers, the
Gebietskommissar's office continued to hold hope of achieving positive outcomes
in the near future. At the end of April, the Gebietskommissar reported that half of
the available land had already been ploughed and that there were "high
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expectations" for cultivating even more.

However, this cultivation would not

stem the tide of starvation, as harvest was still months away. As problems with
the food supply continued in May 1942, the civil administration re-opened soup
kitchens and ordered that, given the ongoing potatos shortage, every bit of
available land not already given over to crops should be planted with
vegetables.476
In July 1942, Rolle would learn (if he did not know already), that there was
"virtually no bread for the people." For a local administration not even a year old,
the problems seemed as comprehensive as they were insurmountable. Codified
in a checklist, Rohde claimed that the indigenous population suffered under
circumstances due to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

wholly deficient wages
wholly inadequate provision of food and clothing of all types
enormous increases in all prices
difficulty in getting to work because of the confiscation of bicycles
inconsiderate removal of workers for the German Reich
withdrawal of rouble notes and hence impoverishment of further groups of
the population
7. many other drastic measures.477

With continued lack of adequate food supplies for the indigenous population,
the Gebietskommissar's police made clear the definitive link between the growing
partisan threat and food economics. Increasingly, the relationship between the
civil administration and the indigenous population was not a positive one.
Equally, local populations were well aware of the methods and means of the
occupiers. In one sense they can be seen as "subjects" in which the
476
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Gebietskommissar and his officials took some interest. Local populations knew
about partisans, knew about war events, and certainly knew the fate of Jews and
other racial enemies.478 As objects of the on-going Nazi-Soviet propaganda war,
the indigenous population were certainly more than passive victims. As we have
seen, passivity was a valued state for the local civil administration, prompting ad
hoc policy alterations and concessions such as soup kitchens and vegetable
patches. Certainly, the relationship was a complex one marked by levels of
cooperation and co-existence.479
Importantly, locals tended to exhibit a rather refined (and practiced) ability to
gauge which way the wind was blowing. Shared space and, to a limited degree,
experience of occupation realities could engender a situation far different from
the expectations of either Moscow or Berlin. In this context, the outsider was not
always the German but could indeed be the partisan.480 While it is certain that
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who would be the next target on the German hit list. For intercommunity fears,
suspicions and rumours see BA R94/6, "Report of the Stadtkommissar Brest,"
20.7.1942 and BA R94/6, "Report of the Stadtkommissar Brest," 12.7.1942.
479
For an extreme example see BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest: Situation Report,"
15.7.1942 which related an incident in which "the Jewish Order Service seized a
Bolshevik who had escaped from prison and delivered him back to prison for the
SD."
480
BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 22.8.1942. "Generally
the mood of the population is against the partisans and I am now receiving
messages regarding their whereabouts..." The partisan as enemy of the locals
was also reflected in numerous other reports. Importantly, in the 22.8.1942
report, Rolle praised the "the work of dedicated mounted anti-partisan squads of
"Schuma and Wehrmacht" as "excellent." Also BA R94/7, Gebietskommissar
Report," 24.1.1942 and "Situation Report of Gebietskommissar Brest: Creation of
the Schutzmannschaft," 24.12.1941. However, it should be noted that skills of
some indigenous police were called into question. In late 1942,
Gebietskommissar Burat who was neither unsympathetic to his men nor entirely
faint of praise reported that: "The police skills of the local policeman
184

partisans did enjoy some successes in recruiting and certainly operating locally, it
should also be noted that they could be seen themselves as outsiders and that
neither a general dissatisfaction nor the scale of Nazi anti-Jewish barbarities
necessarily pushed locals into the arms of the partisans.481 The reality on the
ground was certainly not a German effort at winning hearts and minds. Rather
the civil administration appeared hopeful that a balance was possible whereby
some of their mandated tasks might be achieved and some of the negative
consequences mitigated in order to get by.482
At the local level, three factors were cardinal in the practical failure of the
relationship between the occupiers and the occupied: food, labour and events at
the front.483 While the Gebietskommissar had little impact on the last, the others
were certainly within his control while still remaining subject to expectations and
demands from on-high. By mid-summer 1942, frustrations over local work were

(Schutzmannschaften) are zero." See BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation
Report," 31.12.1942.
481
Reports also suggest that actions such as worker roundups and the
indiscriminate violence of anti-partisan actions were more to blame. "The earlier
measures used to combat the partisans were generally rejected by the locals as
too many innocent people were involved." BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest: Situation
Report," 15.7.1942. Conversely, the partisans themselves were not entirely
"local-friendly", as they were known to also burn villages and shoot "recalcitrant
inhabitants." See BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Agricultural Department, Report
of District Agriculturalist Brest," 22.10.1942.
482
Of course, this tactic was not universal for Gebietskommissars. Rather it
served as an important addition to the characterization of civil administrator as
incompetent and mindlessly sadistic. Cases such as Gerhard Erren's behaviour
as the "Bloody Commissar" are highly representative of this perspective. For
Hilberg's reference to Erren see Hilberg, Destruction, 147.
483
This should be distinguished from the more ideological barriers noted in
Mulligan whereby the question of German "what if" and "should have" models is
largely rendered moot. For a representative example of food see BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 20.7.1942.
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clear. So too were the causes and remedies. For the civil administration, the
realities of local rule created a kind of no-win situation. With his ear closer to the
ground, so to speak, the Gebietskommissar could clearly see the impact of
policies that had been made over his head by superior departments. For him,
reality was that his fiefdom was increasingly less an idyllic colonial space and
more a hornet's nest of resistance and violence. For alert minds, these
pressures and demands translated into a losing effort on the ground where the
situation was so critical that "we are driving the people who are still working hard
for us into the arms of the bandits."484 Levels of candid criticism could, in fact, be
extraordinary. Even if the effect of criticism remained in question, the sharpness
of tone and indeed the existence of it at all imply that a Gebietskommissar could
be motivated by more than greed and insightful enough to see both problem and
solution.
Challenging the notion of the Gebietskommissars as powerless cogs in the
Nazi machinery, in July 1942, Rolle wrote to his boss. The biting and sarcastic
tone of his report bears repeating:
Even German farmers would resent it if their ancient rights were taken
away from them. The Tsar did not take away their rights to use the
forest meadows, neither did the Poles, even the Bolsheviks did not
touch the matter. And now we Germans issue these orders during a
war. It is no wonder that we cannot get on with the people. In my
opinion, we must first win the war so our position in the country is
secure and then we will be able to issue orders, but first we have to
apply ourselves to winning the war, and for this we need the local
people. I have spoken with the Obergruppenfuhrer, the General
4b4

BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 20.7.1942. It should be
noted that the "we" indicates the Gebietskommissar perceived himself as part of
the process (the collective 'we') and understood that much damage had already
been done ("still working")

Commissar, personally and told him that a strip of wood must be cut
back on both sides of the road to enable the cars to travel through the
district. Now, I learn from Senior Forester Feldbauch that he has
received an order from above that a 150m of forest must be left at the
sides of the roads (to prevent snowdrifts). I propose that we also dig
out holes in the ground at regular intervals to make it easier for the
bandits to attack.485

Clearly, he was not prevented from speaking his mind, regardless of whether
or not anyone was listening. Just as Carl had spoken out concerning anti-Jewish
operations in Sluzk, Rolle critiqued the effect of broader policies being applied to
his district:
We need complete calm to be established here, not orders which
perhaps make sense in Germany, but should not be applied here in
the Ukraine, above all not in my district. I have nothing further to say
on this."486 The solution, from his perspective was as simple as
obvious: "In my opinion, we must first win the war so our position in
the country is secure and then we will be able to issue orders, but first
we have to apply ourselves to winning the war, and for this we need
the local people.487

While this opinion was not universal, it does raise important considerations
regarding local occupation.
The nature of the food problem for the local population was not one of either
quality, nor indeed, supply. The problem for the Gebietskommissar was in
squaring the demands to extract the last full measure from his district and the
demands, on the ground, to keep things running. In short, however capable the
Gebietskommissar, he was also increasingly hemmed in. To extract food and
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 20.7.1942.
BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 20.7.1942. Despite his
claim that he has nothing more to say on the topic, the report details in depth the
various measures which he feels are responsible for the situation.
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resources for the Reich, a cooperative population was required yet increasingly
impossible to ensure. The 1942 harvest clearly shows the dilemma. The actual
harvest itself was not a bad one.488 While, overall, considering quality and
quantity, it was described as "mediocre," individual crops such as grain, corn and
potatoes were generally described as good.489
The problem then was due to the expectations and the demands of the
regime itself. The grain harvest accurately demonstrates not only these
expectations and demands but also just how unsustainable and surreal the
situation had become. According to the Gebietskommissar, the grain yield in his
district averaged a "good" 600kg per hectare in an area that was never able to
produce surpluses due to soil quality. Of the 600kg, half (300kg) was
automatically earmarked to meet quota demands while another 33% (200kg) was
given over for seed. Only the remaining 100kg was designated "for the
people."490 The Gebietskommissar bluntly stated the impact on the population:
"even the peasants won't have enough food in winter or spring."491 To the
burden of this dire situation, the Gebietskommissar also faced more mundane
problems such as adequate storage facilities and sufficient means of transporting
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 9.10.1942.
Overall harvest results are collected in BA R6/243, "Stadtkommissar. Notes
on Gebietskommissars Meeting in Luzk," 4.9.1942. Chief Agriculturalist Dr.
Oefferts also indicted that supply situation for the local population "will remain
difficult" for the foreseeable future. Also BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Monthly
Report," 22.8.1942; BA R94/76 "SSPF Brest Monthly Report, 15.9.1942; BA
R94/7, "SSPF Brest Monthly Report," 6.10.1942.
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Monthly Report," 2 2.8.1942.
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His suggestion was that the quota be linked to yield. By 1943 however, the
security situation had largely rendered moot such modifications and
considerations.
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food from the field to storage facilities and from there to the Reich.
At the local level, such untenable realities could further be compounded by
the larger breakdowns of occupation and the operation of other agencies. In the
face of starvation and a clearly deteriorating security situation, Gebietskommissar
Rolle openly criticized the practice of the Army Rations Office to feed horses with
wheat and rye. His venomous indictment of this policy clearly shows the level of
both his frustration and the security he felt in expressing, candidly, his opinion as
he stated: "When I heard this I thought, either I am mad or they are. In Germany,
there is a great shortage of bread cereals, here there is no bread at all for the
local people and the Wehrmacht are feeding their horses with rye and wheat. It
is forbidden to give rye bread to the agricultural workers. I do not know the
reason for this, but I have to say that it is a disgrace."493
The impact of food extraction and the proposed changes to the system
tended to be both well known and remarkably similar among the various
agencies under the umbrella of the civil administration. The Gebietskommissar,
The Stadtkommissar, police officials and the District Agriculturist not only lived in
close proximity but, according to their reports, tended to identify similar problems
and solutions reflecting both a similarity of experience and a tendency to see the
problems as the result of factors outside their control. Significantly, blame and
frustration tended to be passed hierarchically upwards rather than horizontally
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among agencies at the local level.
By the beginning of the much anticipated 1942 harvest, local agencies
began to realize that despite their warnings, they were beginning to reap what
was sown. In late July, the Gebietskommissar repeated his appeal for increased
security claiming "that unless the bandit threat is removed from my area, I cannot
guarantee that the harvest will be collected...as the bandits [partisans] are trying
to shut down all agricultural operations."495 In September 1942, the Gendarmerie
District Leader echoed his boss, reporting, for the first time, that partisans
("bandits") "have started to burn property and destroy crops" requiring that "with
the agreement of the District Agriculturalist...we immediately deployed ten men to
protect these harvested crops on the most important state properties with the
task of using all means to prevent the properties and harvested crops from being
burned."496 In terms of food economics and "banditry", with the September 1942
crop burnings and attendant ambushes, the Rubicon of the partisan war had
been crossed despite the "better relationship of trust...between the locals and the
German officers" that the Gendarmerie District Leader perceived two months

That is not to say that there was no friction. In the case of Brest, tensions did
arise between the civil administration (police) and both the SD and the
Wehrmacht on occasion. An example can be found in BA R94/6,
"Stadtkommissar Brest Report," 27.8.1942 and BA R94/7, "Labour Office Brest
Monthly Report ,"27.10.1942. However this friction tended to be regarding
specific (or short term) particularities. Overall, reports regularly noted the
generally good inter-agency cooperation and collaboration.
495
BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 20.7.1942.
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BA R94/7, "Gend. District Leader Brest: Situation Report," 5.9.1942. Note
the this incident was indeed not the first as the Gebietskommissar himself had
reported in July that "the hay which was supposed to be brought from Lukowo to
Brest-Litovsk has been destroyed by the bandits." BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar
Situation Report," 20.7.1942.

earlier.497 The impact of the pressures of imposed food quotas and local
partisan actions were devastating. Not only were rations failing but so too was
morale and therefore security.498
Chronic food shortages encompassed an ebb and flow whereby the
availability of types of food shifted while the overall shortage remained constant.
Where in June-July, the population suffered a bread shortage, in early August the
"locals received virtually no food except for bread rations."499 By the end of the
month, the situation had again deteriorated "to such an extent that not even
bread rations could be issued in the last two weeks."500 However, in October,
bread rations were again distributed regularly.501 The aggregate result of the
situation was disastrous. Lack of food prompted migrations to the countryside as
food shortages tended to be "not so catastrophic" in the rural districts.502
Consequently, the pool of available (and potential) workers continued to
shrink, engendering further decline in a labour situation already infected with
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chronic absenteeism and desertion.

To this shortage and migration was also

added the additional danger of a deteriorating security condition. RohdeF noted
that the impact of migration and starvation led directly to security breakdowns
such as an incident in which "a truck loaded with agriculture products [was]
stopped and seized " by civilians. Further, he clearly understood the link
between shortages and the partisan war asserting: "We cannot exclude the
possibility that some of them join or try to join partisan bands."504
While the link between rations and morale was clear, the civil
administration also understood that the partisan situation might still be managed,
if not eradicated before it was too late, as by late summer 1942 the partisan
problem was not yet out of control. Given their proximity to the partisan war, the
civil administration realized that sheer survival tended to trump ideological
persuasion and other factors in pushing locals into the arms of Soviet
guerrillas.505 Despite hardships, the civil administration understood that active
support for the partisans tended to depend on the proximity of a particular unit.
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BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest: Situation Report," 15.8.1942. "Workers have
increasingly left their posts [to move to the country] because they are receiving
virtually nothing for the ration cards." For "reduced ability to work" see BA R94/6,
"Stadtkommissar Brest: Situation Report," 27.8.1942: The report stated that over
the last two weeks, only 40% of planned rations could be distributed due to grain
shortage. Consequently, the population exhibited both a reduced ability to work
and "depressed mood." For a similar example from mid-1943, BA R94/8,
"Gebietskommissar Monthly Report," 24.7.1943.
504
BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest: Situation Report," 15.8.1942. It should also be
noted that the partisans were not above "requisitioning" food from locals already
poorly provisioned, adding yet another layer to their misery. BA R94/6, "SSPF
Brest: Situation Report," 6.10.1942.
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See Alexander Hill, The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan
Movement in North-West Russia 1941-44 (New York: Frank Cass, 2005) for an
excellent recent study of the Partisan war. Also see Berkhoff, Harvest, 275-304.

As long as a particular area had "not yet been reached," the overriding concern
of the population was not partisan war but finding enough food to get through the
day. In regards to isolating the partisans from the population, the remedy then
was as clear as it was impossible: "The be all and end all for peace among the
people is food."506
Food production and requisitioning was certainly closely monitored and
assisted by the civil administration. Meeting pre-set quotas were the most
pressing concern. Through the Food and Agriculture Department and in
collaboration with German agriculturalists in the rural districts, crops were sown,
harvested, collected, stored and shipped.507 Given the increased security
pressures with the 1942 harvest, threshing, seizure and storage, particularly on
State Farms, was carried out immediately, often requiring the participation of the
Gebietskommissar's police assets to provide security.508 This arrangement
meant that if the civil administration were able to ensure security forces oversaw
the harvest in a particular area, collection and delivery of the hated quotas
generally could proceed effectively. Thus, harvest and cultivation was "all thanks
not only to the activity of the farmers...but also the active cooperation of the
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BA R94/6, "Stadtkommissar Brest: Situation Report," 27.8.1942.
For civil administration storage and monitoring see BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Agricultural Department, Report of District Agriculturalist
Brest," 22.10.1942.
508
A representative example of this process in the 1942 corn harvest is
contained in BA R94/7, "SSPF Brest: Situation Report," 6.10.1942. The overall
results were not always negative. If police were deployed to a particular area
"disruptions by bandits...have been kept down and suppressed with help of the
police now deployed in region." BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest: Situation
Report," 9.10.1942.
507

Gendarmerie.
The flipside of this situation meant that the Gendarmerie was increasingly
stretched thin allowing fewer resources to be dedicated to an aggressive
engagement in the partisan war.510 As a result, facing pressures to both "bring in
the harvest" while simultaneously being expected to assist in anti-partisan efforts,
the Gebietskommissar again faced a seemingly impossible dilemma. In the case
of Brest, Burat assigned the highest priority to "harvesting, tilling and sowing."511
Yet even in this most important function, in the ideologically charged and surreal
world of the occupation, mass murder trumped all. In October, at the height of
the harvest and midst of a partisan war, the Gebietskommissar's police assets
were deployed to assist in the liquidation of 20,000 of the district's Jews. Despite
the projected negative outcomes of the killing on local economic activity and the
further stretching of already sparse resources, this action showed clearly where
the regime's ultimate priorities lay.512
While the overall situation was a dire one, this refocusing of assets
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BA R94/7, "Gend. District Leader Brest: Situation Report for November
1942," 5.12.1942.
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guarding.
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Agricultural Department, Report of District
Agriculturalist Brest," 22.10.1942. This report reflected on the negative impact (in
terms of agriculture) resulting from the large scale Jewish liquidation in the
district in October 1942. Also BA R94/7, "Gend. District Leader Brest: Situation
Report," 8.11.1942 describing police "deployment during actions against the
Jews in the town and administrative district of Brest-Litovsk from 15.10.1942 on.
Up to now, 20,000 Jews have been shot." Also see BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Brest: Situation Report," 9.10.1942. In this report, the
Gebietskommissar also reflected on the liquidation of Jews in Domachevo.

towards security was not entirely without merit or result. As the 1942 harvest
ended, agriculturalists noted that "bandit activity [had] only been observed
sporadically...as a result of the successful police operations."513 Indeed, despite
mediocre yields in some crops, a larger area was sown which, Rolle concluded,
was "probably because they [peasants] have gained some confidence in German
leadership."514
However, according to the District Agriculturalist, the problem was not
sowing but rather effectively bringing in the harvest. In general, increased police
deployments proved the only effective means to ensure reluctant "peasants
[were] more willing to deliver the quota."515 Further, the machinery of the civil
administration and police themselves seemed to handicap security efforts.
Despite the centrality of securing the harvest, despite the Gebietskommissar's
prioritization, the Food and Agriculture Department lamented that "the policemen
available to me (Schutzpolizei-Dienstabteilung and Gendarmerie) are, as I
constantly report, so overloaded with administrative work that there are very few
officers available for the actual police work."516 The reality of the 1942 harvest
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Agricultural Department, Report of District
Agriculturalist Brest," 24.11.1942. In the same report the District agriculturalist
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Agriculturalist Brest," 22.10.1942. The Agriculturalist reported that police actions
were so successful that he felt "order will be restored...in the next few weeks."
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BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar, Dept. II," 19.2.1943. The report continued:
"For example, in the town of Brest-Litovsk, 22 of 44 members of the Protection
Police are occupied with administration. This is an impossible situation. There

was that the Gebietskommissars faced a kind of race to bring in the harvest in
which they were clearly on the defensive, trapped in what had become "an
impossible situation."517 By 1943, even these measures would prove ineffective
as the situation in the rural areas rapidly spiralled out of control. The pressure for
the Gebietskommissar then was to get to a particular field before the partisans.
When this proved impossible, "sometimes the whole grain harvest, sometimes a
substantial part of it has been destroyed by bandits by fire."518
In August 1942, the Rohde voiced concerns felt by the entire civil
administration. He informed his superior that "in my opinion, something must be
done quickly to feed the locals if they are to be used for work. Otherwise, one of
these days it will happen that we will no longer be able to defend ourselves
against the bandits."519 By early 1943, his prophetic pronouncement was
increasingly the order of the day as local farmers faced a tight squeeze from both
sides in the conflict. Not only were there crop quotas to be met but the peasants
also faced large cattle quotas from the civil administration and often "quotas"

are not enough policemen to carry out the police tasks and it would be helpful if
police administrative apparatus could be greatly reduced."
517
While Gebietskommissar Rolle hoped for an improvement through police
operations, he also conceded that "it has not been possible to counter this
terrible state of affairs effectively." He predicted that "the whole amount of grain
destroyed will exceed about 200 tons." It is also noteworthy that police
deployments could also go disastrously wrong such as in October 1942 when
"unfortunately an entire village with the whole of the harvest was also burned
down by police action. The loss here likewise amounts to 50-60 tons." BA
R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 9.10.1942; BA R94/8,
"Gebietskommissar, Dept. Il,"1 9.2.1943.
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imposed by the partisans.

In the countryside, the administration noted that

"things are very bad as the last cows have been taken from the peasants"
meaning that "there will no calves in spring and the food situation will be even
worse."521 As hoarded stocks were increasingly used up over the winter months,
the loss of the last cow, to either Nazi or partisan, easily turned an already dire
situation into an impossible one. 522 The impact on the population was as
negative and seminal as the Gebietskommissar had predicted. Chronic food
shortages and attendant spin-off problems such as the black market and petty
crime seemed to boil over in early 1943. In a summary report of January 1943
the situation in Brest-Litovsk had deteriorated to the point where the
Gebietskommissar worried that "it is impossible to keep a whole town together if
the people are only eating food which they have had to purchase on the black
market for high prices." He described long bread lines and empty shops,
residents with "a bread ration card at the end of the month, there was not one
single occasion when the shops had bread." While repeating the "old maxim that
if people can eat till they are full, they are calm," expectations had been lowered
to a point where the civil administration now pleaded "we should at least try to

Partisan requisitioning is addressed in BA R94/7, "SSPF Brest Monthly
Report," 6.10.1942. The Gend. District Leader noted that the partisans
"repeatedly made surprise appearances and extorted from the farmers' cattle,
which they let away."
521
BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar, Dept. II," 19.2.1943.
522
See BA R94/7, "Gend. District Leader Brest: Situation Report," 9.10.1942;
BA R94/7, "Gend. District Leader Brest: Situation Report, "8.11.1942; BA R94/8,
Gend. District Leader Brest: Situation Report, 4.2.1943; BA R94/8,
"Gebietskommissar, Dept. II," 19.2.1943.

give the working population sufficient bread and potatoes."523
The cumulative result on the Gebietskommissar and his staff, already
aware of unhappy reversals at the front, was telling. Feelings of being ignored,
isolated, vulnerable and increasingly hemmed-in were powerfully conveyed in
reports as the civil administration explained that "an instruction to prevent this
unhappy state of affairs is needed from a higher office."524 Reports clearly
reflected the Gebietskommissar's awareness that the machine barely
functioned.525 In the meantime and in the absence of any clear directives from
the higher echelons, the Gebietskommissar continued to improvise. Given the
critical deterioration in the food situation, Burat ordered his regional chiefs to
provide poorer communities with "more balance" to supplement the diet of "great
numbers of people who only eat potatoes."526
By mid-1943, it was obvious that such measures had little impact on the
overall situation on the ground. As the Red Army began to push across the front,
rumours of evacuations and possible defeat raised tensions and fear to the point
where "people in the rural areas [were] so frightened that whenever they see any
policemen they try to get out of the way."527 By June, the occupation had clearly
entered a new phase as the civil administration rapidly began to lose control of
their fiefdoms and their status as "eastern kings." In the hinterland, the District

523

BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar, Dept. II," 19.2.1943. The result of this policy
was expected to: "bring an immediate reduction in the black-market prices
because to stay alive everyone has to deal in something to earn more money."
524
Ibid.
525
See Ibid for a representative and comprehensive example.
526
BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 10.4.1943.
527
Ibid.

Agriculturalist informed the Gebietskommissar that "June 1943 [was] the most
restless month during the almost two years I have been here" as partisans began
to target guarded storage facilities rather than just burning crops in the field.528
By summer 1943, partisan activity was so intense that the civil
administration could no longer control or oversee the work of its indigenous
district leaders. Further, entire areas of the district were effectively "no go zones"
that were "given over to the bandits" who were "advancing all the time."529 In
face of partisan success, the District Agriculturalist informed the
Gebietskommissar that "the fields have not all been cultivated" meaning that "a
large number of the planted areas will have to be left...until our police are again
able to establish order and to ensure that the orders of the German
authorities...are carried out."530
The effect of losing control was dramatic. Unrest and lack of discipline
among indigenous police units only added fuel to the fire, having a negative
effect on the delivery of quotas by farmers. Further, the civil administration
witnessed a formerly docile (or cowed) population emboldened because "they
have noticed that we cannot enforce orders and are becoming more casual and
cheeky."531 Ultimately, the most significant development was the open
recognition and realization and confirmation of earlier warnings that when "once
again no protection is provided...the bandits can carry out their destruction with
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no fear of punishment."532
The realities of the spiralling situation could not be lost on a
Gebietskommissar. Perceiving that the population now behaved "passively" and
sometimes with "concealed hostility," Gebietskommissar Burat asserted a
solution based not on repression but rather provisioning and reconciliation. By
mid-1943, the problems facing the local civil administration had been diagnosed
by the Gebietskommissar as twofold: as always supply and demand and
increased partisan activity. Their interconnectedness was clear. There was not
enough food to meet demand and, in turn, "bandit activity" was only amplified by
the often forcible seizure of quota goods.533 The remedy, the Gebietskommissar
asserted, favoured the carrot rather than the stick. Demonstrating an
understanding of the nature of his charges and the limitation of "stick discipline"
and repression, Burat argued: "The only way to pacify the town people is to
continue to supply them with goods. At the least, they must be continuously
guaranteed a minimum amount of food."534 In the case of Brest-Litovsk, the
Gebietskommissar continued to sanction soup kitchens, which, he noted "brought
about a slight improvement."535 While such ideas certainly did nothing to shake
the foundations of the racial ladder in the east, it does suggest that space existed
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Ibid.
BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 24.7.1943. Burat also
noted that of late, partisan activity had been influenced as a result of "the
collection of younger age groups to work in the Reich."
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Ibid.
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The Gebietskommissar cited frequent reports that the attitude of workers was
not significantly improved by access to work kitchens because they complained:
"if my family is starving, I cannot enjoy the food in the works kitchen." BA R94/8,
"Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 24.7.1943.
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for a Gebietskommissar not only to critically access selective policies but also to
implement corrective measures, however limited, within his fiefdom. In this way,
influence and power at the local can be understood as flexible, negotiable and
revisable.
Two further factors come to light in this report. First, Burat noted, with
some frustration, that Reich Germans in his Gebiet continued to pester him
concerning their access to food resources. While an RKU decree (22.3.1943)
reduced food supplies allocated to Reich Germans, Burat reported that they
continued to hold his Food and Agriculture Department responsible for not
providing a "balanced diet with fruit." While still "adequate," he suggested that
their plight was the result of the broader food allocation system, mandated at the
centre, rather than any actual shortages in his area. He also noted that he would
continue to try and rectify provisioning problems by growing more locally.
Second, the interest of the Gebietskommissar in the local population
focused on those "valuable" to his operations. While situation reports exhibited
an extraordinary regard for some locals, the focus remained strongly rooted in
two assumptions: preserving productivity or maintaining security. If a particular
local or group was not tied to either of these assumptions, they were simply cut
loose entirely, if they were considered at all. While Reich Germans, farmers and
workers represent the former such group, refugee gypsies and Russians
certainly fell into the later. In the case of the "several hundred Soviet families"
still in the area by mid-1943, the Gebietskommissar ordered all women not
actively employed sent to work in Germany and their children placed in
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orphanages. Yet, even this "very unpleasant" solution was preferable to that
imposed on the remaining gypsies. Referring to the deportees from Bialystok,
Gebietskommissar Burat lamented the "ghastly sight" of gypsy "scum" whose
"main occupation... [was] begging and stealing." To solve the "vital" problem he
requested authorization to ensure they "be treated like the Jews."536
While the Gebietskommissar clearly had the interests of "favoured" locals
in mind, it certainly was not based on altruistic notions. Rather, an effective
Gebietskommissar understood that the requirements of a functioning regime did
not always square with the dogma or overall agenda of his masters in Riga,
Rowno or Berlin. As a result, he could advocate saving some, while actively
working to repress and even kill others. In the climate of racist utilitarianism, an
effective Gebietskommissar was perhaps more one-eyed king than "blockhead."
By 20 July 1943, Operation Citadel had failed at Kursk. The results were
felt almost immediately in OMi areas, most acutely in the RKU. Beginning in
early fall 1943, situation reports began to describe new challenges to the regime.
No longer were the partisans and quotas the sole enemies of the civil
administration. In the face of a collapsing front, the Gebietskommissars faced
the logistical nightmare of retreating German forces and, ultimately, the looming
shadow of the advancing Red Army.537
In Brest-Litovsk, the impact was psychological as well as logistic. Not
surprisingly, the Gendarmerie District Leader reported to the Gebietskommissar
that: "due to the withdrawal from the front, the local people friendly to the
536
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BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 24.7.1943.
Ibid, in which the Gebietskommissar requested additional troops for security.

Germans [were] very subdued.

In terms of logistics, the ongoing and

intensified partisan war only heightened an already critical situation. In early fall,
the Gebietskommissar's worst fears were confirmed as crops rotted in the field,
unable to be collected due to partisan raids and sabotage. Not only was
cultivation and collection difficult due to mundane factors such as labour and
machinery shortages but had they, in fact, became "impossible in areas with
significant partisans."539 By October, the District Agriculturist reported to the
Gebietskommissar that "1/3 of the Brest-Litovsk district is still controlled by
bandits and from here the quota can only be delivered with Wehrmacht
protection and with the use of force." Even after collection, crops were not safe.
Persistent and effective partisan actions had reduced the number of usable
storage facilities to a point where the Gebietskommissar was forced to consider
using schools for storage space. Even guarded warehouses were not safe as
wily "bandits," firing tracer ammunition, attacked and destroyed them. In one
case, the civil administration lost 250 tons of hay to such a tactic.
The situation had moved beyond the capacity of the Gebietskommissar
and his assets to handle.540 Consequently, the civil administration turned to the
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BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader Brest Monthly Report," 4.10 1943. Not
surprisingly, the Gend. District Leader also noted the heightened concern of
indigenous police, clearly worried about the failing fortunes at the front.
539
Ibid. The District Agriculturist reported however that "7,500 tons of grain
[was] collected in a Gebiet" using "horse-drawn wagons ...to bring the crops in
from the areas which do not have a large number of bandits." Further, farmers
who continued to try and meet quotas were forced to take increasingly careful
precautionary measures such as attempting to "vary their routes to enable them
to deliver their quota and avoid bandits."
540
For scarcity of local security forces see BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader
Brest Monthly Report," 4.10 1943 and 23.12.1943. A Gebietskommissar's

Wehrmacht to provide effective security.

With the assistance of the

Wehrmacht, the civil administration continued to struggle against the partisans, in
some cases with moderate success.542 Yet the very presence of Wehrmacht
units proved a double- edged sword for the Gebietskommissar. On the one
hand, a larger number of Wehrmacht forces in the area allowed their deployment
against partisans. On the other hand, their very presence in the rear areas was
the result of their retreat from the front and a sobering reminder of the collapsing
fortunes of the war. More important for the Gebietskommissar however was the
impossible equation engendered by their presence in terms of provisioning and
food economics. Due to defeats at the front, an increased Wehrmacht presence
in OMi areas only exacerbated an already untenable situation.543 At the moment
when food became even scarcer and harder to harvest, the demand increased.
For example, in Brest, the Army Supply Office pressured the Gebietskommissar

appeals for assistance would not be unusual considering the manpower
shortages in terms of German police and the fears of the growing unreliability in
some indigenous forces. BA R94/8, "District Agriculturalist Monthly Report,"
9.6.1943 and BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 22.8.1942.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that there was praise rather than derision for
some indigenous forces as they fought well against the growing tide of partisans.
541
In terms of interagency cooperation, the trend towards more friendly relations
ontinued even as the front collapsed. Gebietskommissar Burat reported that the
local military forces were indeed very understanding. BA R94/8,
"Gebietskommissar Brest. Situation Report," 23.12.1943.
542
"During harvesting with the help of the Wehrmacht, bandit leaders have been
found in the villages and handed over to the SD. Unfortunately, there are not
enough Wehrmacht men to purge the entire area. We are doing all we can."
543
The arrival of retreating Wehrmacht units was not the only problem as "trains
arriving with refugees from the front" further compounded the problems in the
area. BA R94/8, "District Agriculturist Brest Monthly Report," 16.10.1943. In
December 1943 the Gend. District Leader reported increased pressure due to
massive population increase of Army units and refugees. BA R94/8, "Gend.
District Leader Brest: Situation Report," 5.12.1943 and BA R94/8,
"Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 23.12.1943.

for even more cows due to the increased volume of troops in the area and the
increased need for marching rations.544 Such demands simply could not be
met.545 Perhaps even more threatening was the difficulty of even acquiring and
distributing Wehrmacht provisions to Gendarmerie posts in rural areas.546 By
year- end, the security situation was so acute that district police assets could no
longer rely on local food procurement, depending instead on supply from
Wehrmacht stores.547 Clearly, the situation was out of control.
Yet despite the crumbling situation and increasingly alarming reports, at
the local level, the administration not only continued to function but to attempt,
with some relative success, to function effectively. In late October 1943,
Gebietskommissar Burat reported that his overworked staff continued to try to
find solutions to the food problem.548 His efforts were even recognized and
commended by the Gendarmerie District Leader in late December for performing
"tasks in an exemplary manner."549 Despite the obstacles and pressures, "in
total, 80% of the grain and potato quotas [were] met" in spite of the fact that "in
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activity...put the meat supply for Brest in jeopardy." BA R94/8, "Gend. District
Leader Brest Situation Report," 5.12.1943.
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BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader Brest Monthly Report," 4.10 1943.
Interestingly, the Gend. Leader also noted the plight of Schutzmannschaft/Gend.
posts.
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BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader Brest Situation Report," 5.12.1943; "Gend.
District Leader Brest Situation Report," 4.1.1944 and "Gend. District Leader Brest
Situation Report," 3.2.1944.
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BA R94/7, Contribution to Monthly Report of Section II," 31.10.1943.
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BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader Brest Monthly Report," 23.12.1943.

partisan infested regions, the harvest [was] way behind."550
According to the Gendarmerie District Leader, "special praise" was due
to the Gebietskommissar's men 'in the field' for their efforts in the "collection of
quotas."551 Ultimately, however effective the Gebietskommissar and his staff
were, the whirlwind of larger events quickly engulfed them. In December 1943, a
large scale partisan raid on the town of Domataschwo, a civil administration and
police stronghold, resulted in the burning of the District Agriculturalist's office and
home and his narrow escape, despite his initial capture. In all, twenty-five
buildings were burned, including the police barracks.552 This event marked the
death throes of the civil administration as the entire region "to the south of Brest
[was] virtually entirely controlled by the bandits."553 Consequently, the civil
administration could no longer venture beyond the "immediate vicinities of
localities where there are police formations," thereby surrendering "the greater
part of the region" to the partisans.554 No longer able to move about, much less
exert influence on his fiefdom, the main concern of the Gebietskommissar
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According to the Gend. District Leader, problems arose from seizing and
requisitioning food "inconsiderately." BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader Brest
Monthly Report," 23.12.1943.
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BA R94/8, "Gend. District Leader Brest Monthly Report," 5.12.1943 and
"Gend. District Leader Brest Monthly Report," 23.12.1943. During this attack, the
District Agriculturalist was "pulled from his house" by partisans but managed to
escape with his staff. A second attack occurred in January 1944 in which an
additional twenty-seven buildings were burned down. BA R94/8, "Gend. District
Leader Brest Monthly Report," 3.2.1944.
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At this point, all day to day operations outside the towns were virtually
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became scraping together enough supplies to feed those holed up in the few
remaining redoubts.555
Food economics clearly demonstrated the harsh realities and
irreconcilable challenges facing the civil administration, and particularly the
Gebietskommissar. Yet, as we have seen, not every challenge, whether external
or internal, was always impossible to manage. In the case of Brest-Litovsk, a
close reading of the context and the networks of challenges and responses
suggests the need for an important re-thinking of the local civil administration. If
effectiveness can be measured by effort in addition to result, a savvy
Gebietskommissar could claim some measure of it. In Brest, despite the overall
failure of food policy to meet its stated aims, quotas continued to be met and
dogged effort given even as the security situation fell apart. Finally, while not
down-playing either the racism or brutal violence of the local civil administration,
food economics highlights the complexities and inherent inconsistencies in the
occupation, As both Dieckmann and Gerlach have shown, food economics
contributed a further impetus for mass murder. Yet, as we have seen in Brest, it
also reveals a level of concern, altruistic or not, that a Gebietskommissar could
show towards the local population. Certainly, ethnic Germans enjoyed the most
empathy, followed by those indigenous persons willing to collaborate with the
regime. In spite of critical shortages, their welfare clearly was in the mind of the
civil administration. Even Jews (if not gypsies) received a level of concern,
555

By early 1944, just weeks prior to evacuation, the Gebietskommissar faced a
dire reality in which "supplying the town of Brest-Litovsk with its numerous
Wehrmacht units with food and horse fodder [was] becoming increasingly
difficult." Ibid.

however wholly selfish and temporary it may have been. Such reactions do
nothing to exonerate Gebietskommissars but did bring to light the complex web
of choices they faced and ultimately to underscore their ability and willingness to
make them.
In the end, however, Gebietskommissars failed their Fuhrer. Yet why,
when, and how they failed remain important considerations. Mismanagement
and ineptitude are part of the explanation, yet other, perhaps equally
representative possibilities existed. In these cases, the Gebietskommissar that
emerges is like a conductor on a runaway train, collecting fares until the very
moment when the train flies from the rails.556

This metaphor was originally attributed to German industrialists in the Third
Reich but is equally applicable to the civil administration at the local level.

Chapter 7
"The Whole Thing Went Backwards": Labour Policy, Procurement
and Partisans

An important reality of the eastern occupation was just how thin the
Germans were on the ground. Civil officials were faced with the hard truth that
for the regime to function at all, some measure of cooperation with the
indigenous population was required. However limited their abilities, suspect their
racial lineage, questionable their loyalties, the simple truth was that a
Gebietskommissar could not operate without them. To this labour prerequisite,
the centre further muddied the waters. In important areas such as production
quotas and evolving Jewish policy, the demands of the centre pushed outwards
to the periphery. Simultaneously, there existed other policies, such as the
demand for labour exported to the Reich, which added a pulling pressure to the
Gebietskommissar's already overwhelming workload. Yet, the raison d'etre of
the civil administration was "to represent the interests of the Reich."557
Ultimately, in both the short-term and long-term, Gebietskommissars failed.
Understanding and analyzing Nazi labour policy at the local level requires
an understanding of the numerous socio-ethnic and age groups targeted by the
local regime. In terms of socio-ethnic groups, five are identifiable:
Volksdeutsche, indigenous Slavs (Ukrainians and Byelorussians), Russians
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(Soviets), Jews and Gypsies.

Each of these groups held a unique place not

only in the Nazi universe but also in terms of their functions and place within the
day to day operations of the district regime. Labour policy and location in
operations also varied significantly over time underscoring the fundamentally
complex and nuanced balancing act that a Gebietskommissar faced. From the
outset, relationships with the various social and ethnic groups were complex and
multifaceted. For some, the new regime brought the hope for positive changes
and relief from the "twenty-three year Soviet psychosis." For others, less hopeful
of the liberating benevolence of the Nazis, the best strategy was passivity as a
means to navigate the new reality. Yet overall, a Gebietskommissar could
expect a kind of honeymoon period with the bulk of the indigenous Slavic
population as the tendency of the locals was to adopt a "wait and see" outlook.559
Certainly, Gebietskommissars quickly became aware of the various
competing national communities and their constant animosity-fuelled efforts to
improve their own lot, at the expense of the other. In western Ukraine, this
dynamic largely revolved around Polish-Ukrainian relations.560 Throughout the
occupation, the civil administration was forced to relate to a mixed and divided

Note note that the social backgrounds within these groups fluctuated
dramatically. In BA R94/6, "Situation Report SSPF Brest," 15.3.1942, the
divisions within the Jewish community are clearly reported.
559
CIDK, 1275/3/662, "Report by FK 675, Abt. VII (Mil. Admin) to SD,"
26.7.1941. Of course this did not impact the entire social order. As we have
seen, the administration was certainly not above harsh measures against certain
segments or suspected anti-German elements.
560
Interestingly, the Brest civil administration detected that relations between
Poles and Jews was much more sympathetic than the one between Ukrainians
and Jews.

population intent on co-opting the regime for their own ends as much as the
regime attempted the same.
As we have seen with taxation and food policy, an effective
Gebietskommissar administration meant a hands-on approach was essential.561
Yet in regards to labour policy, what was meant by effective? What system
precisely was to be managed? Again, akin to taxes and food exploitation, labour
policy had a particular framework, goals and methods. This policy, like food
economics, contained two largely exclusive objectives: ensuring a functioning,
productive local economy while simultaneously exporting labour to the Reich.
This reality was further compounded by the consequences of war on the factors
of production and also the way in which the war itself was fought, particularly
behind the front lines. This combination of factors meant that the most likely
outcome at the local level, regardless of ability, was an overwhelmed
Gebietskommissar engaged in a losing struggle.562 Seen in this way, the local
civil administration is best understood as "bailing water" rather than building any
sort of Lebensraum. Whatever their intentions, the harsh realities of meeting
demands from above and below were obvious.
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BA R94/6, "Situation Report SSPF Brest," 15.3.1942. BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 24.12.1941 notes the problems and
unreliability of local indigenous administrators.
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In August 1942 Gebietskommissar Rolle reported that his administration had
only 205 Germans in the entire district. BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest
Monthly Report," 22.8.1942.
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Orders stated that the responsibility for the use of Labour and sending
people to the Reich [lay] with the Gebietskommissar in each case."563 To meet
these demands, the Gebietskommissar turned to his Labour Office and
numerous area sub-offices.564 The first and cardinal task of the office was clearly
spelled out by the Gebietskommissar: "identifying the members of the
population...capable of work."565 Erecting the foundation of the new order
required workers, lots of workers. Following the initial work of the Army, the civil
administration focussed on registering labour assets with a Labour Office.566
Initially, the main difficulty was too many workers rather than too few. Early
assessments presented a harsh reality in which the combination of war damage
and a lack of materials on hand meant "a large part of the population [was]
available for work."567 Yet, even in this seemingly positive situation, the
outcomes were indeed dubious. Unemployment meant a Gebietskommissar
managed a population already "with little money to spend", further compounded
by an unpopular, centrally mandated wage scheme under which wages were
artificially deflated and set at a range between 80-150RM.568 Consequently, a
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R94/7, "GebietskommissarSituation Report," 24.12.1941.
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CIDK, 1275/3/662, "Report by FK 675, Abt. VII (Mil. Admin) to SD,"
11.8.1941. Army registration with the Labour Office in Brest for example,
registered 3600 by mid August 1941. However, they had anticipated 10,000.
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Ibid. In the RKU, Erich Koch issued Wage Orders 90.50 and 91.12. BA
R94/6, "Situation Report SSPF Brest," 15.3.1942, also BA R94/6, "Situation
Report of Stadtkommissar Brest," 23.12.1941. For their unpopularity, BA R94/6,

double-bind tying labour to food economics resulted in a black market literally
draining the population of whatever income could be earned.569 The overall
result of this policy was quickly draining the pool of potential voluntary labour as
registration with the Labour Office generally heightened the detested prospect of
transport to the Reich. Neither did working locally secure enough wages to get
by.570
This bounty of labour soon proved ephemeral however as, with the
establishment of the Labour Office, too many transformed into too few. Given
the lack of food, work, and decent wages, compounded by high prices and the
danger of deportation, a contracting labour force was inevitable. A
Gebietskommissar quickly faced the additional problem of not only the declining
number of workers available but also how qualified these workers really were.571
In short order, all agencies at the local level understood that some workers were,
in fact, better than others. In a peculiar inversion of the racial ladder, Jews were
most effective and cheap, followed by Poles, Ukrainians, Russians and
Gypsies.572 While local Christians still had the possibility to move on or dodge
labour, the Jewish population enjoyed fewer liberties. Already identified and

"Stadtkommissar Brest," 12.1.1942 and BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation
Report," 24.1.1942.
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In some cases, barter replaced currency as detailed in BA R94/6, "Situation
Report SSPF Brest," 15.3.1942 and "Stadtkommissar Brest," 12.1.1942.
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BA R94/6, "Stadtkommissar Brest," 12.1.1942 and BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 24.1.1942.
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Reports indicate that all offices at the local level understood that some
workers were, in fact, better than others.
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See BA R94/6, "Stadtkommissar Brest," 26.11.1941; BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 24.12.1941. Initially, the Labour Office
used Jewish skilled workers exclusively to construct offices and winter quarters.
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centrally managed, Jews afforded the Gebietskommissar an important interim
solution to the critical labour shortage. Excluded from economic life, this
relationship granted Jews precious opportunities to earn wages at the same time
as it benefited the regime.573 In Brest, Rolle reported that he "could not avoid
allowing Jewish workers to work for some properties subordinate to the Food and
Agricultural Office as there was no one else available."574 Unfortunately for the
Gebietskommissar "the most skilled workers belonged to the Jewish population"
anyway.
All employment was to be formally arranged through the Labour Office
that acted as a clearing house with labour requirements matched to available
registered workers.576 By coordinating various agencies, such as the police and
Labour department, whatever labour could be raised in the area was centrally
distributed to meet both local needs and deportation quotas.577 Initially, he could
turn to prisoners of war to meet demands. However, as these stocks dwindled
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Initially, the city prison in Brest was exclusively used to procure "agricultural
workers for the German Reich" and was the responsibility of the
Gebietskommissar. BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 15.4.1942.
Excellent coordination at civil administration offices is indicated in BA R94/7,
"Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 24.1.1942.

by early 1942, he was forced to look to the local population.

In practice, the

Gebietskommissar was constantly bombarded from all sides by requests for
labour. Each month, local and Reich requests for workers would pour in,
demanding the Gebietskommissar, through the Labour Office, engaged in a kind
of juggling act in an effort to meet the growing demands with the dwindling labour
resources.
As the numbers of prisoners of war dwindled by early 1942, the civil
administration was forced to look to the local population. While for all intents and
purposes the labour requirements proved infinite, the pool of registered labour,
particularly skilled labour, quickly proved finite. Again, dismal wages and the
prospect of deportation did little to encourage voluntary registration.
Coordinating with his various offices, the Gebietskommissar was forced toward
compulsory registration. Understanding the link between labour and food, the
initial tactic was to cross-check ration lists with labour lists.579 From these lists,
labour assets could then be doled out to needy concerns such as the railway,
state farms, local factories, agencies such as the OT, and even the civil
administration itself.580 However, given the twin pressures of local and Reich
needs, the Gebietskommissar ultimately required a more detailed mechanism by
578
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BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 12.6.1942. On good cooperation
with OT, BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report,"24.12.1941. This
certainly was an imperfect system. While the Wehrmacht was simply outside this
system, others overcame shortages by 'cheating'. For example, the OT and
railways both set up their own camps to house the 900 workers they had simply
recruited by pulling them off transports intended for the Reich. BA R94/6, Labour
Office Brest Monthly Report," 6.7.1942.

which labour demands could be met. Of course, with a more complex
mechanism, the possibilities and potentials for breakdowns proved even more
acute. Further, the civil administration also faced the reality that transportations
were, in fact, two-way: Gebiet to Reich and Reich to Gebiet. As trains left
carrying workers to the Reich, other trains arrived, carrying those incapable of
meeting the demands of working in Germany. Returning workers were billeted
in a squalid reception camp, shared with those destined for deportation to the
Reich. The entire enterprise was so poorly organized and maintained that
returning workers could slip into the general population even before internment,
thereby avoiding labour deployment altogether.581 Consequently, the
Gebietskommissar faced demands from those going and coming. Returning
workers, like those departing, required classification, provisioning and,
eventually, a final destination. This effectively doubled the demands on the civil
administration as well as compounding an already deteriorating security situation.
In terms of Reich labour procurement, the process remained under the
control of the Gebietskommissar and his attendant offices. Once deemed
suitable for shipment to the Reich, workers were moved to a reception camp
where they waited in dismal conditions. While interned awaiting transport to the
Reich or release, workers were guarded by local police assets and tended to
occupy their time primarily with repeated escape attempts. By mid-1942, a
reception camp could contain over 3500 people, compounding the already
581

BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 15.7.1942. Workers "unusable" by
the local Labour Office could eventually expect to be returned home. However,
even this was not a sure thing. In some cases, locals were sent to the wrong
village by mistake.

untenable provisioning situation while providing yet another security headache
for the Gebietskommissar. In Brest, Rohde reported openly:

the whole organization of the transportation to the German Reich and
back is so deficient and poorly thought through that it can only end in
disaster. There is, in particular, a shortage of German forces to take
control of the transport operations. The small number of men
available have, in my opinion, completely lost track of things. These
transport operations can be no help to us as far as propaganda is
concerned. It still remains a puzzle to me how cripples, heavily
pregnant women and even blind people have been transported to the
German Reich to work.582

In a single month, June 1942, the civil administration initially received
20,739 potential workers. Somewhere between their arrival and returning from
debusing, 739 or almost four percent vanished. While 18,490 did move on to the
Reich, 1510 remained under the care and responsibility of the
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^ "Provision of workers to the Reich: 1.4 to 30.6.1942." This report detailed
the reality of labour transportation.
Transportation from the station to the reception camp
Number of transportations: 36
Number of people: 20739
Transportation from the reception camp to the debusing station and back
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Number of people: 18490
From the hospital to Kiev etc.
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BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 15.7.1942.

Gebietskommissar, requiring not only provisioning but also the constant guard of
local police. In short, in a single month, 2249, about eleven percent of the total
contingent, either escaped or deemed unsuitable for deportation. Finally, on top
of this, the reception camp received about 5500 locals returning from the Reich,
unfit for service.583 The Gebietskommissar faced an enormous problem,
reporting that proper supervision and management of these people was simply
impossible for him. Clearly, the entire process was severely compromised.
Whatever problems the Gebietskommissar faced with the Reich labour
procurement office, local needs only compounded his headaches. Again, the
civil administration was caught between two conflicting demands: a functioning
and productive occupation and the needs of the homeland. Locally, the
administration required a labour force to meet both these needs, through
production as well the repair, maintenance and expansion of the infrastructure.584
Such demands required significant labour, an already scare commodity.
Thus, by mid-1942, the labour procurement system was in crisis due to
pressure to meet local needs. In July, the Reichsbahn alone requested an
additional 1800 workers.585 Demands for the future were equally dire: 1000 more
for the railways in autumn, 200 for the local metal factory, 50 for wood-working
and 2600 unskilled labourers. Eighteen months into the occupation, entire towns
supported full employment. Yet manufacturing was not the priority of either the
Gebietskommissar or the Reich. Having to prioritize demands, the civil

BA R94/6, Labour Office Brest Monthly Report," 6.7.1942.
BA R94/7, "Labour Office Brest Monthly Report," 27.10.1942.
Ibid. In general, the railway seemed insatiable in terms of labour needs.
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administration favoured agriculture over all else. Beginning in 1942, workers
were expected to be released from their businesses in order to assist in bringing
in the harvest. So important was this effort that a Gebietskommissar could even
order a halt to Reich labour recruitment for specific age groups for the duration of
the harvest season.586
In the end, labour needs were never fully met. Pressured by a
deteriorating security situation, lack of provisions and the abiding unwillingness of
locals to fully embrace the new system, at best the Gebietskommissar could
sometimes tread water before he inevitably sank. Labour procurement was a
millstone for the Gebietskommissar. Obviously, from the indigenous perspective,
labour in Germany was not a popular destination. Working locally for low wages
and no food would have been little better. For the Gebietskommissar this
situation only compounded the problems already inherent in the task of finding
deportees. First, despite a critical lack of German personnel (even typists)
locally, labour had to be identified as both capable of work and "surplus to [local]
plans."587 Second, the entire enterprise was hamstrung because "there were
some problems as this was all started in somewhat of a rushu" Third, the
Gebietskommissar was forced to rely on local chiefs, already understood as
unreliable, to carry out orders due to the chronic understaffing of Germans in the
civil administration. Finally, as the "recruitment" process did not take place in an
information or security vacuum, "a large number of farmers and workers
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 22.8.1942 and
BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 21.8.1943.
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suddenly disappeared into the woods.

These core challenges, when taken

together, help account for the central dilemma facing a Gebietskommissar: the
dramatic shortage of labour. Further, even the effort at labour recruitment,
whatever the results, placed an extraordinary strain on a Gebietskommissar
already juggling multiple demands on his abilities and on his resources. The
collection, concentration and deportation of workers, as well as those retained for
local employment, all siphoned limited resources such as housing, food and
security assets. Given the dropping production rates, desertion and attendant
security and propaganda risks, the Gebietskommissar was forced to manage
demands which could drain more than they generated.589
Yet failures in the realization of labour policy were not entirely situational
but rather betray significant systemic failures built in to the exploitation policy of
occupation. Critically, the civil administration was chronically understaffed. A
Gebietskommissar was forced to stretch his resources as thin as possible, so far
as to be woefully inadequate in most tasks. In Brest, Reich transports, the raison
d' etre of local labour policy, were allocated a mere three to five German
policemen and ten to fifteen local police, in total, to both guard and carry out
transports. In other efforts, such as local reconstruction, limited personnel meant
that new concerns would, at some point, be handed over to local managers and
labourers. Once out of the hands, and "transferred to locals, the whole thing
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Ibid. On shortages, BA R94/6, "Report of Stadtkommissar Brest," 25.4.1942.
BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 21.8.1943, for
production at a standstill.
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[went] backwards, the business stagnated," requiring the Gebietskommissar to
"start over."590
In terms of efficiency and coordination, some local agencies displayed a
remarkable lack of ability even considering the harsh external pressures. Far
from the stereotype of German competence, the Gebietskommissars managed a
network more prone to failure than success, where even apparent successes
only laid the foundation for later failures. Local labour recruitment, carried out by
agencies of the Gebietskommissar was:
sometimes performed so clumsily that the majority of the workers
recruited escaped. The police are too weak to catch them and the
escapees make colossal propaganda against the German
administration and gradually the general situation is making it
impossible for the German administration to keep control.

Further, meeting some demands meant undercutting others. In some
cases, a Gebietskommissar had to intervene directly as his own offices undercut
each other in order to meet their demands. For example in the 1943 harvest,
Gebietskommissar Burat noted that "the collection of the young age group [was]
having a detrimental effect on the state farms as many of the farm labourers
come from this age group. The resulting gaps cannot be filled."592 In the end, he
was forced to order a halt to labour recruitments for the duration of the harvest.
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 22.8.1942.
BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 9.6.1943.
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Ibid, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 24.6.1943. Burat continued:
"At present the situation is that these youngsters have escaped into the woods in
order to escape the mustering. Other farm workers, who do not belong to this
age group, have also escaped to the woods because they are frightened they will
be sent to Germany. If the young farmworkers are permanent staff, I had issued
591
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The nature of the regime also meant that a Gebietskommissar oversaw a
system characterized by overlapping competencies and, to some extent,
competing agencies. Initially, some districts with both a Stadtkommissar and
Gebietskommissar were burdened with parallel administrations. In other cases,
one administrator could actively lobby for replication, as was the case in Brest. It
was not until October 1942 that redundant offices in the city and district
administrations were merged. While according to Burat, this had certainly
reduced some overlap and ensured his office was somewhat better staffed with
Reich Germans, "the range of work and the workload has become greater, since
four Reich Germans were retained from the former Stadtkommissar's office,
whose work is now distributed among the remaining Reich Germans in my
office."593
While locally, cooperation and coordination were the norm for most tasks,
labour recruitment and maintenance really brought out the worst in the various
agencies.594 The Wehrmacht, for example, offered higher wages to attract local

an order in accordance with the directives on the collection of workers to the
effect that these workers should be left on the farms and gradually replaced."
593
BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 9.10.1942.
594
Many reports directly referred to excellent cooperation and collaboration,
even between local SD assets and the civil administration. Locally, close
collaboration between agencies was the norm. Representative reports are: BA
R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Situation Report," 24.12.1941; BA R94/6, "Situation
Report SSPF Brest," 15.3.1942; BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly
Report," 21.8.1943 and BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report,"
9.10.1942. This reality continued to the end of the occupation. BA R 94/8,
"Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 23.12.1943. However, outside the
"direct control area" of the Gebietskommissar, problems could arise. Also the
mobile nature of some SD killings squads was significant. If a unit was locally
based, a better relationship between agencies was possible. Note that the killing
in Domachevo employed units technically under the control of the civil

workers while others sought to entice workers from their current employer with
the prospect of a free, warm lunch. The civil administration soon understood that
not only was this tactic destructive but also seemingly endorsed, at least tacitly,
by some agencies. While on the whole, close collaboration at the local level was
the rule rather than the exception, competition for labour strained cooperation
between some agencies, particularly the Wehrmacht which was beyond the
control of the Gebietskommissar, if still subject to some informal cajoling and
E;QG;

persuasion.
As a matter of course, agencies tended to hoard labour while
simultaneously trying to increase their labour pool by any means necessary.596
Given the western location of Brest, for example, it acted as kind of hub where
workers heading for the Reich from points east passed through. In spring 1942,
Stadtkommissar Burat complained that some were being hijacked from the trains
when he reported: "it is frequently obvious that German departments here are

administration without the Gebietskommissar knowing or asking. Finally, the
problems of gasoline, security risks and the isolated nature of each town were
factors in limiting the size of a Gebietskommissar's "direct control area." BA
R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 9.10.1942.
595
BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 15.4.1942 and "SSPF Brest
Situation Report," 12.6.1942. The Wehrmacht for example tended to pay higher
salaries than other agencies such as the Reichsbahn.
596
BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 22.8.1942. In an
interesting case of labour stealing, Gebietskommissar Rolle reported: "only 350
Jews were working as craftsmen. The SSPF ordered the removal of 1000. The
City Commissar and myself were not informed in advance about the removal of
the Jews. One bright morning, when I went to visit the businesses there were no
Jews there and my staff officer had to drive around all day and collect up Jews
which were needed for vital war business. Nevertheless, we did not get them all
back." These Jews were apparently stolen by the police for use in workshops he
had set up.
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taking these workers away quite improperly.

Far from ending the practice, the

civil administration would later embrace it.
Finally, while a Gebietskommissar could expect a great many demands
arriving from higher authorities, in critical ways he was left unsupported, acting
pretty much on his own as he interpreted the situation required.598 In some
cases, despite the requests of a Gebietskommissar, clarifications and directives
relating to the situation were not forthcoming. In Brest, Burat complained that
while he had repeatedly asked for decisions "of a basic nature" to be made at
higher levels, he had failed to receive them, apart from one interim decision. As
a result he noted "I am placed in a predicament, very often making provisional
decisions according to my own assessment, even on basic questions, in which
case there is a danger that these may be in contradiction to later decisions. A
remedy for this deplorable state of affairs is urgently desired."599 Whatever his
ability, a Gebietskommissar faced an uphill struggle. Saddled with challenging if
not impossible demands with limited resources on hand, he was further
handicapped by the nature of the system that was in place. Even if these
obstacles were overcome (or at least worked around), he could expect little
support from his own superiors. Not surprisingly, the results of this situation were
long predicted and, at times somewhat cynically noted at the local level.
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BA R94/6, "Report of Stadtkommissar Brest," 25.4.1942.
This reality was particularly acute in terms of law, at least initially, which,
apart from some basic directives was left up to the Gebietskommissar to
translate at the local level.
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 9.10.1942.
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Gebietskommissars were also forced to contend with other pressures, in
particular the strategies employed by local workers to ensure their own wellbeing,
a goal which they understood was not the first priority of the new regime. Dealt
uncompromising orders from higher levels concerning both wage schemes and
the food exportation quotas, workers could never expect to see any fruits of their
labour, either in their pockets or at the supper table. Initially, compounding the
acute labour shortage, workers favoured a tactic of job-hopping in which an
employed worker would shop around for the best deal in terms of wage and
fringe benefits, such as free lunches. Yet, as the honeymoon period with the
occupiers dwindled in 1942, desertion wracked the urban labour forces, as
workers ran for the countryside to find, at best food and, at worst, a partisan band
to join.600 In the countryside, fearing deportation to the Reich, young men fled
the state farms while others, released from other work to participate in the
harvest simply never returned. By fall 1942, recruitment and labour recovery was
increasingly endangered by the deteriorating security situation. In some rural
areas, the surplus workers were "very difficult to get hold of as no-one dared
approach them due to the bandit danger."601 As whole areas came under the
control of partisan bands, labour recruitment came to a virtual standstill.602
Locals increasingly perceived that they had been "much better off under
the Bolsheviks," a perception no doubt reinforced by increased partisan activity
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° BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 12.6.1942, 2893. Lack of food is
documented in BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 22.8.1942.
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BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 21.8.1943.
225

and, by early 1943, the proximity of the Red Army.

The conditions on the

ground, the behaviour of the occupiers and their tactics for labour recruitment
certainly prompted many to favour the partisans over the Nazis.604 By 1943, the
situation was dire indeed as Gebietskommissars faced a harsh reality where
partisan activity had increased enormously.
Attacks on state farms, villages and Town halls are the order of the
day. The delivery of the quota by the farmers has been stopped. It is
impossible to use wagons to collect wood or provide workers for
urgent jobs. If the bandits are not destroyed by the Wehrmacht and
police in the near future, this year's harvest, which promises to be
excellent, will be endangered.605

In early fall 1943, the full reality of the situation, and the general failure of
labour policy was clearly summed up by the Brest Gebietskommissar: "the great
demand for labour can only be partially covered as workers cannot be obtained
from the territory controlled by the bandits or from the peaceful areas. It is not
bUJ

BA R94/6, "SSPF Brest Situation Report," 12.6.1942..
Ibid. BA R94/6, "Labour Office Brest Monthly Report," 6.7.1942 provides an
insightful summary of the interrelated problems. Labour needs required workers
who needed to be coerced. The system itself favoured harsh methods to soft
ones yet did not have adequate resources to deal with fallout of such tactics.
The result summarized: "We have to assume that they [fleeing workers] have
joined the partisans." However it is also important to note that support for the
partisans was not universal, particularly in 1941-1942.
605
BA R94/8, Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 24.6.1943. Also note
that requests for more security forces were a contstant feature. In Brest, the
Gebietskommissar even directly appealed to other agencies. In a meeting with
with Wehrmacht and police superiors in Rowno, he asked for support in the
pacification of the district. He reported: "Everyone showed great understanding
for the difficult situation of the civil administration. The commander of the training
regiment here, was also the senior officer in the garrison, has promised me
active support, but so far nothing has happened. Even if something does happen
it will only be small operations which will not contribute to the permanent
pacification of the district. Therefore, I repeat my request for the permanent
reinforcement of my gendarmes." BA R94/8, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly
Report," 21.8.1943.
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possible to travel around the district as bridges have been blown up and some
districts are controlled entirely by bandits."606
In the end, whatever the tactics and ability of those at the local level, they
were undone and overwhelmed by the tide of war. By late 1943, the civil
administration was no longer focussed on labour procurement but rather the
processing and provisioning of the waves of refugees pouring in from the east.
As the front buckled, points west received not only civilians but the retreating
Wehrmacht. Rather than the deserted streets of the previous year, Brest was full
to bursting with "Wehrmacht units, retainers and refugees. The town is now so
heavily populated that I must refuse to take any more people, including
Wehrmacht and refugees."607
While limited efforts were attempted to use refugees for labour
deportations, the Labour Office was "mainly occupied with forwarding and
accommodating the refugees from the operational areas."608 However, both
labour and security concerns remained. Despite the fact that the recruitment for
the Reich had virtually ended, there still existed a great shortage of labour locally,
particularly for the railway. Further, the Gebietskommissar reported that he had
reached an ad hoc arrangement with the Field Commandant, Major General
Spengler, with whom he had "an excellent relationship" to assist in providing
additional security. Yet despite the General making "every effort to help us to
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Ibid, "Gebietskommissar Brest Monthly Report," 16.10.1943. As refugees
from the front arrived in the district, "the people capable of work are sent to the
German Reich."
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protect the district," there remained "in the rural part of the district...insufficient
security forces to support the work of the civilian population, particularly my
agriculturalist."609 To the end, and despite an increased military presence,
aggressive and successful partisan attacks continued to occur.
Ultimately, the core problems with labour policy at the local level were
similar to those affecting other policies, save mass murder: internal hindrances to
efficiency in carrying out tasks and external roadblocks to the ability to carry them
out. These two factors were not only intimately intertwined but also reinforcing.
In short, Gebietskommissars faced intense pressures with little support or even
realization from higher offices as to the exact situation on the ground. Further, in
effect, they were caught between a rock and a hard place. While certainly their
reports must be seen as in some way an effort to pass the buck, it is significant
that the different agencies and offices, each with differing goals and agendas
tended to represent the situation relatively similarly. In the close-knit world
shared by local agencies, a general consensus of not only the challenges facing
the regime but their causes also was consistently represented in their reports
across the span of the occupation.
In the face of the pressures and demands, efforts were made to find
solutions to seemingly insurmountable problems. Over time, a
Gebietskommissar could, and did, attempt various methods in terms of labour
policy. Initially, surplus POWs could be utilized and whatever workforce
remained after Barbarossa put back to work. Yet, as these stocks fell and the
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reality of the occupation became increasingly obvious to local labourers,
modifications were in order. Cleary, given the dynamic of low wages and high
prices, for some, labour recruitment was not a positive prospect. Compulsory
recruitment offered a way out.610 Consequently, the Gebietskommissar, often
with his police, ordered regular labour round-ups to be carried out in search of
the unemployed.611 If a person was identified as a potential worker, they were
immediately taken into custody and "sent to the town prison to join the labour
process."612 For those found in rural areas, a compulsory labour camp was
established while others were forcibly brought into town from the hinterland.613 In
reality, the Gebietskommissar's efforts at recruiting anyone caught up in dawn
raids carried out by the Schupo also faced the familiar problems and limitations
affecting the civil administration. Lack of manpower meant that such raids,
usually involving about thirty men, were not particularly successful. In one series
of raids, the police netted about ten workers a day but none were actually
identified as unemployed.614 The downside of this tactic was not lost on local
agencies. For example, the District Agriculturalist in Brest informed the
Gebietskommissar that "the continuous recruitment of workers for the Reich,
which although necessary, caused unease throughout the district, the result of
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which is that people have lost all respect for the German police and no longer
obey the rules and regulations."615
Yet despite the widespread use of such methods, a Gebietskommissar,
particularly a creative one, was not necessarily limited to them. Less aggressive
tactics were also attempted. Initially, Rolle attempted to coordinated and share
the assets of all employers in the area. In early August 1942, he successfully
ensured that "urgent requirements from the railway" were met by the transfer of
workers from Wehrmacht and private business.616 However, this effort at finding
local solutions was not permanent as the other agencies apparently caught on
that they might lose labour faster than gain it. Some six weeks later, in early
October 1942, new Gebietskommissar Franz Burat chaired a meeting of local
agencies and "important employers" asking them to volunteer the release of
workers as the situation demanded. In an obvious effort to formalize a process
that had already occurred ad hoc, Burat implored the seventy-two local
businesses and agencies, representing almost 8000 employees, to see the big
picture. Unsurprisingly, he met with very limited success. The Wehrmacht, for
example, offered an insignificant 100 to the cause.617 Clearly some concerns
trumped a general spirit of cooperation and collaboration.
If cooperation was not assured, and dawn raids ineffective and counterproductive, a Gebietskommissar could still manage. In Brest, netting workers
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from outside the district proved relatively effective.

As the war progressed,

meeting demands meant that a Gebietskommissar would even employ methods
previously condemned. When, in July 1942, there was an urgent need of 3000
workers, Rolle's Labour Office began to skim workers transports moving through
his district to the Reich. Yet even this tactic was limited by the need to provision
these workers and the security concerns inherent to deploying forced labour.619
Further, while clearly not a concern to the local civil administrator, the labour
procurement was a zero sum game. For the Gebietskommissar however, his
immediate situation was so untenable that he was willing to engage in activities
in which supplying specific Peter meant stealing from collective Paul.
Like taxation and food economic, overall labour policy failed to meet either
broader expectations or specific local needs. There were simply not enough
workers available.620 The system itself was so fundamentally broken, inefficient
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BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Situation Report," 20.7.1942. In the case
of the train skimming, the scheme ultimately failed as "they [workers] could not
be fed properly."
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This reality clearly demonstrates the surreal nature of the occupation.
Despite massive deficits in workers, despite a general lack of expertise and
ability in the workers that were available, the regime did not nor could not see
past its ideological demands. In the face of labour shortages, the regime
murdered Jews. In reality, Jews could remedy many of the problems facing the
civil administration. The civil administration perceived them as a largely docile
and obedient population, highly skilled and clearly motivated to prove their worth
to the regime. Further, they were fundamentally alienated, cut off from the
broader population and largely without any kind of safety net rather living in truly
totalitarian environment. Yet regardless of this perfect fit, in time, the regime
affected their extermination. It is significant to note that Gebietskommissars
actively and effectively assisted in this process. However, it must also be noted
that, at the local level, there was an acute awareness of the negative results of
Jewish policy. While in the main, the solution was total, there were efforts at
negotiating, and even sidestepping this most sacred of Nazi charges. While
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and self-defeating that even the labour which was available could never be
effectively exploited. At the heart of the matter, whatever the ability of a
particular Gebietskommissar, scarcity of resources was the constant companion
of his administration. Beyond the general failure to meet goals, labour policy
provoked other significant failures. First, it proved a significant propaganda
failure. Not only did this undercut the honeymoon period with the indigenous
Christian population but also provided invaluable ammunition to resistance
groups and the Soviet regime. With the formation of labour camps, compulsory
labour and deportation, by mid-1942, the population was no longer willing to
extend the benefit of the doubt to the occupiers. Second, combined with other
factors such as food economics and Soviet military strategy, labour policy
reinforced and accelerated a more general security failure. If the Labour Office
supplied local demands with a work force, it also supplied partisan bands with
willing recruits. Favouring life in the forest and the brutality of a war without
mercy to the starvation and slave labour of life under the Nazis, labour policy
literally sent people running into the arms of the Soviet partisans. Overall, the
logic and practice of labour policy at the local level created more problems than it
solved. Here, predictions that the results would be as bad as foreseen proved
largely correct.
The work of the civil administration in the East provides important insights
into aims, goals, values and priorities of both the Gebietskommissar and the Nazi
certainly not motivated by decency or altruism, this reality must still be
acknowledged. BA R94/7, "Contribution to Monthly Report of Section II,"
31.10.1942 for a representative example. Also see Browning, "German Killers",
140-2.
232

regime itself. It offers a lens through which the various levels and types of
interaction such as centre-periphery, Nazi-indigenous can be examined in detail.
Focussing on a specific region, provides a microcosm of the eastern experience,
a kind of Petri dish within the larger "laboratory...for understanding the essential
features of the Nazi state."621 As we have seen, occupation at the local level
passed through several phases from 1941 to 1944. Exploring and understanding
the Gebietskommissar's work provides a valuable barometer to understand the
pressures and realities of the time. In some ways, Gebietskommissars enjoyed
relative success, more in terms of problem solving than "goal-meeting" but
victories nonetheless. In the end, this was simply not enough. The story of
Gebietskommissars is, fundamentally, one of scarcity: of ability, support and
direction, of food and labour. Yet in the inverted world of the Nazi east, there
was an abundance of some things. In the kingdom of the blind there was no
shortage of brutality, violence, coercion and resistance. In this context,
particularly at the local level, orders were rarely enacted as written, tactics shifted
and participants learned, for better and worse, that a cat could be skinned any
number of ways.
Akin to the broader findings of Timothy Mulligan, the question is not whether
the Nazis blew it, squandering what should have been the perfect opportunity.
Rather, as we have seen, the big story is how the regime could not have
succeeded, how ideological and practical choices made by the Nazis themselves
fundamentally undercut any chance of long- term success. In short, asserting

Steinberg, "Third Reich Reflected," 621, fn. 3.
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that they should have acted differently misses the point. In the grand scheme, as
Nazis, they could not have acted differently. At the local level, where such broad
considerations possess less weight, we see the results and the failures with
particular clarity.
For the Gebietskommissar, the ability to overcome or even clearly navigate
the web of reinforcing problems was simply absent. Yet, if effort and success are
understood contextually and with a realistic sense of what indeed was possible,
the general representation of the Gebietskommissar as utter failure, constantly
on the short end of the stick in an inter-agency Hobbesian war of all against all,
should be reconsidered. Contrary to such blanket conclusions of idiot and
incompetent, we do find Gebietskommissars who doggedly pursued their tasks
with resolve and, in some cases, ability. True, their backgrounds as Party
Mitarbieter and political soldiers ensured their abilities and expertise had
important limits, but perhaps most damning was not a failure to work hard but
rather a propensity to shovel out of a hole by digging straight down.
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Conclusion
"In a closed society where everybody's guilty, the only crime is getting caught. In a world of
thieves, the only final sin is stupidity." Hunter S. Thompson

In the span of only about 18 months, the much vaunted German war
machine went from kicking in the rotten door of the USSR to evacuating their
eastern Lebensraum. While the fate of the war was decided in the ruins of
Stalingrad and plains around Kursk, efforts at the demographic transformation of
the colonial areas proved equally disastrous. Previous historiography has
certainly provided important perspectives on this general failure. In the end, like
the war at the front, behind the lines, in areas under the civil administration the
eastern enterprise failed just as completely.
Beginning in 1956 with Alexander Dallin's seminal German Rule in Russia,
historians have provided sweeping overviews of the occupation that, while
providing a broad framework within which subsequent research has been
conducted, raised as many questions as were answered. Dallin asserted that
German policy toward the indigenous populations proved a disastrous missed
opportunity. The architects of General Plan East missed the obvious, the
occupiers failing to recognize that the Soviet experience had engendered intense
hatred toward the Moscow regime and, with liberation, created a vast pool of
peoples willing to collaborate with the Germans.622 This missed opportunity
appeared symptomatic of larger structural weakness. Dallin's implicit contention
is that eastern policies reflected the totalitarian nature of Nazi regime itself.
622
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Decisions, actions and principles determined at the centre by the elite proved the
linchpin upon which success or failure (in the east) rested. Failure at this level
ensured the failure of the entire enterprise.
The plausibility of the missed opportunity thesis came under fire in the late
1980s with Timothy Mulligan's The Politics of Illusion and Empire which
addressed directly the conflicting, perhaps mutually exclusive, goals of the
occupation.623 For Mulligan, Nazi (racial) ideology ensured that all efforts at
winning indigenous support proved futile. Simply, the distance between
propaganda and reality ensured that the "reforms" that were carried out did not
square with the brutality and exploitation already experienced. When pragmatic
reform did manage to filter down with some success, despite the best efforts to
de-rail them, any fundamental rethinking of eastern policy proved impossible as
the entire enterprise took place within a context dominated by Hitler's unwavering
ideological vision.624
While the studies of Dallin, Reitlinger and Mulligan did much to set the
agenda, more recent research has highlighted three important factors that
distorted their picture of the OET.625 However, historians have limited their focus
to the Nazi elite. While such key figures cannot be divorced from any analysis of
eastern policy, new research has recognized power's negotiable character and
the necessity of examining not only how and why policy was determined but also

The "incongruities" of eastern policies were certainly not lost on a number of
Nazi elites, including Rosenberg. For conflicting goals see Mulligan, Politics, 7071, 88, 103, 183-87. Also see Chiari, "Deutsche Zivilverwaltung," 76.
624
Mulligan, Politics, 184-85.
625
Chiari, "Deutsche Zivilverwaltung," 69.
236

how it was implemented, transformed and negotiated at the various levels. As a
result, historians have turned to more regional, even local, case studies to more
fully understand the nature of German occupation at the local level. With the
opening of archives in the former Soviet Union, historians have been able to
broaden the scope of research to include the periphery and enquire how the later
interacted with the centre.
Building on this new material and resultant research, Jonathan Steinberg
asserted that failure in the east was the result of individual short-comings and
failings of the local leadership. As Gebietskommissars were universally failures
so too was the civil administration and ultimately the Third Reich. In terms of tax
collection, food economics and labour policy, clearly Gebietskommissars fell far
short of Berlin's expectations. But Steinberg's historiographical essay reflected
what recent works left out, namely; the wider structural roadblocks and the
Gebietskommissars efforts to navigate them. While Steinberg and others have
clearly detailed what they saw as personal failings, any consideration of
attendant systemic and situational factors is not addressed.
The goals of the Nazi occupation were maximum exploitation and
spoliation.626 The OMi expected Gebietskommissars to operate, at least in
theory, according to these guiding principles. From the outset, they were to be
largely self-sufficient, that is, to cover their operating costs and fundamental nonmilitary needs from their own areas.627 Upon arrival, basic necessities such as
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housing, domestic supplies and office supplies were procured locally.
Gebietskommissars, their staffs and their families moved into local houses,
sharing accommodations, living and working closely not only with their personnel
but other agencies such as the German police and SD. Everything from bedding
to table-settings came locally as the civil administrators literally arrived by car
with only the barest of necessities.628 Not surprisingly, the needs of this initial
deployment were largely met by the contributions of the local Jewish
community.629
Yet despite their role in establishing the new colonial east, the civil
administration was not always adequately supplied with even the most basic
administrative supplies.630 In August 1942, Gebietskommissar Rolle informed

civil administrators were not above helping themselves to the spoils of war.
However, this was not a universal reaction. For example, in early 1942
Gebietskommissar Rolle noted prophetically and candidly: "The administration
from East Prussia attempted, and succeeded, to remove all documents and
furniture. Similarly, of all things the agriculture has been greatly damaged.
Everything, which was not nailed down, whether living or dead, has been
removed from the farms. There will be difficulties ahead and it is not at all clear
whether we will be able to make anything of it. The customs officers also try to
take everything, they were not even too embarrassed to take furniture out of the
schools. One could almost say that our compatriots behaved worse than the
Bolsheviks." BA R94/7, "Gebietskommissar Brest Report," 24.1.1942.
628
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The supply situation was, at times, surprisingly acute. In a report from May
1942, one senior local civil administrator noted that he urgently required a new
uniform as the one he had been issued at Krbssinsee was falling apart. In

the OMi that "we will soon have to stop working because we do not have any
more paper. I have to keep one official vehicle unused because we do not have
the necessary tires so I have to use the tires for two trucks on one. If things go
on like this, I will have to lay up all the wagons."631
Rather than superimposing specific new structures onto the occupied
Soviet Union, the civil administration improvised and adapted systems already in
place. The result was a Nazi system largely copying the Soviet one it
replaced.632 Initially, the regime understood this solution as a temporary
necessity that would entail significant systemic problems for the future and posed
dangerous difficulties in the long-term development of the colonial east.633 From
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the regime's perspective, there simply were too few Reich Germans or local
professionals on hand to do otherwise.634
The resultant Nazi-Soviet hybrid, proved largely out of step with local
realities and particularities. In areas ranging from taxation to geographic reorganisation, the new system was superimposed on the old. Further,
corrections, alterations and modifications were made on the fly and would largely
be reactive rather than proactive.635 Consequently, from the very beginning, at
the local level the new civil administration proved largely "on the defensive."
Aside from such larger structural complications, particular difficulties arose in
the effort to translate broader policy for local application. Theoretically, the
Gebietskommissar was a "guidance authority," to act largely in a supervisory and
advisory role. To this end, menial administrative tasks were to be delegated to
the local indigenous administration. With the clerical work left to locals, broader
authority and guidance remained the province of Nazi bureaucrats. The situation
on the ground proved far different.
The 1941 invasion, however, often damaged local, indigenous industry
resulting in chronic shortages and increased strain on an already struggling
economy.636 In this atmosphere, Gebietskommissars were expected to ensure
that specific supply needs were met, take responsibility for the indigenous
Europe, should encounter certain difficulties. Furthermore the East must not be
the slum quarter of Europe. It is on this very point but the hopes which Germany
has shown as a cultural supremacy are not to be disregarded."
634
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population and, when required, to take direct action.

To supervise conditions

for the benefit of the Reich rather than the population, Gebietskommissars
participated in native affairs in so far as "intensive intervention" allowed, despite
critical shortages in German manpower.638 In short, if Gebietskommissars were
anxious to fulfill their economic tasks, they simultaneously faced security and
political goals often incompatible with either maximum exploitation or
pacification.639 In a context where swords were increasingly favoured over
plough-shares, Gebietskommissars fared poorly.
At the local level, the reality was an unfavourable combination of too much
space, too few Germans or effective indigenous officials. As a result,
Gebietskommissar authority tended to be spread thin and his ability to act as
simply a steering element significantly limited. In short, Gebietskommissars
faced a nearly impossible task. The sheer size of the territory and lack of
manpower made meaningful and widespread translation and implementation of
policy difficult if not impossible. Whatever the structure in place, eastern policy
contained irreconcilable imperatives.640 If an indigenous local authority existed
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thereby allowing the system to function in a meaningful way, the
Gebietskommissar would necessarily be forced to sacrifice, however de facto this
might be, the totality of their authority. The danger for the Gebietskommissar
was obvious: increase the responsibility of the indigenous administration and risk
engendering a sense of parity or simply lose control of day-to-day bureaucratic
functioning. In practice, this meant that local officials holding office could not
function independently of the German administration or far from the eye of the
Gebietskommissar, however watchful or not that may have been.
As my study has shown, the structure of the occupation did have some
advantages for the civil administration that the Gebietskommissar might turn to
his advantage. However, this reality was neither recognized nor appreciated at
higher levels of the administration. Reflecting on the occupation administration in
mid-1944, Generalkommissar Waldemar Magunia asserted that timely
adjustments to local conditions were generally handicapped and in some cases
impossible. Administrative "stiffness" made consideration of specific local
conditions more difficult and ensured that the local administration was largely
incapable of making rapid changes in light of either political or local
requirements. The final outcome, he argued, was a kind of systemic atrophy that

and local agencies see USHMM, Ace. 1996.A.269 'Zhitomir Oblast' Records,
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109.
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made local rule more difficult.

With a system imposed from above and

favouring ideological and bureaucratic rigidity to flexibility and awareness of
specific and special local conditions, local civil administrators seemed largely
handicapped from the outset.
Certainly, in practice, Gebietskommissars were more concerned with the
specific functioning of the administration than originally intended.642 As a result,
they spent more time working through administrative details compounded by
juggling broader policy demands and local needs. The impact at the local level
could be dramatic. Swamped with overseeing and carrying out the daily
functioning of the district, Gebietskommissars faced significant challenges in the
transfer, adaptation and translation of decrees and orders from the
Generalkommissariate level to the local level. Yet, as we have seen, the
Gebietskommissars did not simply supervise their application "as is" but rather
proved willing and capable of translating decrees and policy into terms
understandable and applicable to the character of their local area. It cannot be
ignored that this process also demonstrated a significant impromptu and
improvisational element in Gebietskommissar rule. In an environment charged
with high expectations but few resources, the general sense that they made it up
as they went along is strongly reflected.
The Nazi regime and the Gebietskommissar alike were engaged in
demographic engineering and the construction of a racial empire. Part of this
641
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undertaking was certainly the genocide of eastern Jewry and other assorted "life
unworthy of life." At one level, the micro-chronologies used in this study allow for
a better understanding of the "machinery of destruction" in Nazi occupied Soviet
territories and variations from area to area. At another, they also allow a better
profile of the transformation of civil officials to mass murderers on a very personal
and local level. Here it is vitally important to recognize that each event in this
process unfolded without the certainty of any other subsequent acts. However,
the "tuned in" administrator was able to see ahead and recognize the direction
and contours of evolving Jewish policy and the resulting demands of the day.
While the civil administration was not tasked specifically with murdering
their charges, the occupation featured a particular atmosphere of organized
violence from its inception. For the civil administration, this reality was initially
manifested in the brutal treatment of the civilian population. This behaviour
generally took the form of beatings, public humiliation and robbery, often masked
as quasi-official confiscations and contributions. While such activities were rarely
deadly, they took place within an increasingly radical context highlighted by the
plight of locally interned Soviet prisoners of war.
Beginning almost immediately after taking their posts in 1941,
Gebietskommissars worked closely with their police in the imprisonment,
interrogation and murder of "undesirables." Escalating violence generally began
with local or isolated killings where victims were abused and murdered. In these
cases, Gebietskommissars tended to be more ecumenical than not, targeting
local Christians as well. In this way, they got their feet wet with killings that,
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however brutal or unjust, were cloaked in a veil of legality, expedience and
necessity.
The final steps on the path to genocide began in late 1941 with the
transition from murder to mass murderer. Again employing local police assets,
the shift from local and isolated killings to more select and ideologically flavoured
murder generally began with the murder of the Roma. In this phase, "useless
eaters" and non-productive racial enemies could be eliminated and the
productive, whatever their racial status, retained. The murder of gypsies and
other rural undesirables marked the acceleration toward killing on a massive
scale. The 1941 murders of local Byelorussians, Poles and gypsies established
the two types of violent performance that the civil administration would repeat in
targeting Jews in the coming months.643 For local non-Jews, killings were
generally selective, targeting rural undesirables and those deemed a security
risk.644 For gypsies, the killing was total as the administration destroyed every
single one they could get their hands on.645 Such actions certainly highlight the
interplay of ideological assumptions with local conditions and realities.
Brutal behaviour, while not preordained, was certainly not entirely out of
character. Many Gebietskommissars were violent men. In the ranks of the
Freikorps, national army and the SA, they had experienced repetitive violent
performance long before eastern deployment in 1941. By 1942, they were again
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operating in this familiar situation in which violence was part of the job.

With

their eastern deployment (if not earlier), ideology and practicality reinforced the
perception that provocation and conflict be resolved primarily by force and
violence. Consequently, future violent performance often resulted from minimal
provocation.647
Personnel records demonstrate that while they were not unaccustomed to
violence, such activities took place within a particular hierarchical and militarized
context. As Nazi thugs, street fighters and foot-soldiers, they engaged in
violence collectively and professionally. Overall, however, the strongest linkage
of career and large-scale violence occurred in the east and within the Nazi
context of Weltanschauungskrieg. In this way, eastern service marked a kind of
recidivism.
Mass murders and the day-to-day violence of occupation were intensely
local affairs. Certainly, outside agencies were prominently involved. Yet in 19411942, victims would recognize the faces of the local Nazi agents at every stage
of the genocidal process: collection, selection, transportation and killing. The
undertaking of mass murder was not a project designed or capable of being
undertaken in secret and rather spawned close working relationships and a
generally cooperative spirit at the local level. In essence, a dynamic existed
favouring locally engineered and collaborative action in which inter-agency
cooperation was the norm rather than exception. In terms of mass murder, more
often than not, the Gebietskommissars were equal to the task.
646
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Yet, given the variances in factors such as personality, interpretation of
the canon worldview and local conditions, ranges of behaviour existed.
Gebietskommissars were certainly not carbon copies but rather exhibited a range
of responses to a common set of circumstances. In general, this span can be
roughly characterized as having three nodes: eager, active and provisional.
More simply Gebietskommissars can be described as (a) those who embrace
killing (b) those that "got on with it" (c) those that "dragged their feet."
The existence of a range of behaviour collectively called foot dragging,
meaning reluctant and/or protracted compliance to orders, raises important
questions concerning the interpretation and negotiation of orders, the effective
application of central power in the periphery, the existence of and limitations on
"real power" in the Gebietskommissariate, ranges and limitations on acceptable
behaviour and the absolute primacy of ideological motives for mass murder. In
the final analysis however, Gebietskommissars consistently facilitated murder:
the intentional killing of another person with premeditation. In specific situations
this was in the form of mass murder while in others it involved individual, even
isolated murders.
The nature of the Nazi war in the east produced a radical and escalating
Jewish policy towards a Final Solution. In a similar fashion, repetitive violence
ending in mass murder followed a pattern of escalating commitment. The
Gebietskommissar's path to genocide was both twisted and incremental,
fashioned through the combination of specific backgrounds, local needs and

247

conditions of the occupation. In the end, the process of "becoming evil" began
long before the shooting pits were dug and the pistols loaded.648
Steadily improved rank and status within the Party throughout the 1930s
suggests Nazism was a snug fit for Gebietskommissars. Further, most were
Altkampfer, joining prior to the 1933 seizure of power. Social rank and status
was tied to fortunes of an organization yet to be established politically as a "sure
thing." No longer a fringe party by 1930, involvement with the Nazis afforded
nobodies the means to achieve status and social dominance as a self made
man.
Gebietskommissars had certainly experienced significant "ups and downs"
professionally. In the embrace of the Party, universally, they experienced
promotion and professional success. In general, Gebietskommissars seized on
these opportunities, rising relatively quickly and regularly through the ranks of the
SA and civil administration. The brown shirt meant status and professional
place. Simply, Nazism allowed for a bright future and a better life. Yet, as the
Second World War began, Gebietskommissars, holding important ranks in the
SA (and Party), found themselves demoted to the junior echelons of the army,
holding ranks of sergeant or lower. Certainly, this relative decline in status would
reinforce the intimate link between social status, rank and party involvement. As
long-time Nazi functionaries, they were accustomed to the Nazism's particular
idiosyncrasies in terms of how it operated. Given their survivability and relative

James Waller's phrase "becoming evil" is certainly helpful for understanding
both process and the reality that extraordinary evil does not necessarily require
extraordinary explanations.

success in promotions, they understood both how to navigate and prosper.
Motivations such as careerism and "job-protection" played a significant role.649
Undoubtedly, their long careers in the Nazi Party and ideological training
infused their worldviews with an anti-Semitism that imagined a world free of the
taint of Jewry. However, whatever their personal experiences with Jews, they
could not have imagined the scale of the "problem" in the USSR. On coming
east, they were confronted with tens of thousands of Jews.
Gebietskommissar interaction with Jews should be understood as a sliding
scale of radicalism. When a solution was required, increasingly radical options
were not only considered but enacted. When combined with the nature of violent
performance, the scale of the problem allowed for a relatively seamless transition
to violence on a grand scale.
Nazism tended to engender a "climate of impunity." This gave rise to a
new ethics. In this Nazi world, hijacked principles like "Es istschon alles
Scheise, mach was du willsf obliterated the fine line ensuring civil behaviour.650
What is so troubling about this process is that this reality did not reject morality or
conscience but instead inverted it turning virtue to vice and vice to virtue.651 In
understanding these killers, their motives and path to genocide, beliefs systems
and self-interest remain important links in the murder chain.
Gebietskommissars came to their posts with distinct, invested personal
and professional interests. Further, this interest as well as much of their identity
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was profoundly linked to Nazism. Within the movement, they had experienced
the greatest fulfillment of their needs and expectations. At the apex of their Nazi
careers, command of an eastern district ensured an even stronger affiliation and
adherence to the organization. At best, duty demanded it while, at worst, being
onside was in their best self-interest.
Clearly motivation must be seen as containing complex and
interconnected elements based on disparate factors. Further, each individual
contains within themselves myriad motivations, some complimentary, others
contradictory. As we have seen, the interconnectedness between
Gebietskommissar motivation and behaviour can be expressed as a "perpetrator
equation," a chain that facilitated the transition from Nazi functionary to murderer.
In this mutation, a poisonous confluence of factors merged personality with a
background influenced by "Nazi values" and local-temporal realities of
occupation. Gebietskommissar were men, but not "ordinary men."
Collective biography has enabled significant inroads into establishing and
analyzing Gebietskommissar identity. Certainly, individual stories are often hard
to consistently establish. Yet when Gebietskommissars are addressed more
broadly, important shared attributes and patterns of experience emerge. The
resulting "Gebietskommissar X" composite, discussed in chapter 3, marks the
first effort to comprehensively and collectively reconstruct and identify local civil
administrators.
In this way, new findings about background and experience allow for new
insights. A Gebietskommissar's particular background interacted intimately with
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the demands of eastern service as they consistently, and in some cases
tenaciously, tried to carry out their duty. We have seen how they employed the
tools learned as career Nazis and relied on "muscle memory" engendered by
paramilitary experience. Not surprisingly, previous experience often shaped
responses by forming both the foundation and the boundaries of their choices
and responses. Yet, clearly Gebietskommissars were not merely Nazi
automatons as similarities in background did not prompt identitical responses.
Indeed, while ranges of behaviour were certainly limited by background,
experience and the realities of the east, Gebietskommissars did make individual
choices that proved not entirely predictable, universal nor consistent with past
historical representations.
Critically, sensitivity to grey zones and individual complexities is not to say
that they were "accidental Nazis." Gebietskommissars tended to follow the
pattern of making increasingly radical life choices with attendant escalating
commitments. This propensity to extremism marks yet another fundamental
separation from "ordinary men." Like every other German male of their
generation, they grew and came of age in "hard times." In response, they chose
paramilitarism, violence, and the simplicities of bigotry on the ideological fringes.
Like every other German male of their generation, they needed a career.
Gebietskommissars chose a Nazi one, tied their futures to it and were rewarded.
Finally, in eastern service, we find a string of incrementally more radical
decisions. In terms of mass murder and genocide most quickly involved their
agencies. And, in most of their tasks they "stuck with it" right to the end.
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Detailing the lowest level of the German occupation administration and the
men who functioned there bridges a gap in the historiography and promotes a
fuller picture of the Nazi regime itself. If the regime was the sum of its parts, to
better understand it, the more parts we know about the better. In the end,
Gebietskommissars were not only products of Nazism but Nazism also a product
of them.
This study has revealed who these administrators were and detailed their
social backgrounds and ideological experience. By way of their orders, actions
and their own words, we have seen what they perceived as their main functions
and the key features of how they exercised power. Finally, their relationship with
the indigenous population and their role in mass murder and the genocide shows
a range of behaviours and responses to the demands of the "eastern mission."
Chronically under-supplied, particularly in terms of manpower,
Gebietskommissars faced the high expectations of both their superiors and other
agencies. Levels of success, if not effort, were directly related to the difficulty of
realizing a given task or policy. Simply, in tasks that were consistently hard to
enforce or fiercely contested such as taxation, food economics or labour policy,
Gebietskommissar generally fell short.
In some cases, despite difficulties and growing sense of a general failure,
hard work was neither always shunned nor unrewarded. In significant ways,
managing the east became more feasible and widespread than transforming it.
Further, dissenting voices from the periphery can also be heard offering candid
criticism and blunt denunciations of both certain policies and the methods of their

252

application. Whatever they may have been, Gebietskommissars were not silent
"cogs." Ultimately, this study has shown Gebietskommissars to be complex
personalities and active historical agents and in this role they were not simply a
collection of incompetent failed party-men, "blockheads" and "ass-lickers."
If the local civil administration found some tasks nearly impossible to carry
out and enjoyed only limited success, others were considerably easier. Here lies
the fundamental dichotomy of the civil administration in the occupied Soviet
Union. In the east, bringing in the harvest proved far more difficult for a
Gebietskommissar than mass murder and genocide and not a single
Gebietskommissar resigned.
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Appendix I: Biographies
"The man in the violent situation reveals those qualities least dispensable to his personality, those
qualities which are all he will have to take into eternity with him..."
-Flannery O'Connor

Robert Georg Marschall, Sdolbunow (Reichskommissariat Ukraine)
Gebietskommissar Marschall was born March 22, 1903 in Lobau,
Germany. The middle child (of three boys), Marschall's father was a
businessman. Educated in his hometown until 1918, Marschall then studied in
the Sorenbohm Padagogium (Pomerania) where he took his school leaving
exam/university entrance qualification [Abitur] after about 18 months.652
Receiving his certificate (Zeugnis der Oberprima), he moved to Berlin as trainee
with the Deutschen Bank in 1921 where he worked for the next two and half
years. While employed as a bank trainee, the young Marschall continued his
education, studying at the Handelshochschule in Berlin, taking his business
diploma exam in 1926. His part-time continued education continued until 1933,
first at technical schools and then an urban professional school in Berlin.653
In 1933, Marschall began teaching economics and "social policy" in
Kulmbach and Konigswinter. In 1936 (or 1937), this training allowed him to
accept at teaching position at Ordensburg Vogelsang where he remained until
entering the military in September 1939. While Marschall's position at
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Ordensburg Vogelsang remains unclear, the facility itself was intended to provide
the ideological and spiritual element in an Ordensjunker's three tier education.
Marschall joined the Nazi Party in 1930 while living in Berlin. Within the
Party, he acted as a cell-leader while simultaneously serving in the SA.
According to Marschall, he was appointed Hauptsturmfuhrer without any effort or
desire on his part {"ohne mein Zutun').654 He was also a member of both the
National Socialist Teachers Alliance (NSLB) and a Berlin city delegate for the
German Labour Front (DAF). Called up for military service in 1939, the thirty-five
year old Marschall's war service began as a corporal {Gefreiter) in a flak unit.
Stationed in Koln, Marschall rose in rank to an NCO prior to his deployment in
the east in September 1941,655
Like all Gebietskommissars, Marschall's Osteinsatz began at Ordensburg
Krossinsee in Falkenburg. Following this initial training, Marschall was sent east,
to Rowno (RKU) and ordered to wait for a Gebiet to open up. In short order, one
did and Marschall began his Gebietskommissariat career in Sdolbunow (RKU) in
October 1941. One year later, he transferred to Kostopol where he remained
until evacuated in January 1944.656 With the tide of war definitively turned, the
former Gebietskommissar continued to work for the civilian administration,
ironically in his birth place of Lobau in the Generalgouvernment. The collapsing
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eastern front pushed Marschall west.

In late March 1945, he returned to the

Wehrmacht and the final month of the war was spent in the infantry. At war's
end, Marschall entered British custody where he remained until September 1945.

Wilhelm Sohlmann, Minsk Stadt (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
Wilhelm Sohlmann was born 22 March 1886 in Braunschweig, Lower Saxony. A
businessman (Kaufmann) by profession, he belonged to Obergruppe VI, Nordsee,
Brigade 61 in nearby Hanover where he resided.658 Sohlmann's formal education proved
rather limited having only attended primary school. However, his martial instruction was
more substantial. At 20, from October 1906 to October 1907, he served in Fusilier
Regiment 73. He returned again to the Army at 26 between 1912 and 1913 with Infantry
Regiment 74. A career NCO, the highest rank Sohlmann attained was Vizefeldwebel
("vice sergeant"). But the majority of his service was at the more modest rank of platoon
commander and machine-gun platoon leader. Significantly, he did not see service in the
Great War. Despite his apparent absence from the trenches, Sohlmann returned to
uniform in the wake of German defeat. After the Armistice, Sohlmann enlisted in the
ranks of Freikorps Stahlhelm, enjoying a successful tenure until 1928. Whatever his
military record prior to this service, Sohlmann, a machine gun specialist, flourished with
the unit ultimately being awarded an Iron Cross (second class).659
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Two years after leaving Stahlhelm, Sohlmann joined the NSDAP in May 1930 and
the SA three months later in August. He immediately became an active member. While
not formally well-schooled, Sohlmann's political education was strengthened by his
attendance at a Reichsfuhrerschule training course in Munich and participation in four
Party marches in his first four years.660 Further, his service to the Party included
membership in Hanover City Council beginning in March 1933 shortly after the Nazi
seizure of power.
Wilhelm Sohlmann enjoyed steady promotion in the SA after his enlistment and
proved himself a committed "street-fighter" where martial prowess counted more than
classroom pedigree. In July 1932, Wilhelm Sohlmann was convicted and fined 100 RM
(100,00 RM) for illegally carrying a weapon.661 Concurrently, he moved through the ranks
for the movement: Scharfuhrer (1.7.30), Sturmfuhrer(1.10.30), Sturmbannfuhrer (1.5.31),
Standartenfuhrer (~\.7.32) and Oberfuhrer (1.3.33). Promoted five times in three years, by
September 1932, Sohlmann was also serving as Fuhrer der Standarte 73.e62 By 1938, he
was also sitting as the BCirgermeister of scenic Norderney.663 The initial OMi deployment
in the East in 1941 slated Sohlmann for service as Gebietskommissar for Mogilew.664
However, the area remained under military administration and was never handed over the
civil administration. As a result, Wilhelm Sohlmann would have to wait for his
appointment. It was not until (sometime) in 1943, that a post opened and he assumed the
660
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role of Gebietskommissar for Kreisgebiet Minsk-Stadt. He was the third person to hold
the post and, by far, the least educated.665

Hermann Hanweg, Lida (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
Hermann Hanweg was born in 1907 probably in Hanover.666 At 21, he
joined the Nazi Party.667 In 1936 Hanweg attended Ordensburg Vogelsang and
Ordensburg Krossinsee as Kameradschaftsfuhrer. After graduating from the
training academies, he entered the Army and served as an Infantry corporal,
seeing action in the 1940 France campaign.668 In summer 1941, Hanweg again
returned to Ordensburg Krossinsee in preparation for eastern service. In the fall
he traveled with his new staff by car to Lida to assume his position as
Gebietskommissar.
Two of Hanweg's staff, Leopold Windisch and Rudolf Werner, did not think
highly of him.669 In fact, Werner characterized him as arrogant and taken with
himself. In general, Hanweg tended to rely not on the functionaries at his
disposal but rather on the manager of his administration, namely Windisch.
According to information of numerous domestic and foreign witnesses, Hanweg
was fundamentally a soft person, who was rather apathetic about his
professional duties, who here and there allowed Jews supplementary provisions.
665
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Some Jews even spoke of him as a father figure.

In regards to local Jewish

affairs, Hanweg displayed a far more sophistated approach than "stick discipline"
and overwhelming violence. With Lida's Jews, he apparently maintained a
congenial relationship. Significantly, he did so without losing his credibility as a
Nazi. Whatever his behaviour, it was clear to Werner that Hanweg never felt
beholden to "his Jews" and proved himself "a convinced national socialist."671
Whatever his abilities as a Gebietskommissar, it was Hanweg's immoral
personal behaviour that led to his removal in spring 1944. Presumably due to his
"open love affair" with his secretary, the Gebietskommissar was transferred to the
Wehrmacht and moved west. In August 1944, he posted his last letter from
Nancy and went missing, presumed killed in the fighting around Metz.

Fritz Buschmann, Novogrodek (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
A late addition to the ranks of the Gebietskommissars, Fritz Buschmann
was born 11 August 1903, in Dortmund.672 As a youth, he attended primary
school, two years of secondary school, three years of business school and two
years of pharmaceutical studies. Based on this experience, Buschmann worked
as a pharmacist in Soldin, Brandenburg, where he combined employment with
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NA BDC, SA Personnel Files. A3341, Series SA-Kartei, "Fritz Buschmann,
11.8.1903." Bushmanns's 1934 SA Fuhrer-Fragebogen listed his faith as
Evangelical-Lutheran.

his party activity.673 While the area remained under German control after the
Great War, it occupied the very frontier bordering territories (eastern Pomerania)
seized by Poland under the Versailles Treaty. Buschmann was married and
fathered two children in 1930 and 1932. In his personnel record it was reported
that he had recently fathered a son, Peter Wolfgang, born 20 May 1943, on
assuming his position as Gebietskommissar in Novogrodek.674
Buschmann's political and paramilitary education began early. He claimed
that in 1918 (age 15) he joined the Deutschvolkischer Schutz und Trutz Bund. In
1921, he served nine months with the infamous Freikorps Oberlandwhere he
attained the rank of Gefechtsordonnanz.675 In 1924, he served six months as a
volunteer junior enlisted officer (Unteroffizier Freiwilliger) in the "schwarzen
Reichswehr." By the mid-1920s, Buschmann was an active paramilitary
belonging to several organizations concurrently. From 1924-1928, he was a
conservative Stahlhelm (Steel Helmets) member and, for one year, a county
secretary. In 1926, he joined two additional organizations, Wehrband Ostmark
as a platoon leader (Zugfuhrer) and Wehrwolf (1926-1931) where he served as
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Soldin is located in Brandenburg, just south of Hinter Pommern (Eastern
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This Freikorps produced such Nazi notables as Reichsfuhrer-SS und Chef
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Hans Hinkel, SS-Oberst-Gruppenfuhrer und Panzer Generaloberst der WaffenSS Josef Dietrich and SS-Gruppenfuhrer Franz Hayler.

Landesverbandsfuhrer Grenzmark.

His service was significant enough for him

to warrant two commendations: the Silesian Eagle (first and second class) and
the Bewahrungsabzeichen des Freikorps Oberland. Buschmann's paramilitary
service was not without personal sacrifice, as he received a severe wound in the
fighting.
Buschmann joined the Nazi Party on 4 January 1929 and acted as district
speaker (Kreisredner) until October 1931. By March 1933 he was a Mitglied des
Kreistages and Special Representative of the Higher SA Leadership at the Soldin
District Council Office. On 1 September 1931, Buschmann joined the SA as an
active member. Between 1929 and 1934, he attended numerous courses
focused on leadership, physical fitness and weapons training. Additionally,
beginning in 1932, he attended important marches and rallies including the 1933
Reichsparteitag. Between enlistment in the SA in October 1931 and February
1934, Buschmann received three promotions from Truppfuhrer in 1931 to
Obersturmbannfuhrer by 1934.677 By 1934, he served as leader of Standarte
205 (22 Brigade, Ostmark) in Soldin.
Fritz Buschmann did not possess an unblemished criminal record either
before or after joining the Party. As an active radical, he was charged with
various offenses on three occasions between 1926 and 1931. On 11 May 1926,
he was charged with unauthorized possession of arms and in October 1927,
while a member of Wehrbund Ostmark, with conspiracy. Both occurred prior to
676

Ranks: Wehrbund Ostmark: Zugfuhrer, Stahlhelm: Kreissekretar, Wehrwolf:
Landesfuhrer.
677
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enrolment in the Party. However, the young Buschmann seemed unable to
entirely break with his troubled past once enrolled. In June 1931, just ten weeks
prior to admission into the SA, he was charged with resistance to State Authority
(13. 6. 31: wegen widerstandes gegen die Staatsgewalt(SA). Certainly,
Buschmann proved an active political soldier.
In the middle of October 1943, Buschmann became the
Gebietskommissar of Novogrodek, replacing Wilhelm Traub. Nine months
previously he had been promoted to Standartenfuhrer (9.11.42) from
Obersturmbannfuhrer, a rank he had held for the previous eight years (20.2.34).
However, the tide of war having turned against the Nazis, this appointment
proved short-lived. Nonetheless, even after evacuation from the east,
Buschmann remained a valuable and loyal Nazi. Given his significant
experience and political reliability he was promoted to the rank of Major on 22
February 1944 with the Reserve Army.

Rudolf Werner, Baranowitsche (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
Rudolf Werner was born 19 December, 1898 in Chemnitz, Germany.678 A textile
specialist by trade, his formal education consisted of Volksschule, Realgymnasium and
Hohere Werkschule. Werner was certainly proud of his his war experience, which he
cited on his SA leader questionnaire (SA-Fuhrer Fragebogen).679 Despite his lack of
higher education, he claimed knowledge of French and English. Married, Werner sired

Chemnitz, located in the Ore Mountains, is the third largest city in Saxony.
NA BDC, SA Personnel Files. A3341, Series SA-Kartei, "Rudolf Werner,
19.12.1898," SA-Fuhrer Fragebogen, 15.10.1934.
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six children beginning with Rolf (1923) and Irmhild (1934).

Between 1936 and 1942, he

had four more children. His first, a daughter was born in early 1936 followed by two sons
(April 1939) and (May 1941) and another daughter a year later in May 1942. In October
1943, Rolf was killed in action shortly after his twentieth birthday.
At the outbreak of war in 1914, Werner enlisted in the Nationale Wehrverbande
Jungsturm serving as a platoon leader (Zugfuhrer) until 1917. In May 1917, Werner
enlisted in the Army at 19. He remained in the service until February 1919. In the Great
War, Werner was a front soldier, serving primarily as a corporal and machine-gunner with
Infantry Regiment 104 on the Western Front. For his service he received an Iron Cross
(Second Class)
Werner joined the NSDAP 1 June 1930. Two months later, he entered his
hometown branch of the SA. Werner proved an active and effective Nazi activist.
Throughout the early 1930s, Werner participated in numerous Nazi training courses and
programs that suggest his life interests were threefold: sports, combat, and the Party.
Between 1931 and 1933, he attended two sports courses (SA-Sportschule) in Doberitz.
He also attended two other courses in Schmorkau-Konigsbruck that combined his
interests in sport and combat. A dedicated education in weaponry was simultaneously
pursued as Werner honed his marksmanship with a month long police machine-gun
course in Chemnitz and at a SA Weapons course in Konigsbruck a month later. Finally,
Werner was a regular attendee at Party leadership courses, participating for nine weeks
in two programs in Munich between 1932 and 1934 {Lehrgang Reichsfuhrerschule

Werner married Elise (nee Heinitz), one year his junior. Rolf was born in
1923 and Irmhild in 1934. Additionally, Werner claimed an Evangelical-Lutheran
background.
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Munchen). Like thousands of other Nazi "co-workers" Werner also participated in the
most significant Party functions in the early 1930s, Reichsparteitag Nurnberg, in 1933 and
again in 1934.
Werner's diligence did not go unrewarded. In just over four years, he enjoyed a
meteoric rise from Truppfuhrerto Standartenfuhrer, the Army equivalent of rising from
Sergeant to Colonel.681 His final promotion came 30 January 1940 when he moved to
Oberfuhrer (Brigadier General). His promotions were accompanied by appointments to
increasingly more positions. Beginning in Chemnitz as Fuhrerdes Sturmes 13/104 he
moved on to staff work with Group Thuringen in late 1933. In 1936, assumed the position
of Referent for Organisation and Deployment and, finally, to Head of Leadership Division
of Group Thuringen in March 1937.
In the wake of the invasion of the USSR, Rudolf Werner assumed his post as
Gebietskommissar of Baranowitsche in 1941. It was here that he would be able to tie
together strands of experience, training, ideology and personality.

Willi MLiller, Hansewicze (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
Willi Muller was born 10 February, 1907 in GroGruckerswalde, Saxony near the
Sudeten border. He was married to Elsa who bore him one child in April 1937.682
Muller's education began at Volksschule in GroGruckerswalde followed by attendance at
Realschule in Marienberg and Realgymnasium in Annaberg. He received a higher
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education at the University of Leipzig and Freiburg studying Law and political science. In
1927 he took the first State exam in 1930 and the second in 1934. Muller supplemented
his formal education with a paramilitary one while he was still a teenager. In 1924 at 17,
Muller enlisted in the ranks of Freikorps Wehrwolf where he held the rank of
Wehrwolfmann (private) until leaving the unit in 1927 presumably to continue with his
formal education.683
Despite his paramilitary past, Muller was not immediately attracted to the Nazi
movement. Rather he claimed that the Young Plan in 1929 opened him to the voice of
the NSDAP.684 He joined the party on 1 April, 1931 at age 24. Muller served as a Party
Regierungsrat\r\ Saxony throughout the 1930s and joined the SA after four years in the
party's ranks on February, 1935. Following enlistment in the Brownshirts, his Nazi career
really began in earnest as Co-chair of the District Court {Zivilberuf Regierungsassessor
an der Amtshauptmannschaft) in Floha. 885 Having completed his 2.Staatsexamen in
1934, Muller continued training hard to sharpen his legal skills to understand the "points
of the jurisdiction of a party court." By August 1939, Muller was acting as Chairman of the
District Court and Government Council in Annaberg.686
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On 16 June 1941, Muller, then delegated to the Saxony Ministry of the Interior, was
immediately given a leave of absence for eastern service and sent for training to
Ordensburg Krossinsee. While the transfer came only a few days prior to Barbarossa,
Muller had already been considered for eastern deployment as early as 10 May 1941.687
Muller assumed his post as Gebietskommissar in Hansewicze in late summer-fall 1941.
From his earliest Party assessment report, he was recognized for both his
professional acumen and his ideological correctness.688 High praise and excellent work
proved the hallmark of his service. While in 1937 he was assessed as a "very valuable
co-worker," high praise indeed, his 1938 review proved even more gushing.689 Clearly, as
the report recommended, Muller was marked for higher things.690 Muller's 1943 Service
Report confirmed his consistent commitment to the Party. During his service as
Gebietskommissar he continued to be commended for his skill, energy and comradely
demeanour. Further his reputation for objectivity and fairness {Gerechtigkeitsempfinden)
assured him the confidence of his comrades, his superiors and the Party.691
But there was far more to Willi Muller than simply a capable SA-man and
party functionary. In November 1940, Muller revealed to the Chairman of the
687
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Party Court in Munich that he was, in fact, also an agent for the Security Service
(SD). He had been active in the SD since 1935, the same year he joined the
SA.692 Between 1935 and 1940, Muller split time between the Party job and the
SD. By early 1940, Muller believed that he could no longer maintain both
positions and would like to move into the SD full-time and be "released from any
other party work." However, Muller simultaneously found himself indispensable
in his Party work in Annaberg and he asked for a postponement of his SD
transfer. As a result, Muller faced a critical career choice. Unable to
permanently hold his position as Kreisrichter and facing the expiration of the offer
to move to the SS, Muller intended to submit his documents to the SD. But fully
aware of the impact this decision would have on his career, Muller hesitated,
fearing his transfer to the SS would strip him of the service rank he had attained
in the Party. Not surprisingly, he did not relish the prospect.
Muller proposed an arrangement whereby he might retain his service rank.
Choosing careful words, Muller made his pitch. Suggesting himself an important
official, he claimed leaving his party post proved a hard task. To solve the
problem, Muller offered to continue as a Kreisrichter even if he moved to the
SS.693 Believing the problem solved, Muller remarked that he assumed that the
SD would assent or at least the issue would be settled after mediation. If no
dispensation was possible, Muller would select the Party over a transfer.
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Ultimately, Muller hopes were dashed by the Party in early 1941. Simply, a Party
judge could not simultaneously be an SD member.694 However, the careerminded Muller was not left entirely unrewarded. Less than a year later, he would
find himself a Gebietskommissar in the east. Finally, on June 7, 1943 Muller
received a final important promotion while still serving in the east. Upon his
return to the Reich, he would assume the position of Presidency over the Party
Court in Annaberg.695
Willi Muller proved himself a valuable, high-prized and savvy Nazi.
Despite his humble origins, he worked hard within the Party to create a
promising, if not mercurial, career. From his joining the Party in 1931, to
deployment in Hansewicze a decade later, Muller effectively wedded ideological
commitment with careerist aspirations. Certainly, in this case, the OMi did not
dredge the bottom of the Party barrel.

Heinrich Carl, Sluzk (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
Heinrich Carl was born November 12,1895 in Drage, Schleswig.696 Like many of
his Gebietskommissar colleagues, he was a military veteran. In the First World War, the
young Heinrich served as a non-commissioned officer (Unteroffiziei) where he developed
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an abiding respect for the armed forces.697 In 1939, his position as NSDAP
Kreisgeschaftsfuhrer'm Rendsberg exempted him from military service. However, the
forty-three year Carl immediately volunteered for active duty. He re-entered the Army,
again as an Unteroffizier, and saw action in the 1940 France campaign. For his service,
he was promoted to Lieutenant. Unfortunately, Sciatica (Ischiasleidens) prevented
continued active duty, prompting his transfer to a reserve battalion. One year later, Carl
was selected for eastern service and deployed, as Gebietskommissar, to Sluzk in August
1941.

Gerhard Erren, Slonim (Reichskommissariat Ostland)
Born March 4,1901 in Mittenbruck, in contemporary Poland, Gerhard
Erren was raised by his father, a farmer and Handwerksohn, and received his
formal education from 1907 to 1930.698 From 1907 to 1913, Erren attended his
hometown city school (Stadtschule) before graduating to Ftealschule and
Seminar in Myslowitz were he completed his schooling with an Abitur.699 In
1927, Erren continued his education at the College for Physical Education

697

Carl's later testimony demonstrated his affinity for the military. While
Gebietskommissar of Sluzk, he claimed to have excellent relations with local
Wehrmacht units.
698
NA BDC, SA Personnel Files. A3341, Series SA-Kartei, "Gerhard Erren,
4.4.1901 "SA-Fuhrer Fragebogen, 15.10.1934, Lebenslauf, Slonim, 27.10.1943.
In terms of family origins, Erren was pulled to the German frontiers from both the
east and west. His father, a Bauern and Handwerkersohn came from
Niederrhein in the west and his mother from Ostschlesein in the east.
699
Located just west (9km) of Katowice, Myslowitz had a population of about
19,000 in 1914. Significantly, in 1922, the city became Polish.
269

(Berlin-Spandau), graduating as a Physical Education teacher.700 From 19291930, Erren was again in the classroom studying biology, geography and history.
Erren married twice, he fathered two children, Evamaria in 1929 and
Gerhard in 1935. In 1936, Evamaria died of diphtheria. On 25 September 1943,
Erren's second marriage took place while he served as the Gebietskommissar of
Slonim. This marriage, to the 32 year old Wilma Lohmeyer, marked the
formalization of a relationship that had already produced children.701 Despite an
undoubtedly hectic schedule that included both local administration and a
cardinal role in the mass murder of local Jews, the prolific Erren fathered two
children: Geert, born in April 1942 and Edda, in July 1943. Interestingly, his
betrothal occurred in September 1943, two months after the child's birth.702
Too young for service in the Great War, Erren embraced paramilitary
membership at 18, serving from 1919 to 1922 as a Freikorps border guard and
also Stahlhelm (1920-1923).703 In 1922, while on Freikorps duty, Erren's father
died from a wound he received in the so-called Polenaufstand (Polish Rebellion)
a year earlier.704 From 1919 to 1922, Erren was actively engaged in Freikorps
combat operations in Upper Silesia which earned him the Silesian Eagle (I & II
class) in the process. Further service was in the ranks of East-Silesian
Grenzschutz-Wehrverband "Landesschutzen"under Reichswehrjurisdiction
700
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which netted him more citations.

Finally, his active duty days behind him, he

trained for several months with Infantry Regiment 94 in the late 1920s and
1930s.
Erren remained active in paramilitary circles throughout the 1920s. He
worked as a District Manager for the National League of Cosel (1923-1927) and
District Chief of Sports and Defence training courses. From 1926-1933, he
continued such activity acting as an instructor at the Reichswasserschutz
Coselhafen and a Gymnasium Physical Education teacher in Leobschutz und
Neisse.706

While Erren certainly possessed characteristics highly valued by the
NSDAP, he was a relative latecomer to the Nazi party. Joining the movement on
1 May 1933, Erren appears a March violet, climbing abroad the Nazi bandwagon
almost immediately after the seizure of power.707 However, this was far from the
case. Rather, Erren claimed that his long and dedicated service with various
Freikorps and paramilitary groups had soured him on party politics. Rather than
the party, he claimed his mission was guided by his volkisch commitment to the
German people. Further, membership in Wehrverband "Landesschutzen"
forbade membership in any political party. However, Erren was indeed a Nazi in
spirit if not in uniform. He stated, that from the beginning of 1931, he publicly
confessed his sympathy with the movement and its worldview. Clearly, the
message of the NSDAP struck Erren as different from that of the traditional
705

Ibid. Erren earned: "Goldene und Silberne Hindenburgmedaille,
Bronzeabzeichen der 100 besten Schutzen von Ostschlesein."
706
Ibid.
707
Ibid and BDC Blau Kartei, A3340 MFOK E016, 2538.

parties in which he had lost faith. In 1933, with the absorption of the
Wehrverband "Landesschutzen" \nto the SA, Erren enthusiastically threw himself
into the uniform and the work of the NSDAP.
From 1933 to 1936, Erren put his teacher training to use as a NSDAP
physical education teacher in Upper Silesia where, from 1934 onward, he
functioned mainly as political leader. His formal Nazi education came at
Ordensburg Vogelsang in October 1936 with the Special Course Key Leaders.
Here his physical education was supplemented with classes on hereditary
biology, ethnology, population politics, ancient and early modern history, political
philosophy, German history and geo-politics. In 1937, he began work at
Ordensburg Krossinsee as a "Comrade-Leader" and sub-commander providing
forty candidates with a solid Nazi ideological education.
On 10 September 1939, he again returned to military duty with Infantry
Regiment 747. Seeing action again, Erren fought in the 1940 France campaign
between May and July 1940, where he distinguished himself in combat, earning
an Iron Cross (2nd Class) and War Service Cross (2nd Class) and promotion from
corporal to Sergeant.708 He was discharged in July 1941 for service with the civil
administration in the east. In July - August 1941 Erren attended the
Gebietskommissar training course at Krossinsee. He then traveled to his new
post, Slonim, arriving on 1 September 1941. Over the next two years, he would
earn the moniker "The Bloody Commissar."709

Erren saw action in the invasion of France.
For his service in Slonim, he earned the ironically named "Verdienst und
Tapferkeitsauszeichnung fur Angehorige der Ostvolker II, Kl. in Silbermit

709

As the tide of the Red Army rolled over Slonim, Erren was brought into the
SS by Generalkommissar von Gottberg on 28 November 1943 as a leader of the
SS-Hauptamt staff.710 Gottberg had personally cleared the appointment with
Himmler and lavished praise on the former Gebietskommissar considering him
"politically important."711 As the war entered its final phases in early 1945, Erren
joined the ranks of the Waffen SS as SS-Fuhrerlor ideological schooling. 712
Gerhard Erren proved highly motivated and reliable. In fact, Gerhard
Erren was the "perfect Nazi": obsessed with physical fitness, a decorated combat
veteran and ideologically correct.713

Schwersten." Additionally, he also claimed participation in anti-Partisan
operations (Beteiligung an Partisaneneinsatzen) as part of his war service. See
Ibid. Lebenslauf, 27.10.1943.
710
Ibid, Personalverfugung, 18.10.1944.
711
Ibid, "Letter from v. Gottberg to SS-Grfhr. V. Herff, 23.1.1944." Also see Ibid,
"Betr: Aufnahme des Gebietskommissars Gerhard Erren, geb. 4.3.01, in die
Schtzstaffel, 25.2.1944. "Die Aufnahme von Erren hat politische Bedeutung."
Erren entered as a SS-Sturmbannfuhrer.
712
\b\6,"Meldung Berlin, 9.2.45." He was granted the rank of SSUntersturmfuhrer der Reserve der Waffen-SS.
713
Generalkommissar von Gottberg even noted that "urgent considerations of
political significance justified speeding up the paperwork for his SS admission."
NA BDC, SS Officer Personnel Files. A3343, SSO, "SS Admission (Aufnahme),
1944."
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Appendix II
The Case of Gebietskommissariat Lida
Under the command of General Commissar Wilhelm Kube, headquartered
in Minsk, GK-Wei3ruthenien was to consist of five Hauptkommissariaten [Main
Commissariats, HK]: Minsk, Baranowitsche, Vitebsk, Smolensk, and Mogilev.714
Realities of the war however ensured civil administrations were set up only in the
Minsk and Baranowitsche regions, the rest remaining military districts. Located
in western Belorussia (formerly eastern Poland), SA-Gruppenfuhrer Fenz headed
the administration of Hauptkommissariat Baranowitsche.715 The 41,000 sq km of
the region was further subdivided into five Gebietskommissariate (Kreisegebiete):
Baranowitsche, Slonim, Novogrodek, Hansewicze, and Lida.
Occupied by the Soviets in 1939, Lida fell within the area east of the
Grodno-Brest Litovsk line promised to the Soviet Union in the nonaggression
pact of 23 August 1939. Immediately, the Soviets absorbed Lida into the
Belorussian SSR. With the initial success of Barbarossa in June 1941, the area
fell quickly to advancing German forces. By June 28/29 the city itself, extensively
damaged in the fighting, was formally occupied as Military District 102.716 In
total, the district comprised the city and seven rayons: Ivje, Juraciski, Radun,

714

Also referred to as a Hauptbezirk. This administrative unit was unique to
WeiBruthenien.
715
Fenz was killed in action 17.2.1943. For the administrative arrangements
see BA-L AR-Z 94d/59, v.11, 1488, v. 19, 2634.
716
Lida was damaged primarily by Luftwaffe bombardments. For military
occupation see Ibid, v. 17, 2351.
274

Shchuchin, Voronovo (Werenow), Vasiliski and Zoludek.717 Transfer from
military to civilian administration proved relatively speedy. On 31 August 1941,
western areas of the USSR were transferred to the civil administration.
The population of the Lida region totalled approximately 283,000, the vast
majority of the population ethnically Polish (192,474 - 68%).718 Byelorussians
proved the next largest groups totalling 66,657 (23.5%) followed by: Jews
(4,419), Lithuanians (2,963), Tatars (531), Ethnic Germans (76) and a remaining
268 "people of miscellaneous nationality."719
In 1937, the population of Lida city sat at 24,870. Although an accurate
count is impossible to determine throughout the occupation, witnesses estimated
the population ranged from 15,000-30,000.720 According to a German witness, in
the summer of 1941 Lida supported a population of 25,000 including about 8,000
Jews.721 As a result of the 1939 and 1941 invasions, the Jewish population
fluctuated dramatically with refugees.722 With the onset of Barbarossa and the
subsequent first wave of shootings this population further swelled as Lithuanian

717

See NARB 370/1/80, USHMM RG 53 003M Minsk, Reel 11, "Verzeichnis der
Gebiete und Kreise des Generalbezirks WeiBruthenien," Minsk, 5 .4.1943. BAL AR-Z 94d/59, v.8, 680. "The region of Lida consisted of 8 districts about the
size of normal Prussian districts, and - in addition to Lida - the rayons Ivje (about
4500 - 5000 inhabitants), Juracishki, Radun, Shchuchin (2000 - 3000
inhabitants), Vasiliski (about 3500 - 5000 inhabitants) Voronovo and Zoludek
(1700 inhabitants)."
718
The approximate totals do not equal the sum of the listed individual ethnic
figures. Using these sums, Poles equaled 71.9%.
719
BA-L AR-Z 94d/59, v.1, 80; v. 17, 2442.
720
Ibid, v.8, 680.
721
Ibid, v.1, 83, 90, v. 17, 2356. "For the period of the German occupation, one
can also assume a population of 20,000 to 25,000 people, of them about 7,200 to
7,500 Jews."
722
Ibid, v.1, 172.
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Jews fled to Lida.

Finally, as the military campaign continued, the refugee

population of the area continued to grow as Soviet-displaced persons were
driven west by the devastation of the advance.724
As an urban hub, the city contained important services including the
regional Gymnasium, "barracks, electric plants, mail and telephone offices, a
railway station, airport and hospitals." Industrial development proved
considerable and included a pair of mechanical equipment factories, "a nail
factory, saw mill, oil presses, a soap factory, a city abattoir" and a brewery.
Perhaps the most important industry, the "Ardal" galoshes factory, one of the
largest in Poland, ceased production for the duration of the German
occupation.725
By 1942, the civil administration in Lida presided over an indigenous
population over 250,000 people distributed over 7 Kreise and 32 communities.726
At the apex of the local German administration sat the Gebietskommissar. In
Lida, Hermann Hanweg held this post from late summer 1941 to spring 1944.
Among his other duties, Hanweg, as Gebietskommissar, enjoyed control of
regional police posts and substations. Directly under Hanweg was the Staff
Chief [Stabsleiter], "simultaneously Chief of the Division of Politics and
Nationality. In line with other RKO areas, the administrative structure in Lida
consisted of six divisions: Politics, Race, and Nationality (I), Economics and

723

Ibid, v.2, 4 3 7 .
Ibid.
725
Ibid, v.2, 327, v. 13, 1807. Initially, Lida supported two breweries but one was
destroyed in the fighting in 1941.
726
Agregate totals are derived from NARB 370/1/80.
724

industry (II), Labour (III), Administration, credit union, and taxes (IV), Forestry
and wood (V) and Agriculture (VI). Beneath this level was the indigenous
administration consisting of local mayors in cities and towns followed by local
leaders in smaller villages.
The administrative staff arrived in Lida by way of the OMi training facility
Ordensburg Krossinsee in Pomerania. Following this initial training, the German
staff began to arrive in their new posts in late summer-early fall 1941,727 The
most senior Lida staff including the Gebietskommissar, Staff Chief and Chief
Administrative Secretary arrived in September 1941 from Krossinsee via motor
car and established headquarters in the Gymnasium and living accommodations
nearby.728
After the initial deployment in later summer/fall 1941, the office of the civil
administration began to develop.729 As Staff Leader, Leopold Windisch
controlled the Politics Division. In this capacity, his power extended "over cultural
and religious matters, as well as propaganda (public relations)."730 The Labour
Department was created and controlled by an official named Cordes. Originally
sent to the east as an Army Administration Inspector with the Army Economic
Command in Minsk, Cordes was discharged from the Wehrmacht on 1 March

^ The civil administration sported yellow-brown uniforms that resembled
NSDAP and SA livery leading to the pointed nick-name "Goldfasane" (Golden
Pheasant). Additionally, neither insignia nor epaulettes adorned staff uniforms
expect for a lapel cord. Headdress consisted of the familiar NSDAP peaked cap
marked with rank designation and golden cord.
728
BA-L AR-Z 94d/59, v.2, 315.
729
In total the entire command supported about 40 Germans. See Ibid, v.1. 135.
730
Ibid, v.5, 783.

1942 to work as the Director of the Lida Work Office.

However, this

appointment proved short-lived as he was recalled to the Wehrmacht on 31 July
1942 and was replaced by Wittig.732
Even prior to the establishment of the Work Office, Gebietskommissariat
Lida possessed a Forestry and Wood Division. From 25 September 1941 to 2
July 1944, the division was under Kahler. Like Cordes, Kahler too came east as
an Army Administration Inspector of the Administrative Command Minsk. Kahler
remained in the army, again like Cordes, until early 1942. Beginning on 15
February 1942, he became "administratively part of the Gebiet administration as
a forester" in a department that employed both Germans and indigenous people.
Others in the administration included interpreter Eduard Ripper, forester Valentin
Kuczynski and Kahler's personal secretary Sophie Zakrczewska. Interestingly,
the division also employed a local academic, a gymnasium professor named
Kleindienst.733 Finally, the Agricultural Division maintained a staff of District
Agriculturalists stationed in towns throughout the region. In 1943, the Division
was under the direction of Edgar Germer. District Agriculturalists included Kipper
and Weber.734
Given that Lida was one of the first regions to be turned over to civil
administration, the area also served as a training ground. In January 1942, five
trainee administrators, intended for deployment in Polozk, arrived in the city for

Ibid, v.5, 788, v. 16,2320.
Ibid, v. 2, 421.
Ibid, v.1, 89, v.2, 62, v.5, 58, v.9. 301.
Ibid, v.2, 423, v. 7, 2357.

"on-the-job training."735 The group included expectant Gebietskommissar
Borman and his Chief of Staff Selzener.736 While active in the activities in the
area, the trainees held "no official positions there themselves." Ultimately,
Polozk was never established and remained under military administration for the
duration of the occupation.
Apart from the civil administration numerous other agency offices operated
in Lida. Perhaps the most significant was the military presence. Immediately in
the wake of the occupation, the Feld und Ortskommandatur (Field and Town
Command) Lida was established under the command of Ortskommandant Hptm.
Laudien. This agency maintained only a minimal presence of about 30 men.737
Initially, the Ortskommandatur headquartered next to the offices of the civil
administration in the Lida Post Office before transferring to a number of buildings
near the railway station.
As the first German agency to administer the area, the Ortskommandatur
undertook numerous organisational responsibilities beyond its purely military
tasks. Upon occupation, military administrators in the office appointed
Gemeinderate and issued new identity papers. Given the war damage in Lida
itself, a local workforce was engaged to rebuild "various buildings, particularly
barracks" and "built from scratch" other buildings and businesses and materiel
with materials abandoned by the retreating Soviet Army.738
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Ibid, v. 7, 1123, v. 14, 1946, v. 16, 2280.
The ironically named SA-Standartenfuhrer Borman was slated to be
Gebietskommissar of Polozk and Selzener, his Chief of Staff.
737
BA-L AR-Z 94d/59, v. 17, 2351, 2355, v. 18, 2550.
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Ibid, v.17, 2351 f, 2355, 2358.
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Beginning in mid-August 1941, area security was provided by 3rd
Battalion, Infantry Regiment 727 of the regular Army under Battalion Commander
Hauptmann Mayer. In place prior to the arrival of the civil administration, the
unit's headquarters was in the Lida Gymnasium.739 Component companies of
the battalion were stationed in outlying areas of the region. Under First
Lieutenant Amberg, 10th Company was "stationed in Ivje with the Company staff
and two squads"740 while First Lieutenant Kiefer's 12th Company resided in
Shchuchin.741 The deployment of an Army line unit lasted only until early spring
1942. On 13 March 1942, the entire unit transferred east to the Bobriusk region
and was replaced by a "part of the Security Brigade 2."742 This unit was
reinforced in summer 1942 by 3rd Battalion, 217 Reserve Infantry Regiment. This
unit in turn moved on to Mitau in early 1943.
The German military presence in Lida was not limited to combat or even
training forces. Coinciding with the establishment of the civil administration,
Sonderfuhrer [special operatives] of the Wehrmacht War Administration
Inspectors, formed throughout the Generalkommissariate including an office in
Lida. Charged with re-building local industries and economies, the Sonderfuhrer
were to regulate and supervise the renewed production and associated labour.
Part of the Army Administrative Command Minsk, this office acted as the catalyst
for re-starting area industry and as the training ground for future civil
administrators. In Lida, both Cordes and Kahler were initially assigned as
739
740
741
742

Ibid, v.8, 1163, 1169, 1186, v.9, 1299, v. 14, 1933, v. 23, 3157.
Ibid, v.8, 1176
Ibid, v.8, 1169, 1177, v. 10, 1354, 1357.
Ibid, v. 14, 1933, v. 18, 2484.
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Kriegsverwaltungsinspektoren Sonderfuhrer until spring 1942. Agricultural
Leaders "who came later" were also under the auspices of the Wehrmacht.743
Finally, Armament Command Minsk also maintained an outpost of three soldiers
in the Lida. This unit was to liaison between the military, the civil administration
and "local business engaged on Wehrmacht orders."744 Finally, the military
presence in the area was rounded out by the placement of a Luftwaffe Field
Construction Office at the Lida airfield. In the employ of the air force were at
least 50 Jewish forced labourers.745
With Lida's location on the rail lines, the Reich maintained a staff at the
train station consisting of the Director of the Railway Ministry, a station master,
depot officer and assistant.746 Given the overarching goal of spoliation, Lida also
contained a Zentralen Handelsgesellschaft Ost [ZHG] substation. Like other
ZHG stations, the Lida post was "charged with economic exploitation...and [was]
divided into several divisions in the economic and agricultural sector."747 Finally,
the area also included an Organisation Todt (OT) unit.
The city of Lida supported the headquarters of the "Police/ Gendarmerie
regional commander, in charge of all [types of] police in the Lida region."748
Significantly, this command "with only a few employees" shared offices with the
civil administration in the Lida Gymnasium building.749 The command of the local
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Ibid, v. 1, 307, 327, 362, v.5, 788, 805, 858.
Ibid, v. 19, 1371, v. 16, 2245.
lbid,v.20, 20, v.14, 1954.
Ibid, v.5, 782, v. 14. 1954, v. 18, 2540 , v. 19, 2653.
Ibid, v.1, 1, 106.
Ibid, v.14, 2007, v. 16, 2228, 2237, v. 18, 2560.
Ibid, v.16, 2235, v.16, 2292.

police proved unstable throughout the occupation. From its establishment in
October 1941 to April 1942, three different commanders led the Gendarmerie.750
Shortly after the May 1942 mass shootings, the third commander, Gendarmerie
Lieutenant von der Heide was replaced by Bez. Obit, of Gendarmerie Ueck as
police regional leader. However, von der Heide remained in Lida as Ueck's
assistant until he himself was replaced as regional police leader and reassigned
as assistant police regional leader.751
Organisationally, the Gebiet was policed by eight Gendarmerie posts: in
large part after the May 1942 mass shootings. Lida was divided into eight posts:
Lida, Ivje, Juraciski, Radun, Shchuchin, Vasiliski, Voronovo, and Zoludek.752
Additionally, outposts in hamlets, important estates, settlements, and militarily
important sites ensured some measure of police presence throughout the region.
Whatever the limitations placed on the civil administration's control of local
police forces, the Gebietskommissar did enjoy a qualified "power of
command."753 In Lida, rather than being disempowered, Hanweg maintained
substantial authority as "announcements and reports by the Gendarmerie posts
outside Lida did not go to the police regional leader, but directly to the
Gebietskommissar."754
While the position of Gendarmerie leader proved a precarious one,
command of the Lida Gendarmerie Post was considerably more stable.
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752
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Ibid, v.4, 688, v. 23, 3138-47.
Ibid, v. 18, 2559.
Ibid, v.1, 159, 190, v.2, 237, 239, v.3, 609, 611, v.20, 2768, v.21, 2894.
Haberer, "German Police", 20-1.
BA-L AR-Z 94d/59, v. 18, 2560.
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Established in October 1941, the post remained under the control of Riedel until
1944. The post was also responsible for the administration of the local jail out of
which investigations were undertaken.755
Sporting grey-green uniforms (with brown sleeve trim), on average 5-15
Germans officers manned a Gendarmerie post with the assistance of 15-80
indigenous Hilfswillige or Schutzmanner.756 Locally recruited, trained and
commanded, the Lida auxiliary police was made up primarily of Belorussians,
Ukrainians, Poles, and a lesser number of Lithuanians and Latvians.757 While
initially distinguishable only by a white armband, over time Schutzmanner were
outfitted in second hand black SS-uniforms with black kepi and brown collar and
sleeve appliques.
Such local Hilfswillige were not the only indigenous units stationed in the
area. Until March 1942, a German staffed Lithuanian Battalion under 3rd
Battalion, Infantry Regiment 727 was tasked with "security jobs."758 Further, not
all non-German units were raised and deployed locally. In Lida, two Lithuanian
Schutzmannschafts Battalions, similar to the Lida based Motorized Gendarmerie
Platoon 13, were intended as mobile supplementary forces. As a result, these
formations were directly under the SS-and Polizeifuhrer\n Minsk rather than the
Lida Gendarmerie regional leader.759
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Ibid, v.1,3, v.4, 773, v. 16, 2234, v. 10, 1345 v. 16, 2235.
Ibid, v.4, 773, v.5, 795, v.9, 1312, v.10, 1345, v.12, 1675, v.16, 2236.
Ibid, v.4, 670.
Ibid, v.1, 53, v.4, 675, v.10, 1403.
Ibid, v. 5, 867.

Over the duration of the occupation, in total, 200 Germans were deployed.
Perhaps more striking was the nature of the deployment. Rather than continual
policing or security duties, the majority of these German were deployed to secure
the 1943 spring harvest.
In early July 1944, the civil administration in Lida evacuated their post in
the face of Soviet advances. Having occupied the area for less than three years,
the Gebietskommissar and his staff failed to complete most of their efforts at
colonial re-organization. For most of these tasks, there simply were not enough
personnel or time. However, in other respects, such as demographic
"restructuring", they proved lethally efficient and highly successful.
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Appendix III
The Civil Administration in WeiBruthenien, 1942
Generalkommissar KUBE
Minsk

Hauptkommissar FENZ
Baranowitsche

Hauptkommissar EGER
Minsk

HANWEG
Lida

HACHMANN
Glebokie

ERREN
Slonim

SCHMIDT
Wilejka

TRAUB
Novogrodek

KAISER
Minsk-Land

MULLER
Hansewicze
WERNER
Baranowitsche

JANETZKE
Minsk Stadt
BAUER
Borissow

Appendix IV
Departments of the Gebietskommissariat in WeiRruthenien, 1941-1944

Gebietskommissar

Politics, Race and Nationality

r

L.

Economics and Industry

III. Labour

IV. Administration and Taxation

V. Forestry

VI. Agriculture

Source: BA-L 94d/59 v. 1,80.

Appendix V: Maps
German Administration in the Occupied East, 1941
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German Administration in the Occupied East, 1942
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